Athens , 19 November 2008

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Good morning. Tomorrow, Thursday, at 12:00, Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis will give a welcome speech at an event being hosted by the Foreign Ministry’s Historical and Diplomatic Archive service, marking the publication of the book entitled "Grazzi on the Italian attack on Greece".

This is an important event, and academician Mr. Svolopoulos and Honorary Ambassador Mr. Pavlos Apostolidis will give talks on the publication. The event will also be attended by the grandson of the Italian Ambassador, and the event will be held at the Kranidiotis Amphitheatre. I've had the opportunity to take a look at this publication, and the information it contains is in fact exceptionally interesting.

Within the framework of Greece's upcoming OSCE Chairmanship, which starts this January, Ms. Bakoyannis will meet today at 12:30 with the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Mr. Soares.

On Thursday, 20 November, at 10:30, Ms. Bakoyannis will meet with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. Vollebaek.

On Friday, 21 November, Ms. Bakoyannis will meet at the Foreign Ministry with the OSCE Special Representative for combating trafficking in human beings, Ms. Eva Biaudet.

Also on Friday, at 11:30, Ms. Bakoyannis will speak at the International Trade Union Conference on combating forced labor and trafficking in persons, within the framework of the celebration of the 90^th anniversary of the founding of the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE). This event will take place at the Karatzas Mansion amphitheatre on Aiolou street. On the same day, at 13:00, Ms. Bakoyannis will meet with the Pakistani Ambassador to Athens.

Next week, the Foreign Minister will participate in the visits of the Presidents of China and the Republic of Cyprus to Athens.

Regarding Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Valinakis, today at 11:50 he will represent the Greek government at the wreath-laying ceremony of the President of Slovakia at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and he will also participate in Prime Minister Karamanlis’ talks with the Slovakian President, at 14:45.

On Friday, 21 November, Mr. Valinakis will address an international conference on "The Euro-Mediterranean dialogue – Accomplishments and Prospects", which is being organized by the Vice President of the European Parliament, Ms. Kratsa, the French Ambassador to Greece, and the Egyptian Ambassador to Greece. This event will take place at the offices of the European Parliament.

On Monday, 24 November, Mr. Valinakis will meet with the Hungarian Deputy Minister for European Affairs, and at 16:00 the same day, he will meet with the European Health Commissioner, Ms. Androulla Vassiliou.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Doukas will address the Greek-Arab economic forum today. At 16:00 today, he will meet with the President of the Association of Libyan Chambers of Commerce and the Vice President of the Saudi Arabian Chamber of Industry and Commerce.

And on Thursday, 20 November, at 11:00, Mr. Doukas will meet with the Iranian Ambassador to Athens.

Finally, as of tomorrow, the Information Department will communicate with the news media via e-mail, exclusively, rather than by fax.

Your questions, please.

Mr. Hadoulis: Today's Eleftherotypia featured an extensive report on the conditions under which Giorgos Kiliaris died. As the Ministry was involved in the issue with the Defense Ministry, I wanted to ask if you have any information regarding the precise circumstances of the accident. Because until now we didn't know -- we knew that it was an automobile accident.

And the extent to which Greece intends to hold Afghanistan responsible, as the article states that there was a major delay even at clinics that have been supported by Greek funding in the past.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll have to look at that information, and if there's anything specific to tell you, I will get back to you sometime today.

Regardless of that, I would like to remind you that the Greek government and the Foreign Ministry have in recent years shown particular sensitivity regarding the need to bolster the legal framework for protecting journalists covering crisis zones. Together with France, we pursued and achieved the passing of the first Security Council resolution on the protection of war correspondents, that is, journalists covering crisis and conflict zones.

This past September, in fact, on the margins of the proceedings of the UN General Assembly, in a follow-up to this Resolution – again, with France – for the first time there was a special discussion on this. That is: Following the adoption of Resolution 1738, how we can move ahead with the implementation of specific actions on the part of the UN.

