JOURNALIST: Mr. Minister, thank you for
\nbeing kind enough to join us for this conversation\/interview, and we are
\n taping this on Friday morning, and just a few hours ago there was what I
\n think, at least, was a major incident at Farmakonisi. Let's start with
\nthat. What is your take on it? Whether it is an escalation and whether
\nit gives you cause for concern.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Look. Turkey is always being
\n monitored very closely by the Services and by me, personally, and I
\nthink by you, too, as journalists -- and you, as a prominent journalist
\n-- as well as by us, as politicians at the Foreign Ministry. We have
\nmany reasons to think about what Turkey is doing. As you know, for a
\nyear and a half now I have characterized Turkey as a restless power. A
\npower, that, like 19th-century, post-Bismarck Germany, which became
\nrestless and didn't maintain equilibrium in its region. It appears that
\nthere are some people in Turkey who think that Greece could be a Syria
\nor an Iraq. I want to take the opportunity of this interview -- as you
\nknow, I rarely give interviews -- to say that they should think twice
\nabout playing such games. That is, the game that took place at
\nFarmakonisi isn't a game. It is a serious violation of international
\nlaw, and I think they should know that we will not always show the same
\ntolerance and our response will not be just the one we gave. It will be
\nmuch tougher.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Earlier we had the so-called tour of Imia by the Chief of the Turkish national defence general staff.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Not of Imia. In the Imia area. He didn't dare do it. This is good.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: But they were in our territorial waters.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: He wanted to go ashore on Imia, but he didn't. In that sense.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: You believe he wanted to go ashore ...<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: They always like a stroll on the Greek territory. The aromas of Greek soil are always alluring.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: What would the response have been if they had gone ashore?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: They wouldn't have been able
\n to, because we have taken the necessary measures. As I say, Turkey is a
\n restless power, and this implies that we are protecting Greek territory
\n with much greater care than was the case in the past. And Turkey is
\nmaking a mistake. It thinks that, because we are going through an
\neconomic crisis, we are weak with regard to safeguarding the country's
\nsecurity. They're making a big mistake. It is because we have economic
\nproblems that we are taking greater care than in the past of our
\ncountry's security and sovereignty.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Do you think there is some
\nmanual, based on which they are proceeding? They do something at
\nFarmakonisi, then they will do something else?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I don't think Turkey always
\nhas a formulated strategy in place for every move it makes. But I do
\nthink that it has a basic underlying thinking regarding how it will
\ntransform the Aegean into a grey area and then how it will lay claims to
\n that grey area. These are the two steps it wants to take. But often,
\nthe incidents we see in the Aegean or the violations on the part of
\nTurkey are carried out on the initiative of local officials. It is no
\ncoincidence that the high-ranking coast guard officers arrested after
\nthe failed coup attempt last summer had, in their majority, induced
\nincidents in the Aegean in the previous months. Now Turkey has it in
\nmind to trigger incidents at Panagitsa, close to Oinousses, that is. It
\nrealised a few days ago that it couldn't do it there, and then it tried
\nto respond somewhere else.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Do you share the theory
\nsaying that, because we held the exercise at Panagitsa, they responded
\nby doing this at Farmakonisi, and that this will escalate?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I don't think there needs to
\n be an escalation. Nor can the exercise of our sovereign rights be
\nequated with the other side's violation of international law.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: I recall that at some point
\nthere was a lot of tension on the part of the Turks regarding statements
\n made by the defence minister, who did in fact make some tough
\nstatements, that \"the Turkish army is useless\". What is your opinion on
\nthese statements?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I think the positive thing
\nwe had last week, before I went on my most recent trips, was that the
\nGreek side and the Greek Defence Minister did not respond to these
\npersonal attacks by Turkey. Because the key players in Turkey have to
\nrealise that personal attacks and the attempt to belittle a minister of
\nthe government of the other side can't be taken seriously by anyone, but
\n will only be read, even by their own public opinion, as knee jerk
\nreactions. In international relations we don't talk in the way the Turks
\n talk about the Greek minister of defence. And the minister of national
\ndefence did well not to respond to them. I want to put this down under
\nthe very positive developments last week.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: I will ask so that we can be
\n clear on this. Are you in full agreement and consultation with the
\nminister of defence ...<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Whenever necessary, we are definitely in full alignment with the minister of defence.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: There is the highly
\npublicised story of \"the 8\", which has obviously sparked a part of the
\ntension. First of all, why did we let the helicopter in? Wasn't there
\nany way to keep it out? We all knew during<\/p>\n
those days that there was a lot of activity and that there was this scenario ...
N.
