Athens , 13 December 2009

Mr. Pollatos: You expressed your satisfaction with the text of the conclusions on Turkey’s course. Is the fact that Turkey “got round” the evaluation without any substantial sanctions a success?

Mr. Droutsas: Turkey did not get round the evaluation, and this is apparent from its reactions and protests – as well as those of the countries that support Turkey. We managed to get some very important wording into the Conclusions. We removed the very dangerous reference to the effect that bilateral relations should not hinder the accession process, we established the right of the Republic of Cyprus and any other member state to block the opening of chapters. We introduced for the first time a reference to the International Law of the Sea, which is of vital importance to us. With Greece’s full support, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus announced that the chapters concerning the implementation of the Protocol on the Customs Union will not open if Ankara does not comply. The time of concessions that we had in recent years has ended. Things have been put in their proper perspective again, and in fact this was despite our point of departure being a difficult one, without the necessary preparations on the part of the New Democracy government, and with the country’s international prestige at a low ebb due to the oversights and absence of Mr. Karamanlis. Greece’s foreign policy objectives do not change. But there is a clear change in the manner in which they are pursued. Greece has clear positions on all of the issues that are of concern to it. Greece has confidence. It has to be confident. With these positions and this confidence, we are facing every challenge. And we will not allow anyone – here at home or even abroad – to undermine this confidence.

Mr. Pollatos: We are hearing criticism to the effect that the General Affairs Council’s evaluation of Turkey was a pretence and that the 27 ignored the terms and conditions that they themselves had set. Isn’t the status of the EU itself compromised by the flagrant paradox of Turkey’s not recognizing a member of the very club it wants to join?

Mr. Droutsas: I will put by the language of diplomacy for a little so that I can describe the situation I experienced at the Council this week. A Minister from a major European country – one which traditionally looks askance and to the west – fought in the discussion on FYROM to convince the majority of member states, who support our country, that we have to safeguard the credibility of the European Commission, which proposed the opening of accession negotiations with FYROM. Let me remind you here that the governments – and not the bureaucracy of the Commission – are responsible for the relevant decisions. Later, the same Minister opposed my argument that if the Council – that is, the governments of the 27 – close their eyes to Turkey’s non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, then the 2006 decision calling on Turkey to change its stance would be rendered scrap-paper, along with the credibility of the Union itself. Yes, Mr. Pollatos. I don’t hesitate to say it. But this is the pitch we are playing on. This is the reality of the situation. And we have to get results on this pitch. And I say that this week we got a good result.

Mr. Pollatos: From the ongoing contacts you have had recently with your counterparts, do you see Turkey as having a place in the EU? Can united Europe bear an ‘imperial’ Turkey that – despite being a candidate – tries to impose its own terms on its judges?

Mr. Droutsas: Turkey has a place in the EU. But not the Turkey of today. Not the Turkey that plays with the idea of its Ottoman past. The time for empires is past. It is now the time of the European future. Greece is offering this future to its neighbours. This is the future we want to offer to Turkey; to the Turkey that will change, that will adapt to the times and meet the criteria, fully respect good neighbourly relations, the sovereign rights of its neighbours, international law.

A careful observer will discern many insecurities, shortfalls and weaknesses in Turkey, and this often translates into easy declarations. Turkey still has a lot of ground to cover on its approach to European democracies. The re-establishment of relations with Armenia or the opening to the Kurds, for example: We heard bold declarations, but we have seen limited progress in practice. We are dismayed at the fact that the members of the minorities in Turkey continue to be treated as second-class citizens. What happened to the Greek minority in Istanbul, on Imvros, on Tenedos? If one wants to teach Greek in Turkey in 2009, one has to get a permit from the Turkish Cabinet. Is this possible? We hear about religious freedoms, but all of the religious communities are facing serious problems. These issues have been resolved in Europe. Until such time as Turkey musters the courage to take the necessary steps – to the benefit, in the end, of its own society – its European course will meet with obstacles. We will help Turkey, but first Turkey will have to help itself.

Mr. Pollatos: Do you think there is ground for referring the Greek-Turkish disputes to The Hague? How would you reply to the official Turkish proposal for adopting a code of conduct in the Aegean?