Mr. Hadoulis: Regarding the accident, do you need our contact information, or will you tell us today?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I don’t have specific information on the accident right now. What I do know is that it was an automobile accident. Under very bad and difficult conditions, unfortunately we had the tragic death of Kiliaris.

Mr. Polatos: Do you know whether the crew of the Norwegian exploratory vessel Malene Ostervold has instructions to continue exploration of the Greek continental shelf? And a second question: Whether, within the framework of the demarches made last weekend to the Turkish side, the issue was raised of a moratorium on exploration, oil or geophysical, on a disputed continental shelf that has not been designated precisely.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start with your first question. What is the case with regard to the issuing of the relevant information on the exploration is that on the part of Turkey there was no NAVTEX notification of a deadline for the completion of exploration in the area they designated.

Beyond that, the Norwegian vessel – and mainly the company that owns the vessel – has been informed precisely of what section of the area designated by Turkey as the exploration area is on the Greek continental shelf, where, of course, Greece exercises sovereign rights, and no geophysical studies or exploration of any kind can be carried out without the permission of the coastal state, which in this specific case is Greece.

Since the withdrawal of the vessel, and up until this time, there has been no other development that I have any comment on. In any case, this vessel is now beyond the Greek continental shelf.

Regarding your second question, no, I have no information regarding other communications apart from those that were deemed necessary to handle the specific situation that arose in recent  days.

Mr. Vounatsos: Mr. Spokesman, will Greece continue to be bound by the Interim Accord with FYROM?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Given that there has been no withdrawal from the Interim Accord – Greece hasn’t withdrawn, and neither has the other side – the Interim Accord continues to be in effect. That’s one point. Beyond that, we will see what course the recent development at the ICJ take. We don’t need to say anything beyond the fact that proceedings were instituted with regard to a specific article of the Interim Accord.

Beyond that, Greece will set out its legal arguments at the Court.

Mr. Vounatsos: So you aren’t considering withdrawing from the Interim Accord.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: No, there is no such thought at this time. There never was on Greece’s part. Greece’s top priority has always been for the negotiation process to move ahead so that we can find a mutually acceptable solution on the name issue. Greece’s efforts, attention and choices have always been focused on this.

Beyond that, as I said, we had this development that you are aware of. Greece has already studied the basic axes of the strategy and tactics it will follow and that will unfold at the right time, in the right manner and at the right pace.

Greece is neither dragging its feet nor rushing ahead. It is in full control of the timing of its actions. And of course, within this framework, it has retained all its procedural options for optimum promotion of its position and protection of its interests.

Ms. Flores: Is there any chance that the Court will not take the case? That is, as far as I know, it has to take it, examine it, and say whether or not the process will begin. Is there?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: First of all, that concerns the moves that the Court itself will make. I cannot make presumptions or go into a discussion of this – its not advisable.

Beyond that, what will Greece’s position be? I will repeat what I just said: that Greece will submit its own case at the time and within the deadlines determined. Of course, we are keeping open all of the procedural options that are provided for and exist within the framework of the operation of the Court.

Mr. Fourlis: I would like to ask whether the latest proposal from Matthew Nimetz is considered by Greece to be a basis for negotiations.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The latest set of ideas was, as you know, the subject of study. These positions were communicated to Mr. Nimetz by Mr. Vassilakis at their recent meeting in London, and I will repeat once again the manner in which Greece is considering and confronting the specific set of ideas.

There are important dimensions of the Greek position that have been taken into account in the set of ideas, and at the same time there are a number of points that we deem to need clarification and changes. And there are of course also points that we reject.

That is Greece's overall position. With the necessary changes and adaptations, this proposal could gain momentum for resolution of the problem.

Mr. Fourlis: I'm not asking that. Let me make myself clear. I'm not asking whether it can be a basis for a solution, but whether it is a basis for negotiations. That is the question.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Greece has not rejected Mr. Nimetz's latest set of ideas.