\n KOTZIAS: I think that if the competent Authorities in the area of
\nNorthern Greece that the helicopter passed through had known what was in
\n the helicopter and what would happen, they wouldn't have let it
\nthrough. But I imagine they were taken by surprise by the fact that a
\nhelicopter landed on Greek territory and carried the eight officers, who
\n consider themselves persecuted by the Turkish state, and this was also
\nthe ruling of the Greek courts, while the Turkish state says they were
\ninvolved in the coup. To be clear, we have two principles: Politically,
\nwe condemn any type of coup, and we would be the last country -- and
\nespecially the Greek Left -- that could accept or tolerate a military
\ncoup. On the other hand, who is or isn't a putschist -- and whether he
\nhas or will have a fair trial in Turkey or not and has fled to Greece --
\n is decided by the Greek courts. The political condemnation of the coup
\ndoes not entail that every Turkish citizen accused by Ankara of being a
\nputschist is necessarily found to be so by the Greek courts. The
\nexecutive and judiciary are two separate powers, and I hope, at some
\npoint, that this is better understood by the other side.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: You have seen the evidence obviously, the file they've sent us (to Greece).<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: They send it to us (the MFA).<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: They send it to you, exactly, yes.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: They always start with the Foreign Ministry.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Have you -- regardless of the Judiciary -- been convinced that these people were in fact involved in the coup?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I won't judge something that
\n was judged by the Greek courts. If the courts ruled that these people
\ncan and must remain in Greece, they can and must remain in Greece.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Mr. Erdogan said at some
\npoint that he had been assured by the Greek prime minister that they
\nwould be returned to Turkey. Is this the case?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I think that Greece in
\ngeneral has no desire to cover for putschists, but, first, as the
\npolitical leadership, we are not the ones who decide. The courts decide.
\n And, second -- and I think this is very, very serious -- Turkey itself
\nshould realise that it has to implement the rule of law, to protect
\npeople who are in the process of being tried or are in the hands of the
\nsystem of justice. It has to guarantee that their human rights and their
\n physical and mental integrity will be protected, and then pursue any
\nother request. That is, when he says he will \"reintroduce the death
\npenalty,\" when there are dozens of undenied reports that people are
\nbeing mistreated at the hands of the police or other authorities, then I
\n think the problem is with the Turks themselves. I said from the outset
\nthat we condemn the coup and want Turkey to become more democratic and
\nmore European. And it is also our hope and wish that Turkey adopt an
\noutlook on justice in line with Rule of Law as applied in Europe.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: But there wasn't any unofficial assurance from our side that somehow the matter would be taken care of?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: What we always maintain is
\nthat we have no reason to grant asylum to putschists who are proven to
\nbe putschists and whose treatment, in line with European standards, is
\nassured. That is, if Pattakos and Papadopoulos had failed in April 1967
\nand fled to Italy, a democratic Greece -- its judiciary -- would have
\nhad the right to judge them. But if there were a danger of their being
\ntortured and executed -- things, that is, that they carried out the coup
\n in order to be able to do -- I think that Italy and the Italian
\njudiciary would have had another outlook.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: The Turks continue to insist
\n on this, because I understand they insist on the reversal of the
\nruling. In demarches they have presented.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: The Turks, as is the right
\nof each side that accuses the other, are using and capitalising on all
\nlegal means in order to perpetuate the crisis involving these 8 people.
\nAnd I think that the Greek judiciary will take into account any new
\nevidence provided by the Turkish side and rule accordingly.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: What will become of these people in the end?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I hope they live as they have the right to live, and I hope their families do not suffer negative consequences.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Do you think this story with
\n \"the 8\" has affected Erdogan personally, and that all this tension is
\nrelated to \"the 8\"?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I don't think all of this
\ntension has to do with \"the 8,\" that it might personally -- if he really
\n does believe they were involved in the coup -- bother him that some
\nputschists are abroad rather than in his hands. I think there might be
\nsome truth in this. But Turkey's restlessness existed long before last
\nsummer's attempted coup and the case of \"the 8\". Turkey's restlessness
\nhas to do with the fact that it has major internal problems, intense
\ncontradictions. If Erdogan, who wants to become a president with
\nincreased powers and rights, that is, to keep his position -- something
\nthat doesn't happen in the case of the U.S. president -- as head of the
\nmajority party, to shape and implement government policy and to have
\nrights over Parliament, while we know that, naturally, a presidential,
\nor even semi-presidential system has a clear separation between the