Mr. Droutsas: There isn’t one today. We want to give new momentum to the exploratory talks. To improve the two countries’ relations. You ask me about a “code of conduct”. We have no problem with discussing anything, provided it in no way compromises Greece’s sovereign rights. Obviously, we will not bend on this. So that there should be no misunderstandings, let’s clarify it: At this time there is no such discussion. But the best code of conduct is good conduct; for Turkey to stop violating international law.

As regards the settlement of the matter of delimitation of the continental shelf of the two countries, the solution is right before us. There is no need for major philosophy. 160 countries have ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The rules it codifies were already common law. This is a universal convention that, sooner or later, Turkey will have to adopt. And following this recent Council in Brussels, this has been set down for the first time in an official Council text with regard to Turkey.

Mr. Pollatos: There are many who wonder: Why is the government supporting Turkey’s European course when Turkey has an occupation force in Cyprus?

Mr. Droutsas: We are not issuing a blank check. For Turkey to become a member of the EU, it will have to stop being an occupation force. Greece’s government, like the government of the Republic of Cyprus, supports Turkey’s European course on the condition that – among other things – a solution be found on the Cyprus issue. That is why the negotiations are taking place in Cyprus, on the initiative of President Christofias. We support this effort within the framework of the United Nations with all our power. We are supporting the Cypriot government in action, not in words. We want a Cypriot solution that comes from the Cypriots and will serve the Cypriot people as a whole – Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots – in the environment of security provided by the European family. A solution based on the resolutions of the UN; a solution that respects the Community acquis. In today’s Europe, there is no room for occupation forces.

Mr. Pollatos: What is your assessment of Erdogan’s proposal for a quadrilateral conference on the Cyprus issue by March 2010?

Mr. Droutsas: I don’t think Mr. Erdogan’s proposal is aimed at acceleration of or progress in the negotiations, but at upgrading the illegal occupation administration. There is a process under the United Nations. The talks between President Christofias and Mr. Talat are in progress. This is the only process that guarantees a solution will be reached. And this is the process we have to throw all our weight behind. Turkey has the power and influence to provide the dynamic that the Turkish Cypriot leader needs in order to come to the negotiations in a genuinely constructive spirit. So that we can see tangible progress. Turkey just needs to decide to do so.

Mr. Pollatos: What is the Pasok government’s red line on the FYROM issue? Might it accept “Makedonski” as far as language is concerned, as the former Foreign Minister was allegedly discussing?

Mr. Droutsas: There is but one red line, Mr. Pollatos, and it is the national red line: a name with a geographical qualifier, for use in relation to everyone (erga omnes). It was Pasok that, as the opposition party, drew this red line. We formulated it, and the vast majority of the political forces stood with us in the Hellenic Parliament. This is what is important, and this is what we must focus our attention on: that Greece, today, has succeeded in having a clear national line. This gives us strength; we are united in a single voice.

Nothing else should be discussed. In 2005, Mr. Nimetz should not have introduced other issues into his proposals, and it was even worse that Mr. Karamanlis’s government agreed to discuss them. This discussion serves only the purposes of Mr. Gruevski, so that he can hinder the progress of the negotiations under the UN and the achievement of a solution. Mr. Gruevski is trying to monopolize the name Macedonia – with an irredentist outlook – and appropriate an historical past that does not belong to him. So I say to you, clearly: Macedonian identity is part of the identity of every Greek. We will not negotiate this. And it is good for this to be heard not only in Skopje, but also in New York and anywhere else it needs to be heard.

Mr. Pollatos: Does the solution of the name issue have to be for use in relation to everyone, with a change in the FYROM constitution, or need it only concern international use?

Mr. Droutsas: I will say one thing about the issue of the Constitution. We will not allow the final name – when it is agreed upon – not to be set down in full, effectively and in an absolutely binding manner. We will insist on its full implementation, in relation to everyone. We will not allow even the slightest lack of clarity. For Greece, the absolute effectiveness of its erga omnes implementation is the issue. If this means amendment of the Constitution, we will insist.