Mr. Fourlis: Excuse me, but in that sense, Skopje hasn’t rejected it either.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Greece hasn’t rejected it and has submitted a series of points, as I said we consider that there are points in this proposal that take into serious account the key dimensions of the Greek position.

Mr. Fourlis: I didn't get an answer.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: If we say that there are key elements and that have been taken into account, you don't reject the proposal. You are there and discuss it.

Mr. Fourlis: Why won’t you say it?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: It’s obvious.

Mr. Fourlis: It isn't obvious. You haven't said it. I'm asking you to tell me something obvious. Fine, then tell me. Then why don't you say it?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I'm saying that Greece has not rejected it. It has made comments on it. It is a basis for discussion for Greece. But everything I mentioned is needed for it to become a basis for a solution.

Mr. Santamouris: Is there a Greek comment on the fact that the mediator had been informed of this move, and what conclusion do you draw as to what this move on the part of Skopje might mean or signify for the negotiations? That's one question.

The second is whether you have the impression that Skopje will stop at the allegations based upon just one article of the Accord, or will they go further.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Regarding the second question, you're asking me to make an appraisal of how the government in Skopje will move from here on in. I can make no appraisal of what they are thinking or what they might do.

Regarding your first question, Mr. Nimetz's announcement talked about his briefing following the institution of proceedings – just so there is no misunderstanding. There was no previous briefing some time ago suggesting that he knew, etc. He was informed on the same day, and after the proceedings had been instituted. Formally speaking, the same holds true for Greece. But essentially, I must say that Greece was aware that things were going in this direction, beyond the fact that we had been carrying out relevant analyses during the previous time; that is, since the end of last April. But beyond that, Greece found out formally with the actual institution of proceedings, and that is why the Greek reaction came when it had been officially disclosed by the Court that proceedings had been instituted.

Mr. Santamouris: I don't understand something. Was Greece informed before proceedings were instituted, or immediately following the institution of proceedings?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Greece knew. The initial official Greek reaction came when we were officially informed by the Court that proceedings had been instituted.

Mr. Kapoutsis: Mr. Spokesman, do you think there is a likelihood that the negotiations within the framework of the United Nations on the name issue will produce a result, some solution, while there is the pending matter of the proceedings instituted at the International Court of Justice?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: First of all, the judicial course of this case will run for a long time in court. This is clear. An initial assessment talks about a minimum of two years. Beyond that – beyond the minimum of two years – whether the case runs to three or four or five years depends completely on the conduct and procedural tactics of the involved parties.

As for the likely impact of this procedure on the negotiations, let me say that these are two separate processes. What is more, the Interim Accord does not allow for discussion or resolution of the name issue at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. There is a relevant provision in the Interim Accord. The name issue itself cannot be the subject to be addressed by the ICJ. That is clear.

The negotiation process exists. Mr. Nimetz has a mandate and will continue in the manner he sees fit to carry out his mandate. This is a reality. Of course, one should add here that for some time now the process has been in a kind of suspension as a result of the fact – and this is a reality – that one party, Skopje, does not have a negotiator. They have not designated a negotiator who will participate in the process.

For some months now, Skopje has either had more negotiators than it needs or none at all. We will see what happens with that as things develop.

For Greece, negotiations are continuing. We are in the negotiations. The Minister said this yesterday. There's nothing else for me to say. Whether it might impact the negotiations in terms of the general atmosphere remains to be seen.

Mr. Papathanasiou: Mr. Spokesman, it is clear that they are two separate processes: one on the name, and another being that of the proceedings instituted regarding the Interim Accord. But, given that the Court in The Hague is under UN jurisdiction, is it out of the question that at some point it might become – Mr. Nimetz might involve it – and it might become part of the discussion? That would impact the process, I mean.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The subject of the proceedings instituted concerns the implementation of a specific article of the Interim Accord. As I said, the negotiation process is separate. Within the framework of the mandate that has been designated for Mr. Nimetz regarding the main process, I don't see him coming and including substantial portions of a discussion that will take place at the Court. I don't think there is room for that to happen. That is, it is not allowed by his mandate.