\nexecutive power of the president and the legislative power of
\nParliament\u2026 Here there is a complication and the failure of the Turkish
\narmy in Syria, which has many casualties and is not getting results --
\nand at the pace the Turkish military headquarters had hoped--, these two
\n things are putting Mr. Erdogan on edge, because it appears they are
\nalso negatively impacting the prospects of the referendum, when, in
\nfact, coffins are arriving in Turkey. It is no longer like it was 20 or
\n30 years ago, when Turkish society was indifferent to whether -- not
\nindifferent, but, in any case, not shocked by whether or not there were
\ncoffins. Turkey has changed. The western part of Turkey, I would say,
\nhas been Europeanised to a very great extent, and its outlook on war and
\n peace is not exactly what it was in the past.<\/p>\n
I think that what also bears importance
\nis the fact that Turkey lost half the pilots in its air force, whether
\nthey fled abroad or are in prisons or, in any case, have been discharged
\n from the service. This has resulted in a large portion of Turkey's
\npilots either being very young, without a lot of experience, or people
\nbrought out of retirement, who have been cut off, from the point of view
\n of the procedures, from the types of flights being carried out over the
\n Aegean. And these people are also showing unpredictable reactions on a
\npersonal level. And this is why we have to be very calm, with great
\nclarity. Of course, the violation of international law will receive the
\nappropriate response each time.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: They told me that on the day
\n of that tour, the visit to the Imia islets, there were so many planes
\nthat there was a danger of a physical confrontation.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: There is always a danger of
\nphysical confrontation when dogfights take place, where one of the
\npilots has locked onto his target and can shoot it down with the push of
\n a button. And the Greek air force's capability in this regard has
\nincreased a great deal, due to either the Turkish pilots' inexperience
\nor their having been cut off from this, as I described. And this makes
\nthem edgy and unpredictable. They also have restless authorities in the
\nAegean, as I described, including before the coup attempt, and they have
\n an edgy political leadership. All of these things are dangerous. And
\nthis is why -- as you will have seen -- I talk very little and do a lot.
\n Today we are in consultation with all of the big powers on our planet.
\nWe have briefed all of the international organizations, and of course we
\n have made the necessary representations to Turkey regarding the
\nviolations of our territorial waters and their conduct. The
\ninternational environment and international law favour our interests;
\nthey are tools we will not stop using. But I want to say it again here,
\nin my interview with you, Mr. Papahelas: They are not the only tools we
\nhave. We are neither a battered Syria nor a disorganized Iraq.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: It's simply that we are
\nfacing an issue here, that of constant dispute. Whether with the patrol
\nboat that approaches Panagia or with what happened this morning. It
\ncreates a fait accompli -- let me put it that way -- that this is a
\n\"grey area\".<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: There is no fait accompli whatsoever.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Yes, if we don't push them back out of Greek territorial waters.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: We push them out and dispute them and submit the facts to the appropriate international organizations.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: But when all of these things are added up, doesn't it create a fait accompli? That's what I want to understand.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: No, no way. What I want to
\ntell you is, the problem in Turkey today is that this practice isn't
\nbeing carried out solely by the official government. It is also the
\ninspiration of the secular opposition. That is, it isn't just Erdogan
\nwho allows or encourages these challenges to occur. The first instigator
\n of such claims in Turkish Parliament -- and by whom the Erdogan side is
\n being 'carried away', if you will -- are the Kemalists, who, in
\nresponse to the nationalism being exhibited by Erdogan, have expanded
\nthe number of islands and islets they are disputing, depending on the
\nday, from 18 to 160-130. And of course it is very characteristic, as I
\nkeep telling international players at international meetings, that among
\n the islands being disputed -- because you have to demonstrate the
\nabsurdity with an example-- is Gavdos. Gavdos, as you are well aware, is
\n the southernmost Greek island in one of the westernmost points
\nassociated with the Aegean.<\/p>\n
Consequently, as soon as you open the
\nmap and show any foreign friend, or even a neutral foreigner, and you
\ntell him, \"this is what Turkey is disputing. It isn't disputing, let's
\nsay, this islet,\" he can see that this is about old-fashioned
\nneo-Ottoman practices that have no legal, moral or political basis.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Just so I can understand,
\nthere is obviously some \"red line\". Is it a \"red line\" for Turkish
\ncommandos, soldiers not to set foot on an islet?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: The \"red line\" is what we have told them it is.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Which is?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Red.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: And do you believe this is clear to them?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: There is always the matter
\nof what the poet said: that what the mouth says is not necessarily heard
\n by the ear. I hope their ears are clean.
