Athens, 20 November 2007

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: First of all, thank you for responding to the announcement of today's briefing – I know it was short notice. But it was concluded after phone calls I had with many of your colleagues right after we landed in Athens last night that we should meet.

Your colleagues and those of you who work here expressed the desire for a fuller briefing on this Greek initiative that was presented by the Foreign Minister at yesterday’s GAERC.

Though this is a briefing that is dedicated to this initiative, I would also like to give you a brief picture of the Foreign Minister's programme. On Thursday, 22 November, she will be in Bucharest, carrying out a working visit. She will meet with Romanian Prime Minister Mr. Popescu, the President of the Senate, and of course her Romanian counterpart, Mr. Cioroianu, as well as His Beatitude the Romanian Patriarch, Daniel I.

Items on the agenda will include Greek-Romanian bilateral relations, political dialogue, economic relations, etc., as well as issues of European interest, with emphasis on developments in the European Union – the Reform Treaty, enlargement, European Neighborhood Policy, energy policy – as well as issues of international interest, such as developments in the Western Balkans, with emphasis on Kosovo, the Black Sea, Romanian-Bulgarian-Greek trilateral relations. There will also be a discussion ahead of the NATO Summit Meeting, which, as you know, will be taking place in Bucharest.

On Monday, 26 November, the Foreign Minister is to host a luncheon in honour of Albanian President Mr. Bamir Topi, who will be on an official visit to Athens, at the invitation of the President of the Hellenic Republic, Mr. Karolos Papoulias.

That's it for the Minister's programme.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Valinakis is representing our country at the proceedings of the EU-ASEAN Summit Meeting, which is taking place in Singapore.

This is an annual Meeting, which coincides this year with the 30th anniversary of cooperation between the European Union and the countries of Southeast Asia. The proceedings of the Meeting will continue through Thursday, 22 November.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Doukas participated in yesterday's Meeting of EU Development Cooperation Ministers, within the framework of the GAERC, and that is continuing today.

That's it regarding the programmes of the Ministry's political leadership.

Now, regarding the Main subject of our meeting today. Yesterday, within the framework of the discussion on the developments in Kosovo that was held at the Council of Foreign Ministers, Greece, through Foreign Minister Ms. Bakoyannis, submitted to the EU Council of Ministers a specific and cohesive Greek proposal concerning the course of the relations between the countries of the Western Balkans and the European Union from here on in.

The time chosen to make this proposal was very specific. First of all, because, as you all know, the developments in Kosovo and corresponding developments expected in the region have created a certain amount of fluidity in the region. You are aware of the concerns that exist regarding the issue of Kosovo's future status.

And second, it has been ascertained, as set down in the recent European Commission reports and in Enlargement strategy texts, that a deceleration has been observed in the countries of the Western Balkans with regard to the necessary reforms and the adaptation of these countries to the prerequisites and criteria and, more generally, to the requirements of the European Union so that these countries can move ahead fast.

So Greece deemed that this moment is an important and critical moment for the region; that the European Union should send a clear, loud, practical message to the countries of the region so that a new momentum can be created -- and so that momentum is not lost -- and to re-lay, or rather strengthen, the foundations of these countries' hopes for moving ahead on their European course. The message that the European Union has not forgotten them and that their future is in this direction.

So we deemed it necessary to breathe new and necessary vitality into the accession processes and the processes for the adaptation of these countries to the European Union. A new vitality that has a goal; that is aimed at speeding up the pace of their approach to the European Union.

As you already know, as early as 2003, Greece presented, during its EU Presidency, a specific strategy for the European course of the Balkans, and this became the European Union's policy. We are entering a new phase, we are in a new, important phase, and that is why we consider that there must be new vitality, new momentum.

In media language you might say that we are talking about a "Thessaloniki 2" proposal from Greece.