It is something completely different. Negotiations are taking place on one issue, which is the designation of a definitive name. I don't think this will be impacted, or that Mr. Nimetz will let it be impacted by a process that will be running on a completely different issue.

Ms. Karasavva: Just out of curiosity I wanted to ask about the philosophy of the Greek government. It says that there were a number of cases in the past years where it had seen violations of the Interim Accord by Skopje. Why hasn't Greece instituted proceedings in The Hague all this time regarding such cases? And is it perhaps revising this stance now: that in the end it wasn't right not to have done so for so long?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start with a basic position. The Interim Accord has been violated by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, not Greece.

Second. The series of specific, tangible violations of a number of articles, fundamental articles of the Interim Accord, and I would add of the principle of the implementation of good neighborly relations, existed. Greece, as I had the opportunity to answer to the first question I was asked, has a specific purpose: to use all the potential given by the negotiations within the framework of the UN on the name, in order – because this is what we want – for us to reach a mutually acceptable solution on the name issue as soon as possible.

As our number one priority has from the outset been the resolution of the issue, we consciously avoided actions that would make difficult negotiations even more complex. Essentially, that is, creating parallel developments that would create additional causes of delays in the process.

This has been Greece's intention from the very beginning: A speedy and smooth development of the main activity, the negotiations on the name. And this is still our priority. But without a doubt there is a new development, and Greece will be there with its arguments, which I must say have been generously provided to us by the stance of our neighboring country for years now.

Mr. Athanasopoulos:  How can you be sure that Mr. Nimetz will not use the court proceedings, when in the past he has allowed various outside influences on the process? That's one question.

The second is whether you have any information on precisely what is happening with the Greek vessel in the piracy incident in Somalia.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I'll start with your second question. That has in fact been reported by international news agencies. From the brief research we carried out and the information we have, this information doesn't seem to have been confirmed.

Regarding your first question, I think and believe that the first priority, and the only priority, if you will, of the UN Secretary General's personal envoy to the negotiations is for the negotiations to move along as quickly as possible and produce results. I don't think that anybody – and I'm not talking about Mr. Nimetz now –any mediator in a negotiation process would themselves indirectly or directly look for ways to delay the carrying out of their mandate.

Mr. Spyropoulos: I would like you to comment, if you can, on the message sent by Talat to Christofias, to Cyprus, that if by the summer of 2009 it does not appear that the talks will lead to a solution on the Cyprus issue, then some moves will be made to lift the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and upgrade the pseudo-state. Thank you.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: If this is being disclosed as an intention of the Turkish Cypriot side, I have no particular comment to make, beyond the fact that it is a move that violates, if you will, the resolutions of the Security Council regarding what is really the case in Cyprus. That there is one recognized state, and one unrecognized state.

If this is a form of a warning/threat, it brings corresponding criticism upon itself. But I don't have a clear picture of the text. If it is a statement of intentions, as I said, there is a matter of the extent to which these intentions do or do not violate the resolutions of the Security Council.

I believe they do violate the resolutions, because it is clear that one state and one government is recognized. If it is a form of threat, then it is void of merit in and of itself.

Mr. Sourmelidis: I would like to ask whether the delimitation of the continental shelf that was given to the Norwegian company is also binding for any negotiations that take place in the future.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The data provided by Greece concerned – and I want to be clear on this, to avoid any misunderstanding – what Greece considers to be the Greek continental shelf as shown on the map, in the specific case of the continental shelf of the island of Kastelorizo – based on the convention of the law of the sea, islands have their own continental shelf – but only the part that concerned the area of exploration.

No comprehensive designation of the continental shelf was announced. We said that within the area of exploration, which in the view of Greece is the boundary of the Greek continental shelf.