JOURNALIST: Have they stepped on the red line a little bit with what they've done so far?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: They came close this morning.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Right. How does the
\ninternational player see this tension? Is there some initiative under
\nway behind the scenes, Americans, Russians, NATO, someone else?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: No, no. First of all, I
\ndon't think the Americans are in the position, or as willing as they
\nwere in the 1990s, to get mixed up in these processes. The Russians
\ncertainly don't like what the Turks are doing in the Aegean, but they
\nhave their cooperation in Syria. Erdogan believes that this cooperation
\ncan be generalised and become long term. I think he doesn't know Russian
\n foreign policy and diplomacy very well. The European Union is aware of
\ndevelopments, and it is the EU that cautions Turkey in various ways. I
\nremind you that it was the European Union that did not accept Erdogan's
\nspeech on the Treaty of Lausanne, that one can violate international
\nagreements. And this is because the European Union, from one standpoint,
\n is a unifying system that is based on justice; the means, as a
\ntheoretician of European Union systems would say -- are the law and
\njustice. And as a result it has a duty, and also wants to remind Turkey
\nthat it cannot violate the Treaty of Lausanne and it cannot violate
\nEuropean territorial waters. And in fact I will reveal to you that we
\nhave been talking with NATO, as well, in recent days. And as you will
\nremember, Turkey wants NATO -- which has come because of the refugee
\ncrisis -- to withdraw from the Aegean. And we had told them that one of
\nthe reasons Turkey wants this is not because it is anti-NATO, but
\nbecause it doesn't want there to be an international observer seeing
\nwhat it wants to do. And it is no coincidence that the latest incident,
\nwith which we started our conversation, took place in regions 3 and 4,
\nwhere Turkey has ruled out there being cooperation on deterring refugee
\nflows.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Do you believe the NATO presence helps in some way? In the sense that there is a footprint, obviously ...<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I think NATO's presence
\nbothers Turkey, especially on the days or during the periods when it
\nwants to violate international law.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Do you think there is a
\ndanger of the tension spreading to the south, between Rhodes and
\nKastelorizo, which is a very thorny issue in our relations? Because as
\nfar as we have seen, they still haven't done it.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Greece always has to be
\nmilitarily, morally, politically, diplomatically prepared for any sort
\nof incident. But at the same time, the preparation is a reason for its
\nnot following a policy of deterrence for such incidents to occur.<\/p>\n
Consequently, if we see regions or
\nissues in which some incidents might arise, our job, and particularly
\nthat of diplomacy, is to stop us from getting that far. And I would say
\nthat, basically, we have not got that far, on many occasions, thanks to
\ndiplomatic interventions. We have all of the channels of communication
\nopen.<\/p>\n
We have no aggressive inclination
\nagainst Turkey. We are the country that defends Turkey's European path,
\nbecause the democratisation and Europeanisation of Turkey would be a
\nmajor gain for us. We keep the channels and the dialogue open, and we
\nmake it clear that we will not back down or accept any claims on us.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Can you can explain for the
\naverage person -- because I think that one problem we have is that none
\nof the citizens understands the whole web of Greek-Turkish relations and
\n the possible culmination of ...<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Not just everyday citizens, but often experts, as well, I would say.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Right.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: And every time something comes up, the experts themselves have to rethink things too.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: I just want us to explain
\nwhy Panagia is important, why Farmakonisi is important as ... \"grey
\nareas\", and is it something they have put out, like a pawn, to take it
\nback, or have they put it on the table and it exists on the table now,
\nfor negotiation at some point?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Look, what Turkey has wanted
\n for a long time -- and you know this better than me -- is to divide the
\n Aegean at the median, at the 25th parallel, as we say. It wants not to
\nrecognise ... initially, it tried not to recognise legal rights,
\ninternational law with regard to the Greek islands. Not to recognise
\nthat they have a continental shelf, territorial waters, and so on. In
\nthe past two decades, Turkey has gone to a new level of 'quality' -- in
\ninverted commas. It does not consistently claim that the Greek islands
\ndon't have territorial waters or continental shelf rights, but it
\ndisputes the fact that certain islets, as well as inhabited islands, are
\n Greek. And in fact, for a few years now, we are presented in the
\nTurkish press as having seized these islets. Those in the Erdogan camp
\nsay to the Kemalists that \"the Greeks seized them during your time in
\npower\". The Kemalists say that Erdogan handed over 16 islands to us in
\n2006. They are arguing over something that does not belong to them; an
\nargument that has nothing to do with the real facts. That is, how and in
\n what way did we seize these islands that the Turks are now claiming?
\nWhat they want to do is dispute and enlarge the package of a future
\nnegotiation or a future justification for actions that are against
\ninternational law. Thus Turkey is trying to dispute Greek law either
\nthrough disputing the rights deriving from the Greek islands or, when it
\n can't do that, by disputing the fact that they are Greek, even if they
\nhave been inhabited by Greeks for whole millennia. It is a strategy
\nthat, in their opinion, might pay off in the long run.<\/p>\n
This strategy cannot pay off for the
\nvery simple reason that international law is very, very clear on the
\nmatter we are discussing, and international players know this. It cannot
\n pay off because we respond to their actions -- because, you know, if
\nsomeone says to you, \"this is not your house,\" and you don't respond
\nthat \"it is my house,\" in the future the International Court will say,
\n\"yes, but for 30 years they disputed your ownership and you said
\nnothing.\" This is why, without being provocative, there is an
\nappropriate legal and political and diplomatic response to their every
\naction.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: There was a negotiation with
\n Turkey, the exploratory talks. Have these talks reached a point where
\nwe are close to a solution? Are they continuing, have they been frozen?