The title of the texts that …

Mr. Kapoutsis: Could we explain that a little further?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I assume everyone knows about it, but we can recap here. In Thessaloniki, in 2003, the Greek EU Presidency at that time submitted a comprehensive strategic plan, with very specific stages, for the course of all of the Balkan countries towards the European Union.

This proposal and the Thessaloniki agenda became the basis for a specific and applied policy on the part of the European Union. At the current stage, this policy has not reached its limits, but it appears that at this time a new push is needed, and at this time, the critical moment for the Balkans, Greece is submitting a new set of ideas aimed precisely at breathing new life into to the European perspective, and that is the reason.

We might call this proposal that was submitted yesterday "Thessaloniki 2". The title of the proposal submitted yesterday is: "Need for ambitious decisions by the EU on the Western Balkans".

Now, regarding the contents of this proposal. There is a part setting out our thinking regarding the need for this proposal, which runs basically along the lines I just set out for you. And it repeats that our aim is to provide new enthusiasm and motivation for the necessary reforms for the people and the governments of the region, which risk losing their belief in and commitment to an accession that appears distant and even uncertain.

We need urgently to establish a sequence of policy steps that will send an unambiguous and indisputable message to all the countries in the region, that their European perspective is definitive.

This basic idea is elaborated in five specific proposals. 4+1, if you will, because four of them are specific steps and one is a reminder of the conditions under which we can move ahead to the next stage.

Within this framework, and as a first step, Greece believes that the EU should immediately sign Stabilization and Association Agreements with Serbia and, at the soonest possible time, with Bosnia-Herzegovina: the two countries remaining, within which internal problems have not permitted such a positive step so far.

The second step, which I would call encouragement to apply for accession candidacy, is as follows: In the first place, Serbia, followed by the rest of the countries that would have an SA Agreement but no candidate status, should be encouraged to apply for candidacy status in the EU.

The countries that have signed SAAs are Albania and Montenegro. Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have not signed, and we are saying that they should sign SAAs as soon as possible to enter into this process. For the countries that already have SAAs, as well as Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be encouraged to submit applications for accession.

The Commission could then present the avis on the application in the fall of 2008. The December European Council of 2008 could decide about granting candidate status to any applicant country.

I repeat, the two steps are: For countries that do not have SAAs to sign at the soonest possible time. For all of the countries that do not yet have candidate status to be encouraged by the European Union to submit accession applications, for these applications to be considered, and for candidate country status to be granted in December 2008. We're talking about speeding up the procedures.

After that, the third stage, which will be for accession negotiations to begin at some point, when they are candidate countries, and this is the 4+1 I mentioned. A date for the start of Accession negotiations will be decided later on, after December 2008, depending on the progress on the fulfilment of specific benchmarks that will be set.

Progress in the accession process will depend on each country's progress in meeting the specific requirements set by the EU, in full application of the principle of conditionality. I consider it a given that full respect for good neighbourly relations is among the principles and criteria that must be fulfilled for the accession process to begin.

But beyond that, which is a speeding up of the existing procedure, it was deemed appropriate and necessary for there to be something tangible for the specific countries, and that's where the fourth proposal comes in. In order to have, through the European perspective, the effect we desire, we should combine it with measures that would translate this perspective into something practical and tangible for the peoples of the region. Already, in Thessaloniki, we declared that we were aware of the importance the peoples and governments of the region attach to the perspective of liberalization of the visa regime. Following the visa facilitation agreements that we signed this year, the Greek proposal is saying that we should move from visa facilitation to visa liberalization. That is, the EU should now provide the countries of the region with a roadmap that could eventually lead to the visa liberalization. A series of concrete and measurable benchmarks and an outline of the necessary steps leading to visa liberalization. This is an issue that is very important to the peoples of the region.