And, of course, whatever is announced, is announced because Greece has nothing to hide with regard to where it considers both its land and sea boundaries to be, as well as the sea zones where it has sovereign rights.

Mr. Sourmelidis: Based on the specific territorial waters that we have today.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I answered that this designation was made only in the specific region included in the NAVTEX.

Mr. Fourlis: Apart from Norway. With regard to this section, which in your opinion comes out within the framework of NAVTEX, did you brief international organisations or just Norway on this section?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: With regard to the time period that we are referring to, the Norwegian government and the owner company of this particular vessel were briefed, as was the captain of the vessel, of course. During the time period that we have referred to these days.

Mr. Fourlis: (off microphone)

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I said “as was the captain, of course.” “Of course" refers to the captain.

Mr. Fourlis: (off microphone) Why just them?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I repeat, it concerns the time we are referring to, during the last few days, during this incident. This does not dictate what we will do from now on.

Mr. Kalaritis: Mr. Spokesman, the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus and former Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Alexander Downer, is reported to have been hired as a consultant for a British company set up by former MI6 agents, whose main task is to collect state information, which it then sells to companies before they make decisions. It sells them to multinational companies. This particular company was, in fact, accused in 2001 of hiring a German former secret agent to infiltrate environmental organisations on behalf of companies, such as Shell and BP. Doesn’t the fact that the UN’s special envoy is working for such a company that collects state information and sells it to multinational companies have an impact on his credibility in the role that the UN has entrusted him with?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Your question has been noted. I don’t have the information I need in order to take a stance.

Ms. Fryssa: My questions have to do with Kosovo and Bosnia. At the latest General Affairs Council, during the discussion on Kosovo, two of the countries that do not recognise it – i.e., Romania and Cyprus – asked for 6 points to be imposed on Pristina in order for the EULEX mission to be carried out. Greece, for its part, is on the side of those countries that are in favour of continuing to put pressure on Pristina. What can we expect from this move? Can you give us a comment? And a second question about Bosnia. In the discussion on the promotion of its Europeanisation plan, there were countries, including Greece, that asked for the abolition of the Dayton plan. Does this position comply with our firm support for Serbian positions?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I will start with the first point. Greece's moves have always made sure that a way out, a solution could be found, so that the EU mission could operate and be present in Kosovo, because we believe that this contributes substantially to stability in the region.

This 6-point plan – given that it seems that Serbia would be willing to accept it and has accepted it – is now a question of whether we will be able to move – through this six-point text – towards the implementation of the EULEX mission.

Greece will make all the necessary moves in order to put this mission into operation.

Now, with regard to your second question, it is very important for Bosnia to adopt its own pace, its own internal regulation and move forward. If there is a need for certain provisions of the Dayton Agreement to remain, that is up to them to decide. But our position is that Bosnia has to follow its course and destiny at a steady pace.

Mr. Santamouris: My question is whether, in your opinion, Mr. Nimetz’ stance has shifted – and in what direction – in his previous capacity as U.S. negotiator and then as the UN negotiator. And the second question is whether the case of the Norwegian vessel’s research is still open and this is why we are refraining from briefing international organisations. Thank you.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The form and time of notification of international organisations – and whether there will be such notification – will depend on the Ministry’s assessments. You put forward a logical point, i.e., wait until the conclusion of the explorations in order to have the full picture.

Now, with regard to Mr. Nimetz’ stance, I am not going to go into a discussion of how Mr. Nimetz carries out his mission. Everything is judged based on the results obtained, in any case.

Mr. Santamouris: I asked whether Greece sees a difference in Mr. Nimetz’ work between the time when he was the envoy of the United States and now that he is working for the United Nations.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: It is impossible for me to give you – within the briefing’s framework – a comprehensive comparative evaluation of Mr. Nimetz’ activities before and after 1995.