\nWhere are we on this?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: There was a relative
\n'freezing' of the talks, because those who participated from the Turkish
\n side were sent to diplomatic posts abroad, and as a result there is a
\ntransitional period. But in the recent meeting between the
\nSecretaries-General of the two Ministries, they agreed that we have to
\nmaintain this channel of communication. In general, I am in favour of
\nour continuing the conversation ...<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Has this conversation got anywhere, are we close to the outline of a solution?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: It could have got somewhere,
\n but the Turks back off. That is, at some point they seem to understand
\nthat international law has to be implemented, perhaps they understand
\nthat it isn't good to keep everything pending, then they think again,
\nthey return to their claims. When we say that a country is restless, it
\nis also very contradictory. That is, one will find ten reasons why they
\nwant a compromise, a solution, etc. And then another ten reasons that
\ncan explain their aggressiveness or restlessness. The duty of Greek
\ndiplomacy is to support elements of understanding and agreement and at
\nthe same to prevent elements of aggressiveness. But this does not only
\ndepend on our diplomacy, it also involves internal games of Turkey, the
\nstructure of power that prevails at a given time in Turkey\u2019s interior.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: One question that exists, of
\n course, is that at some point, if there is tension again, no one can
\nimagine a war that will last days or anything like that. Obviously, the
\ninternational community will put pressure on Turkey and Greece, either
\nto negotiate bilaterally or to go to the international court.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: It would have been good if
\nthe Helsinki agreements had stayed in place. You know, I have an opinion
\n on this. The Helsinki Accords obliged Turkey to accept that, for any
\nissue it had, we would go to the International Court in The Hague. The
\nHelsinki Agreement, we facilitated their withdrawing from their relevant
\n commitments, because other political forces believed that it is bad for
\n there to be such agreements in relation to the International Court in
\nThe Hague. The only path I see to resolving our differences is diplomacy
\n and Law, and, by extension, if they need to be used, all of the legal
\nframeworks that exist in the international community. This in no way
\nmeans that at this time -- because someone asked me this -- we are going
\n to the courts or anything else. Our strength -- as a mindset and size
\nof force -- is international law. This doesn't mean that we don't also
\nrely on other types of power.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: So you believe, as a matter of course, that we will go to the court at some point.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Not as a matter of course,
\nbut I do believe that if I were to choose between a court and war, I
\nwould choose the court. If I were to choose between the court and a
\nbilateral, substantial, real agreement and process of agreement, I would
\n choose the latter. And for the time being we are on the latter. With
\nthe difficulties involved due to the situation in Turkey.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Mr. Erdogan appears to be all-powerful. Is he the person with whom such an agreement might be reached?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: What I have noted regarding
\nMr. Erdogan is that there has not been a heated incident throughout the
\nduration of his presidency and time as prime minister. This doesn't mean
\n such an incident cannot be provoked by forces in his environment. I
\nthink that Mr. Erdogan -- if things calm down a little in Turkey and he
\ngets what he wants; if he doesn't get it, he might leave -- but if he
\nstays and has got what he wants, he may be able to deal with
\nGreek-Turkish relations in a more clear-sighted manner. I argue that the
\n Turks have to take the measure of their region. Their relationship with
\n Russia isn't long term. We saw a few months ago that the conduct
\nbetween the two states was completely different. With the Armenians they
\n essentially do not even have diplomatic relations, due to the Genocide
\nissue. In Iraq and Syria they are, in a way, in a state of war. The only
\n country with which they have normal relations -- and so they should --
\nand that supports their Europeanisation, is Greece. If they're a little
\nsmart and look beyond their own nose without being restless, I think
\ntheir stance will improve. If they continue to believe, to sense the
\nregion based on their restlessness, great hunger brings gluttony.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: One issue that does exist is
\n that, if I were Erdogan and saw the international environment, I would
\nsay that, if I did something, provoked a quarrel -- let's put it that
\nway -- with Greece, the Europeans wouldn't do anything because they are
\nafraid of the refugee issue. The Americans are in a state of chaos right
\n now, and they need me for ISIS, and I'm on good terms with the
\nRussians, they won't turn against me. Isn't there an issue there?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: It's not that easy, because
\nISIS has the Kurdish issue next to it, and Erdogan hasn't gotten what he
\n wants on the Kurdish issue. Now, regarding Greece - European Union -
\nTurkey. Turkey has a very major negotiation ahead of it with the
\nEuropean Union; a negotiation that also depends on us and on Cyprus.