The fifth proposal is to strengthen funding, as the European Union, for these countries. We consider this to be necessary. As a first step, within our actual budgetary obligations, we should make full use of the principle of flexibility in order to guarantee that any additional available funds will be directed to the region of the Western Balkans. Furthermore, and in light of the next financial perspectives, we should explore all possibilities that would allow a substantial increase of aid given by the European Union in an effort to meet the increasing needs and serve our own priorities in this sensitive region at this very delicate time.

I'll summarize the thinking behind these proposals. There are three specific proposals that concern speeding up of the process. Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina sign Stabilization and Association Agreements. All the countries with this status are encouraged by the European Union to submit accession applications. In the fall of 2008, the Commission assesses these applications and in December 2008 all of these countries gain candidate-country status.

When the actual accession negotiations begin will depend on the fulfilment of criteria, prerequisites, etc., so that the actual negotiations can begin. Just to make this clear and help you understand this, I point out that Turkey is in the midst of these negotiations.

Those are the proposals that concern speeding things up. But we also said that, because this will take time, at the same time there should be specific tangible measures that show these peoples that Europe is at their sides and understands their concerns and desires.

So the process of liberalization of the visa regime should also be sped up, via a roadmap, so that we can move from facilitation to liberalization. And the other reinforcement measure is funding. New funds and provision for even greater aid in the immediate and near future.

That is the overall proposal. It is a comprehensive and cohesive proposal for the region, submitted by Greece. It was very positively received yesterday at the Council, and by Commissioner Mr. Rehn, with a specific statement. And the current Presidency, Portugal, as well as the next Presidency, saw the Greek proposal as a very positive contribution. In fact, the Portuguese Presidency agreed, essentially proposing to send the discussion of the Greek proposal to the December Council.

So we see that a proposal that was submitted at what to our mind is the right time is going on for further discussion, elaboration or enrichment by the Council in December.

This is the proposal that Greece submitted. We believe that this initiative and the response that it has received thus far confirm the role that Greece has and the role that Greece can play in the region; a positive, reinforcing and pioneering role in the region’s European perspective. And this is a message to all the states in the region, to all of our neighboring countries. Greece has a well-known strategy and will persist with consistency and confidence that it is the right policy for the region.

As we've said in many instances, it is obvious that every policy for strengthening relations between the European Union and candidate or interested countries presupposes and requires corresponding, effective conduct on the part of these countries: the adoption of reforms and tangible respect for specific principles and values that determine and pervade the manner in which the European Union functions.

That’s what I wanted to say about the Greek proposal, regarding which I imagine there are questions you would like to ask. But before we get to that, two regions were discussed at yesterday’s Council. One was the Western Balkans, the other was the Middle East.

I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words regarding Greece’s policy on the region of the Middle East. It is without a doubt a region of particular interest to Greece. And this interest is even greater as we approach the upcoming international conference on the Middle East peace process.

Greece’s interest is not merely theoretical. It is not confined to declarations and stances, but is specific and is implemented. I remind you that this policy and interest on the part of Greece manifested itself during the crisis in Lebanon a year and a half ago.

Greece was among the first – if not the first – countries to contribute to the evacuation and transportation of people who wanted to leave the crisis area. Greece also contributed to the economic reconstruction of Lebanon, having made a commitment to provide €5 million towards the reconstruction of the country; a country critical to the stability of the region.

We participated in the Rome meeting on Lebanon. I think it was the first time Greece participated in an international conference on the region. As a member of the Security Council at the time, through active participation we helped to formulate – and I mean this – Security Council Resolution 1701 on Lebanon.

We participated from the very outset in UNIFIL, and we continue to participate there. We submitted proposals to the conference on the reconstruction of Iraq; we have made some proposals regarding economic assistance for Iraq. The great success of Greece’s policy on the region came during our Presidency of the Security Council: a debate on the whole region – not just the Palestinian problem, but with emphasis on the Palestinian problem – between Security Council foreign ministers. This was the first such debate in 20 years in the Security Council. And beyond these activities on a multilateral level, there were a number of bilateral and other meetings of the Foreign Minister and two tours of the Middle East and the countries of the region, including Syria.