Mr. Santamouris: Accept it as a suggestion then, and not as a question.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: OK. I accept it as a suggestion.

Mr. Sourmelidis: Is the referee alright not? That’s what Mr. Santamouris is asking.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: He remains the referee.

Mr. Hadoulis: Coming back to the Skopje issue again, you said earlier that Greece hasn't violated the Interim Accord, right? Given that this article talks about Greece’s obligation not to obstruct FYROM’s accession to international organisations, why does Greece consider that it has not violated it following our veto?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Look, this is the position as I told you. Greece hasn’t violated the Interim Accord. I will not analyse all the arguments that support our position, as you may understand, now that we are facing a long process before the ICJ. What is said, is not said by chance. Be sure of that.

It is, in any event, a paradox that the neighbouring country is using its constitutional name in instituting proceedings at the Court – a UN body – to protect its provisional name, which it had never used within international organisations, as it should have.

Mr. Fourlis: Coming back to the issue of oil – and this vessel – I would like to ask what the Greek government's position is on the eventuality of oil being extracted. Whether the Greek government is thinking about it, is studying it, examining the eventuality of carrying out exploration similar to what the Norwegian ship is doing on behalf of Turkey. And what happened to the proposals that were put forward in the summer to the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Ministry’s leadership by those services that think our country should intensify its efforts in this direction?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Greece never carried out such research on its continental shelf as far as I remember. Beyond that, you are referring to memos or one of the many operational memos and analyses that the Foreign Ministry’s services and the services of other Ministries are required to carry out.

I cannot speak about the Greek government’s intentions and, all the more so, intentions that I am not aware of.

Mr. Caka: The crisis that has been deepening in the two countries, Greece and Skopje, is of concern to Albania and the region’s countries….

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Are you asking me if they are concerned about it or are you saying they are?

Mr. Caka: Whether the region’s countries are concerned, whether this is part of the problem, the fact that their EU accession process is delayed.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Greece has never said that. The matter of concern to Skopje and Athens is a matter on which – in Athens’ view – a mutually acceptable solution can be found. We never said anything about consequences for the course of other countries towards the European Union or NATO.

This was seen in our stance all this time at the discussions held within various organisations which states of the region such as Albania applied to join.

Mr. Caka: What I mean, Mr. Koumoutsakos, is that the European Union, instead of addressing the matter of these countries’ accession seriously, it is now more concerned about this crisis and the resolution of this issue.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I cannot make such an evaluation on what the EU is more concerned with, because what I see at the same time is that the process of other countries of the region coming closer to the European Union is moving forward and progressing smoothly.

I don’t see that the pending issue of determining our neighbouring country’s definitive name has influenced or that it has delayed in any way the progress of other countries in the region.

Mr. Pollatos: Earlier – obviously in answer to criticisms that it was through the media that you were informed about the proceedings – you said you knew. Could you explain to us how you knew, through what process, whether you perhaps tried to change Skopje's mind, etc. And another thing, if you could clarify what is finally going on. Are the negotiations and Skopje’s proceedings two separate things?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Totally separate.

Mr. Pollatos: If you allow me, I would like to complete my question. We are, you said, in a kind of suspension of negotiations, are the negotiations still going on? Are you OK with negotiating with a country that accuses you of not complying with what was agreed upon?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The negotiations are alive and the negotiating process is still there. Greece is there and it is taking part in it. I spoke about a kind of suspension that has come about because for a month now, and I am talking about this particular one month, one side hasn’t had a negotiator. It has not designated a negotiator.

So, when there is a negotiator missing, this has certain consequences. A process cannot continue smoothly when in negotiations between two parties, one of them is absent. This is what I was referring to. Beyond that, the negotiations exist as a process, they are alive and we will see what happens beyond that.

The two processes are distinct. One is a court case relating to a particular article of an agreement. The negotiations are taking place on a UN Security Council mandate on the basis of two of its Resolutions.

Thank you.