\nIt's the customs union. The customs union is a matter of 60 to 80
\nbillion euros -- a great deal of money for a Turkey with a slumping
\neconomy. And much else. But there are tools with which we can work to
\nattract Turkey towards a European path and, at the same time, put
\npressure on Turkey to abandon its current conduct. I think that the
\ncustoms union is an extremely interesting exercise for Greek diplomacy.
\nCustoms union between Turkey and the European Union.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: But if there is a crisis, do
\n you expect anything more than equal distance from the parties I
\ndescribed? America, Russia, Europe?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I don't want us to come to a
\n crisis, and as a result I don't want to describe what will happen
\nafterwards. I do think about it, but the main thing is for me to work so
\n that we don't have a crisis.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Are the telephones working right now with the other side?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Yes, we also had talks about
\n the preparations for the meeting of the two governments in
\nThessaloniki, in reciprocation of the Prime Minister's visit to Izmir.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: But I mean are there also hotlines when there is tension?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: We have to talk about everything. When there is tension, it just makes it difficult to implement everything.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Now I want to ask you about
\nthe Thrace issue. From what I understand, there is tension within the
\nminority, between the pro- and anti-G\u00fclen factions. That's one. And the
\nsecond, there have been some incidents and some say that it may be
\nagitation, some car burnings, and so on. Are you concerned at what is
\nhappening in Thrace right now?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Thrace is Greek territory, a
\n part of the Greek state, and we always have to take care to implement
\nall of the laws. Moreover, just as it is bad for any wall to be painted
\non -- you saw the incident with Angelos Syrigos, the day before
\nyesterday, at Panteion University -- it is equally bad, with another
\npolitical dimension, of course, for walls to be painted on up in
\nKomotini and where the Muslim minority resides. I think that what
\nbothers the Turks today is that a large portion of the Roma and Pomaks
\nhave gained a national Greek conscience, more than in the past, and a
\nsense of difference from the part of the minority that will
\nself-determine as being of Turkish origin.<\/p>\n
The second thing is that there is a
\nwitch hunt within this latter part of the minority. They have discovered
\n pro-G\u00fclen people -- I didn't know them -- and in fact, as you know,
\nthere is also a case of an educator whom they tried -- illegally -- to
\nremove from a school for Muslim children and children who self-determine
\n as being of Turkish origin. I think that, on the one hand, it isn't
\ngood for Turkey's internal controversies to be imported into Greece. On
\nthe other hand, it shows that this group, which according to many is
\ntightly knit, and which self-determines as having relations with Turkey,
\n and which is said to be influenced by the consulate in Komotini, etc.,
\nisn't exactly as they say it is. It shows that there are distinctions,
\nas in every social fabric, and that it has its internal controversies
\nand aspirations.<\/p>\n
What mainly interests me in Thrace is
\nthe implementation of a decision taken by the Prime Minister. And he
\nassigned me, as a member of the government rather than as Foreign
\nMinister, to implement it. It is the creation of a think-tank, a
\npolitical agency, that will look at the issues of Thrace's economic and
\nsocial development. This is a major problem. Because this community is
\nlosing a large portion of its youth -- they are going abroad. The women
\naren't well treated -- they are housebound in the minority families --
\nwe have major spread of drug abuse. These negative aspects of the social
\n fabric are, for me, more serious that whether or not the Komotini
\nConsulate influences the community. Why do I say this? Because third
\nparties can exert influence in the country only when there are social
\nand economic problems. If we revitalise growth in Thrace, if we bring
\nback an attraction to investments, to the population's staying there,
\nthen I think other kinds of phenomena or agitation, as you said, will be
\n limited, if not eliminated. Unfortunately, I have sent a letter twice
\nto the Greek political parties asking them to appoint a representative,
\nwith expertise, so that these issues can be discussed and we can resolve
\n them as a national problem that concerns everyone and the future of the
\n country. Not all of the parties have responded. I am waiting and hoping
\n they will do so in the immediate future.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: We now have a new government
\n in America, you did have some initial contacts with Mr. Flynn, but then
\n of course he left in the meantime, things are moving fast.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I hope I don\u2019t get blamed for it...Did he perhaps leave because he saw me?<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: I didn't say that. What was your impression as to what they believe about the region?<\/p>\n
N.
