Ms. Adam: The chances are that next week you will begin a tour of the Balkans aimed at the completion of the European perspective of the Western Balkans in 2014. Do you really see this as a realistic date? I mean, do you think that within the next four years the FYROM name issue will have been resolved and that – for example – the Netherlands’ objections to Serbian membership in the EU will be overcome? And, in the final analysis, what will you do on the Kosovo issue? Is this target date perhaps a little too optimistic?

Mr. Droutsas: It is imperative for the new Greek government to once again implement a dynamic foreign policy of initiatives so that we can use this presence – the weight that Greece should and does have – in our own interests in foreign policy, and of course in our economic policy as well.

The Balkans are our immediate neighborhood; our immediate priority. Greece can and must play a leading role, as it did from 1999 to 2004. We want to throw our weight behind this region and the promotion of the EU accession courses of all the countries of Southeast Europe. We want to be the motor force – as we have often said – behind the European accession courses of these countries.

I want to make it clear that this proposal is a purely political proposal. In the recent past, during Greece’s 2003 EU Presidency, we agreed on the Thessaloniki strategy, which gave these countries their first specific accession perspective.

The Thessaloniki strategy is still the main point of reference for European Union policy on the region of Southeast Europe. But over the past 5 years, I would say that we have seen the momentum of this strategy flag for a number of reasons, particularly because many EU member states – as well as public opinion in those member states – are cautious about any further enlargement of the European Union.

We chose a date by which these states would be able to prepare adequately and meet all the obligations and criteria for their accession.

There is symbolism in 2014 – 100 years after the outbreak of World War I. And the roots of all of the problems we are facing even today in our region can be traced back to 1914.

The European Union is the most successful peace project we have ever known. So the European Union must once again step up to its responsibilities and promote the accession course of this region in order to create – to contribute towards – peace and stability in this region. And we hope that in this way the pending issues that exist in our region can be worked out – can be resolved.

Ms. Adam: Is Kosovo included in this enlargement?

Mr. Droutsas: Greece’s position on Kosovo is clear and well known, and I want to stress that precisely such thoughts and proposals – the accession of the whole region to the European Union – could contribute effectively to resolving problems and closing wounds like that of Kosovo.

On the Kosovo issue, we heard the voice of the U.S. very loudly. We heard the voice of Russia very loudly.

What we barely heard at all was the voice of the European Union, which – and I say this in all frankness – once again unfortunately lost an opportunity to take its responsibilities; its responsibilities for a region that is an integral part of Europe.

Ms. Adam: On the subject of 2014, do you think this target-date includes the full accession of Turkey, as well?

Mr. Droutsas: As you know, Greece was among the countries that, in 1999, contributed decisively to the opening of Turkey’s European course, and we continue to support Turkey’s European course. In fact, we have said very clearly that we see no alternative to Turkey’s full accession to the European Union.

But at the same time, we always stress that in order for this to happen, Turkey needs to meet all the obligations it has undertaken to the European Union and its member states. Turkey certainly has a long way to go. I don’t think it would help for one to talk about a given date.

The matter is in Turkey’s hands. Turkey needs to carry out the necessary reforms internally, but in the same way it has to fully respect international law; fully respect Greece’s territorial integrity; respect human and minority rights, including, of course, the rights of the Greek minority in Turkey.

Turkey needs to respect religious rights, and I am referring in particular here to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. It needs to cooperate effectively on confronting illegal migration; to contribute constructively to the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Turkey needs to have good neighbourly relations with everyone. It needs to look at its relations with the Republic of Cyprus – because this has to do with an upcoming date: the December European Council – and implement the customs union protocol with the Republic of Cyprus.

That is a pretty long list. It is a long road. It is up to Turkey to get to the end of that road.

Ms. Adam: Turkey will be evaluated by the 27 in December. I have to point out that both you and the Prime Minister refer in your statements to the “rigorous and objective evaluation” of Turkey, but you don’t mention “sanctions”. But the margins have narrowed. Ankara is saying everywhere that it will not implement the protocol. In lieu of any other answer, Athens refers repeatedly to the “new roadmap for Turkey to the EU,” creating the impression that deep down the government would like for Turkey to be allowed past the December stumbling block.

Mr. Droutsas: I think that the phrase “Turkey will be evaluated objectively but rigorously” says it all and is in no way unclear. There is a course to the European Council in December. I think that it would be neither serious nor constructive on our part to presume anything about this course before December.

Everything is on the table. Everything is being examined seriously one more time. The result is in Turkey’s hands. It is Turkey that will be called upon to show what it has done up until that time, and based on what it has done, corresponding decisions will be made in December.

Ms. Adam: The diplomatic arsenal at the disposal of Athens and Nicosia is fairly visible. From full freezing of Turkey’s accession course, to the softer version of freezing more chapters in the negotiations. Do you see a third alternative process? Is there a third alternative in the works?

Mr. Droutsas: You have a very extensive knowledge of these issues, and of course it would be very tempting for me right now to enter into an interesting discussion of all of these issues. But once again, at this stage I will stop at saying that Turkey will be evaluated rigorously and objectively in December.

Ms. Adam: What exactly does the government mean when it says that it wants a new EU roadmap for Turkey? And when will it start? In December, after December, in April, after April? In June? When?

Mr. Droutsas: There is, of course, a roadmap for Turkey. It started in 1999 with the Helsinki decisions, with the philosophy that issues of interest to us, as well, have now become European, so that Turkey should come up against them on its accession course. What we see is that the pressure exerted by the EU has ebbed of late.

It is our impression that this pressure has weakened for an additional reason: because there are now some voices in the European Union proposing alternative routes to Turkey’s full accession.