Those were some of the elements discussed and that the Greek Foreign Minister contributed, along with other thoughts, regarding the situation in the Middle East during yesterdays broad discussion  within the framework of the Foreign Ministers’ luncheon.

We have discussed two of the most regions for Greek foreign policy – regions in our wider neighbourhood – and I am at your disposal to answer any questions you might have.

Ms. Karaviti: I wanted to ask, first of all, whether there was a consultation with interested countries prior to the submission of the proposal, whether we have any information on their response, and in particular with regard to Serbia, whether you consider that this can in any way impact the negotiations on Kosovo’s status.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The desire of these countries to move ahead quickly on their European course is a given fact. So with this proposal we are doing nothing other than responding to their stated will. I would just say that this process has the characteristics that I have mentioned, coinciding with concern for the region.

Your second question?

Ms. Karaviti: Do you have any information on the response …

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: No, we don’t. It was submitted yesterday. The immediate response, which was noted down within the Council, was the support and positive reception by the competent Commissioner, the two Presidencies and other member states. I think it is a very good start for an initiative that is being announced. Let me remind you that in a few days, the proposal will be discussed at the next GAERC at the level of Foreign Ministers, which is something we also regard as a positive token of the response to our proposal.

On Serbia, in relation to Kosovo. There is no connection. A German journalist asked me yesterday why the initiative was not presented only to Greek correspondents, but also to foreign media. Another of your German colleagues asked me if there is a connection between Greece’s position on the Kosovo issue or  developments on this issue, and this proposal. I want to be absolutely clear: There is no connection between the two. The proposal came as the result of an overall concern about the region. We make no direct or indirect linkage, this might be done by others. We believe that now the Balkans have to receive a particular, positive, practical message from the European Union.

Ms. Karasava: There is a standing demand that Serbia hand over wanted war criminals in order for the process to move ahead. Is Greece ignoring this demand by means of this proposal? That is, is it overlooking it or must these criminals be handed over before the start…

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: It is not overlooking it at all. We have repeatedly said that note must be taken of Serbia’s will to cooperate. As you know, there have been steps on the part of Serbia. You also know that the Stabilisation and Association Process with Serbia was frozen for a while. Then, the European Union itself relaunched the process a few months ago, liberalized it, and the process is now under way.

Therefore, with this proposal, we are completely within the European Union framework.

Besides, the Greek proposal would not have been well received if there were any concerns. There is a positive response from key players at the moment, from the two Presidencies, the Commission and many member states.

Mr. Kapoutsis: With Greece’s proposal – which seems to be very good – are we perhaps trying to sweeten the pill for the Serbs and keep Bosnia united, concurrently recognizing Kosovo’s independence, because the new Prime Minister, Mr. Hashim Thaci, has already stated that it is clear that after the conclusion of negotiations on 10 December, Kosovo will unilaterally declare its independence, a development that will by default cause broader unrest, and are we maybe making this – politically and diplomatically correct, in my view – move in order to be ahead of developments and give an alibi to the Serbs – to Serb powers – and keep Bosnia united, because Serbs want to leave, so as to ensure a mild stance and mild reaction on the part of Belgrade with regard to prospective developments in Kosovo.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: We are not sweetening the pill for anyone. The processes, the issues that are of concern in the region are well known. What Greece is aiming at through this proposal is to avoid this region of Europe passing once again into a state of “Balkan melancholy”; that this region is doomed to be away from Europe, face problems, be haunted by its problems, without any prospects, without hope. We believe that we need to try to avoid – we must try to find a way out of – this new period of “Balkan depression”; Giving the impetus with this proposal.

It is not sweetening the pill, it is aimed at keeping the region from falling into a state of counterproductive introversion once again, with few hopes for the future.