\n KOTZIAS: When I met with the Americans, and we saw them four times, I'm
\n talking about Trump\u2019s team, during the run-up to the elections, and in
\nJanuary, one month ago, the last time, we did not discuss Greek-Turkish
\nrelations or the Cyprus issue, as some people may believe. I am not
\nrequesting mediation, I don\u2019t aspire to depend on them, and I didn\u2019t ask
\n for their views. I spoke about the region. And I emphasized, because I
\nalways try to focus on Greece\u2019s constructive agenda, the vital role that
\n Greece plays, as well as its diplomacy and its other actions, in favour
\n of stability in the region: that we are, in other words, a factor that
\npromotes security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. A regional
\n player that, without ideological fixations, undertakes collaborations
\nin order to promote this model of stability and security.<\/p>\n
The
\nsecond thing we discussed with them in detail was their \u201cqueries\u201d about
\nwhere the EU is heading. I got the impression that the EU is a
\nrelatively unknown domain for Trump\u2019s team, or one of uncertainty as to
\nwhat it is exactly that the Europeans want. They have a feeling that the
\n Europeans are getting caught up in nationalism once again; the
\nAmericans always have this concern about the Germans, and this was
\nevident in their statements.<\/p>\n
As for me, when the discussion took
\nplace \u2013twice- at the Foreign Affairs Council and at a dinner, I told
\nthem two things pertaining to America: First, instead of wasting time
\ntrying to figure out what Trump does or does not want -my view is that
\nTrump and his team do not have a clear picture about the EU- they should
\n go and voice their opinion, in other words, plant into the mind of the
\nAmerican leader the view that they would like the U.S. leadership to
\nhave of themselves.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Is there somebody in America that
\n deals with Greece at the moment? Because before, we knew that it was
\nBiden, it was various others. At this time, is there an interlocutor who
\n is a real player?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Look, a large portion of Trump\u2019s
\nteam deals with Greece because they are Greek Americans, and Greece is
\nof great interest to them. The Secretary of State has not yet appointed a
\n Deputy Secretary of State or an Assistant Secretary of State for the
\nregion of South-eastern Europe, a post held by Victoria Nuland in the
\npast. I think that this has to do with the fact that, as is quite clear,
\n they need time to figure out the exact assignment of duties in Trump\u2019s
\nteam. They have not done this yet.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: The Greek
\ngovernment, regarding the Souda Bay, first of all, one supposes that
\nthis cooperation will continue. But if there is a request for further
\nconcession of facilities or potentially other bases, within the
\nframework of the war against ISIS, what will Greece's response be?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: They will have to say what it is they want, how they justify it, and what is being offered in exchange.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Is such a discussion taking place? Has it begun, or not yet?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: It hasn\u2019t with the new Administration, from what I know also through the Ministry of National Defence, no.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST:
\n Do you believe that this relationship between Turkey- Erdogan - Trump
\netc. is something that could evolve into a close relationship? Because
\nsuch indications do exist at the moment.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I believe
\nthat Erdogan, as he is a tense individual, has taken it down a notch
\nwhen dealing with America. I remind you that Erdogan has accused Trump
\nof being a racist, due to the statements that Trump has made regarding
\nthe danger of Islam, regarding Muslims. Furthermore, it is interesting
\nthat Erdogan was one of the few leaders of the Muslim world not to
\ndenounce Trump in regard to the visa restrictions for seven countries.
\nSo we have an Erdogan who is more careful than in the past. He does of
\ncourse have a negative history of attacks against Trump, but he hopes
\nthat, in the long term, the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey can
\n improve. I have a feeling that we will not see this type of
\nself-restraint on the part of Turkey for much longer. In other words,
\nwith the first move that Trump makes that does not meet their
\nexpectations, e.g., U.S. relations with the Kurds, we will have a
\nsomewhat edgy reaction on Turkey's part.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Is there a
\nscenario on the table according to which, during a moment of tension,
\neither with Greece or with Europe, that the flow of refugees will
\nrecommence? Or do you believe that this is not something which is an
\nimmediate concern?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I think that Turkey often reminds
\nthat it controls the flow of refugees. Europe, too, should make the
\nreminder of Turkey\u2019s economic dependence on the EU. We don\u2019t do this. If
\n you just read even the Greek newspapers, for example. One will often
\nread about Turkey's ability to pressure us, to blackmail us, to let the
\nrefugees through. Very seldom will your read about Turkey\u2019s need for the
\n customs union, for example, which we were discussing earlier, and the
\neconomic dependence it has on it, especially at a time when its economy
\nis slumping, with many social problems.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: As you are
\naware, an entire body of literature has been written about your position
\n on the issue of Cyprus, that you take a different approach from that of
\n the President of the Republic of Cyprus, and that you were further
\nahead in the \u201cred lines\u201d that you yourself set in terms of the presence
\nof Turkish troops. Is that true?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I think that some
\npeople were surprised, those who had got used to negotiating having as a
\n starting point for the negotiation - and this has occurred twice in the
\n past - that we cannot put the guarantees on the table with the issues
\nof security because they will never accept them, the Turks will not
\ndiscuss them.<\/p>\n
I believe that with the policy we pursued, and it
\nis a joint policy, I introduced it as a thematic two years ago, in March
\n of 2015, and it was adopted and greatly strengthened by Mr.