I am referring here to thoughts about a special relationship, a privileged relationship – as it is called – between the European Union and Turkey. On the one hand, this deprives certain member states of the will to exert a lot of pressure on Turkey. On the other hand, it deprives Turkey itself of an incentive to make the necessary moves.

Ms. Adam: Just to rephrase that, one side of the roadmap is minimization of the probability of a special relationship, which according to some puts great pressure on Turkey. And the other side is to magnify the pressure exerted by member states on Turkey to meet its European obligations – including recognition of a member state, Cyprus, and implementation of good neighbourly relations with Greece, abandoning, for example, its military-political conduct of violations in the Aegean. How will you do this?

Mr. Droutsas: I come back to what I said before: when we launched this course in 1999, in Helsinki, we created a specific momentum that, as I said, has unfortunately flagged for various reasons. It is precisely this momentum that we want to bring back, bearing in mind, of course, that conditions have changed in certain sectors, that other voices have emerged in the EU; voices expressing different thinking. But I think it is worth our trying this policy again – to bring it back to the point where we had it a few years ago, after which it unfortunately lost momentum.

Ms. Adam: The Helsinki roadmap concerned bilateral issues. Do you see the Helsinki of 1999 being carried over to 2010 within a Euro-Turkish framework?

For example, the Helsinki decisions said that the two countries would have recourse to the Court in The Hague on the issue of the continental shelf and related issues. What are those?

Moreover, if you agree jointly to refer the dispute to arbitration in The Hague, will we go with 12 nautical miles of territorial waters, 6 nautical miles or something else?

Mr. Droutsas: The goal remains the resolution of the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf, on which we have said in the past, and still say now, that this issue can be resolved in the best manner at the International Court in The Hague.

This is a matter that we will pursue. And as you rightly said, the Helsinki decisions put forward a timeframe, a deadline, and Turkey also accepted this; i.e., to take this issue, with Greece, to the International Court in The Hague.

Unfortunately, the policy of the previous government was not to capitalise on this opportunity. We will work again in this direction. Our goal is for this issue – the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf – to be resolved, and it is in this direction that we will move, also capitalizing on Turkey’s EU accession course and the leverage we have to create pressure there.

Ms. Adam: So I am forced to repeat the question: If you agree with Turkey to jointly refer the dispute to arbitration in The Hague, will we go with 12 nautical miles of territorial waters, 6 nautical miles or something else?

Mr. Droutsas: I think that Greece’s position is clear on this, as it is on all issues. Greece has the right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles, in accordance with international law and the Law of the Sea.

Ms. Adam: In his letter to the Prime Minister, Mr. Erdogan shows that he wants to hasten his visit to Athens. Does the government intend to respond to Mr. Erdogan? Will you invite him before or after the December summit?

Mr. Droutsas: We interpret Mr. Erdogan’s letter positively, i.e., that it is the expressed will of Turkey, of the Prime Minister himself, that they want to follow this path of cooperation that we want to open once again with Turkey. This response is a positive indication, I think.

There will, of course, be a relevant reply by the Greek Prime Minister to this letter in the coming days.

We are preparing ourselves seriously, we are examining all issues seriously and take the time needed, we are not in a hurry.

I’ve said this in the past: haste makes waste. Greece wants this cooperation, but any cooperation has its preconditions, requires the right preparation. We are not in a hurry; I stress that it is the other side, it is Turkey that should show tangible proof; it is Turkey that has undertaken certain obligations, because you also mentioned the December date, vis-a-vis the European Union.

So if Turkey is ready to show tangible actions with regard to the implementation of its obligations, we will be the first to look at such moves with satisfaction.

As for the timing of such a meeting or even a visit by Mr. Erdogan to Greece, this is a matter to be examined when the time is ripe, when such a visit truly has a meaning, in order to be able to produce a certain outcome.

Ms. Adam: But this presupposes that the two sides will not waste their time in between and will intensify their bilateral contacts, at least in order to prepare such a meeting between the two Prime Ministers.

Mr. Droutsas: This is self-evident to us. We launched a Greek initiative. Our objective, as I said earlier, is cooperation with Turkey, particularly the delimitation of the continental shelf.

We are, of course, working systematically, and with all the necessary seriousness, towards the achievement of this goal, but, again, we are not in a hurry.

Ms. Adam: But at the moment, the repetition of a bilateral dialogue is done under an additional burden (apart from grey zones). At the moment, Turkey – vis-a-vis Greece and vis-a-vis the European Union – is in essence practically and systematically trying to cut off a broader region from the Aegean Sea, from Greek sovereignty, if not to strike off from the European Union a broader region of the Aegean, i.e. the region of Farmakonissi and Agathonissi. Will you perhaps set certain prerequisites?

Mr. Droutsas: Look, I think that we have been speaking and we will always speak in a clear manner – clear words are necessary and we are using clear words. The Prime Minister himself, during his recent visit to Istanbul, did not beat about the bush.

We cannot, we must not and we are not kidding ourselves, we have clearly and publicly told Turkey what the situation is, what Greece considers that Turkey should respect and what it should do, and this is precisely the framework within which we are making and we will be making any moves.

Ms. Adam: Are you perhaps planning a visit to Skopje in the coming period?

Mr. Droutsas: The Greek position is well known. With regard to Skopje’s accession perspective, to us, there cannot be an accession without the prior resolution of the name issue. Greece can and wants – provided that the name issue is resolved – to help Skopje at all levels, particularly with its European course, and as I have repeatedly said, the government looks at things with an open mind, examines them in all seriousness and looks into all the options.