Ms. Tsaka: An Albanian President is to visit Greece for the first time, what does this entail for Greek-Albanian relations? I will move to the second question later on.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Your questions are always divided into two parts. I have to think when answering your first question what the next question will be. But coming to my answer now. It is clear, it is crystal clear, that any visit – not least a state visit by a Head of State, not least from a neighbouring state with which Greece has been cooperating, having friendly relations and functional bilateral economic, political, or other relations – is an important visit, even if it is only noted as an opportunity to promote and further strengthen Greek-Albanian relations.

Ms. Tsaka: Albanian President Mr. Bamir Topi is regarded as one of the most modern politicians on Albania’s political scene. Do you believe that his presence will help settle some differences; that is, a few problems that have kept the two countries’ relations hostage?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I see no hostages. There is no hostage. There is no need to free any hostages. The two countries' relations have multiple levels, they are complex. I was myself posted to Albania relatively recently, so I know how deep and broad Greek-Albanian relations are. With such broad relations it is, therefore, logical that there will be issues that need working on in order to move further ahead and obstacles to overcome – if there are any.

Such a visit at the level of heads of state aims – among other things – at confirming the positive course, and at helping to provide an impetus to aspects that need such a new impetus. The Greek side, of course – and I imagine the Albanian side, too – are expecting the best possible results from this meeting.

Mr. Spyropoulos: One last question if I may. As you said, you have put forward a proposal, according to which Albania, being one of these countries, will probably be a candidate state a year from now. What is due… (inaudible) …

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I think I explained the Greek proposal, its philosophy, its objectives, and its aims as clearly as I could. In our proposal, the part referring to Albania is the proposal for the European Union to encourage the countries that have already been given stabilisation status to apply for membership.

But the application for membership will be evaluated, as provided for in European Commission procedures, in order – as an ultimate direction – for these countries, including Albania, to be given candidate country status in December 2008.

Mr. Athanassopoulos: Two questions. The first relates to whether you could tell us anything more about what exactly the EU Foreign Ministers were thinking yesterday regarding the Kosovo issue. Because things are going from bad to worse.

I assume you are aware of the statements, etc. of the UK Minister of State for Europe. Apart from the well-wishing, that we still have three weeks left and possibly we have Mr. Ischinger's statements etc., does the European Union have some plan – if I can put it this way – on this issue?

And my second question is whether the Greek proposal – apart from taking into account all the well-known facts – also takes into consideration the upcoming Slovenian Presidency’s effort to appear much more active in the Balkans, essentially stealing our traditional role, in the sense that we are the oldest EU member state in the Balkans, and we essentially want to be a bit in the limelight. Thank you.

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: With regard to the first question: Given that we are precisely at the present stage with regard to Kosovo, just a few weeks before the date that has appeared as a deadline for the Troika’s efforts, the EU Foreign Ministers were particularly careful because it is precisely this stage that is crucial. Three weeks are three weeks.

In politics and diplomacy, as you know, it is circumstances that determine the importance of time. Two months might be an extremely long time, but it could also be a very short time. The same goes for weeks as well.

With regard to the European Union’s role, the European Union is known to have been preparing – depending on developments – to have a stabilizing presence in the region; a presence that the region needs and will need, and the Union is determined to play the role that it should, given that this issue is a European issue par excellence. It needs, of course, the appropriate legitimising basis.

Now, with regard to the upcoming Slovenian Presidency. Greece has submitted a contributory proposal. As is usually the case within the European Union, proposals and initiatives are not imposed. They are the subject of discussions and consultations; they are ideas that are submitted, assisting the upcoming Presidency’s work.

There is no question of competitiveness. Greece has a perception about the region. It has a particular take on the region. It has a knowledge of the region. It can have not only knowledge, but also insight. It has submitted these proposals, which, I believe, contribute to the discussion that everyone will have, and which the current Presidency will want to promote for the rest of its term, followed by the upcoming Presidency.

Greece has a particular role to play in the region, and it is carrying it out as best it can, involving and requesting the input of all the others and, first of all, its partners.  

Journalist: Mr. Spokesman, a question regarding the timing of this proposal. Given that following 10 December there will be certain developments, which could potentially spill over into other countries in the region, such as Skopje and Albania, what do you think would be the most appropriate time to start discussing this proposal, given that, from 10 December onward, there might be negative developments in some countries, which might be some of those that must…

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Ideally, yesterday. In reality, December. It’s not too late. It was put forward now precisely for the European Union to take it into account; to take it into consideration so that it can help avoid negative developments and promote positive ones. This is why the proposal was tabled.

This is the reasoning behind the Greek proposal.

Journalist: Does the Greek proposal include a deadline – is a deadline provided for with regard to accession negotiations, when, of course, we reach this point?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Look, efforts are concentrated on speeding things up, as I said. Not an acceleration in the sense of a blank cheque, but a substantial acceleration; substantial on the part of the European Union, and substantial on the part of interested countries.

The message that is being sent, if you will, is the following: “Hurry up, because if you do, we – the European Union – are willing and prepared to move ahead quickly. Your European perspective will not become entangled in bureaucratic or other processes more than it needs to. You will not go into a logic of inertia. Help us to help you. The sooner and more substantially you comply, the faster your progress will be.” There is an incentive. December 2008.

Beyond that, the time of the start of accession negotiations is very critical.  You understand, you remember, you know, how the issue of Turkey has moved on. The substance of the process, its difficulties, opportunities, preconditions. This is a different stage. We will discuss this at the appropriate time in the future.

What the region needs now is a real, visible incentive. “Hurry up, make serious progress, seriously face your future, because it is here.” The Greek proposal is, if you will, a multiplier of incentives.

Journalist: Do you, do we – as a country – consider that Serbia is willing to exchange Kosovo for its European hope?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: This is not even in the thinking of the Greek proposal. The Serbian government – Serbia – are evaluating the state of affairs and making their decisions. There was no thought of a “trade-off” between one or the other thing. To us, there is no linkage. I said this in answer to a previous question.

We are taking into account the situation in the region, the developing dynamics. But they are not linked, one does not depend upon the other.  

It is a political proposal of a political message. I told you so before. The region must not once again fall prey to a climate of Balkan pessimism, a “Balkan melancholy”. The Balkans have a European future, they can claim it. And this is what all leaderships should think about.

Greece has the insight, the will and the desire to help in this direction. It is a direction to the benefit of everyone.

Journalist: A question about Skopje. There was recently a draft resolution of the US House of Representatives, which 1/4 of the House’s members voted in favour of, calling upon Skopje to take the necessary actions and make the necessary reforms so as not to have any problems on the name issue and with regard to good neighbourly relations with Greece. Do you have a comment on this and do we have, or do you know, anything more on Mr. Burns’ visit to Greece, with regard to negotiations?

Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I will start with the issue of Mr. Burns’ visit. I have no information on that.

With regard to the first question, there is indeed such a resolution with the characteristics that you mentioned. We see that the Greek concern, Greek observations, are welcomed even in countries with a specific policy, such as the United States; a country that has recognised FYROM under its constitutional name. And indeed this text has been signed by 101 people to date.

To draw a comparison, I would like to say that this is the only Congressional resolution on foreign policy matters that has exceeded the barrier of 100 signatures. There are also some interesting statistics.

This was tabled in March, when it was open to other signatures of support. Immediately after the – not so positive, if not negative – official and public reaction on the part of Skopje to Mr. Nimetz’s set of ideas – irrespective of the form which it later took on – this text was signed by 16 members of the House of Representatives. Just to point out the coincidences, eight more members signed it following Mr. Burns’ appearance before the competent Committee with regard to other issues as well, but also with regard to the issues of FYROM’s course and the name.

Thank you very much.