\nAnastasiades, it was as early as the summer of 2015 that we worked
\ntogether and succeeded in having this major issue placed on the table
\nfor the first time, namely the security of Cyprus, the presence of
\noccupying forces and the system of guarantees.<\/p>\n
And the second
\nthing we achieved, together and in concert, is for the foreign, the
\ninternational player, the EU and even the British, the Americans, the
\nRussians, etc. to realize the importance of this matter in the Cyprus
\nissue, and even for Turkey itself to agree to discuss it.<\/p>\n
But be
\naware, Turkey knows that this is its weakest point in terms of Cyprus.
\nAnd it is a point - remember what I am about to tell you \u2013 regarding
\nwhich it will either make a substantial, true compromise and
\nconcessions, or it will be the point over which the negotiations break
\ndown. So because Turkey has not decided - at least up to the point of
\nits referendum - on how it will truly deal with the issues of guarantees
\n and security, whether it will agree to the elimination of the issue of
\nguarantees and security, it is attempting to introduce other issues in
\norder to side-track the conversation. For example, we left Geneva, where
\n Mr. \u00c7avu\u015fo\u011flu got up and left, as did Mr. Ak\u0131nc\u0131 yesterday. Mr.
\n\u00c7avu\u015fo\u011flu left and went to Ankara and started accusing me of not being
\nat the negotiations, and I sent him a response: \u201cI am still here in
\nGeneva and we are discussing the Cyprus issue.\u201d<\/p>\n
They have a
\ndifficulty. So they suddenly introduce a new topic: the four freedoms
\nfor Turks. They have never before raised this issue, stated in such a
\nway. Why did they add it? In the hope that either Anastasiades will be
\nforced not to accept it, so that the negotiations break down over this
\nmatter, thus not breaking down over the issue that frightens them, and
\nconcerning which their argument is very weak - the issue of guarantees
\nand securities - or for it to be accepted, resulting in having the
\nCypriots and Greece squabble with the European Union, since it is common
\n knowledge that Mrs. Merkel is unable to accept this issue. She may
\naccept amendments to the customs union, but not also on this issue,
\nparticularly during the run-up to the German elections.<\/p>\n
Now I see
\n that they have got a strategy of letting issues accrue in the internal
\nnegotiations of Cyprus in order to cause the negotiations to break down.
\n The Parliament of Cyprus issued a decision for Greek children, Greek
\nCypriots in Cyprus, to be taught the 1950 Referendum in History -
\nneither positive nor negative - in the history schoolbooks. It is not
\nfor me to judge the decisions taken by the Republic of Cyprus. What it
\nis that I am assessing is that a reference to a historical, factual
\nevent became an excuse for him to get up and leave the negotiations, for
\n the Turks to start screaming and why - not only to show that they can
\neasily cause the negotiations to fall apart, but also to say \u201cwell, the
\nGreek Cypriots still want the Union and, since they still want the
\nUnion, the Turkish occupying forces must remain,\u201d as part of a supposed
\nsolution to the Cyprus issue.<\/p>\n
I find it unfortunate that a
\nportion of the Press in Greece also made it appear as if differences
\nexisted between Cyprus and Greece, even though this journey is a common
\none, and it is the Turks who would like to make it look as if
\ndifferences exist between the two sides. Of course, we are always in
\nconversation, as well as exchange opinions, and I think this constitutes
\n the strength of our relationship with Cyprus.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Quite
\nsimply, what I understand is that if there was a difference it was that
\nyou held the absolute position for not a single Turkish soldier to
\nremain from the very first day, whereas President Anastasiades was ready
\n to accept their leaving after a period of \u2026<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: No, no. That is wrong.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: The first part isn't the case.<\/p>\n
N.
\n KOTZIAS: How could all the Turkish soldiers leave from the very first
\nday? They are doing a meta-interpretation of what I say..<\/p>\n
Let me
\ntell you how the discussion began. I've gone on the first U.S. visit. I
\nhad seen Kerry then, Nuland, I saw Rice, the National Security Advisor. I
\n had met with their think tanks and then I went to meet the
\nSecretary-General of the UN. As I was leaving after the discussion with
\nthe Secretary-General of the UN, a Turkish journalist asked me, very
\naggressively. He says to me, \u201cwhy are we Turks in a hurry to resolve the
\n Cyprus issue and you are not in a hurry?\u201d And I answered him \u201cSo if
\nyou\u2019re in such a hurry, take your troops and leave.\u201d It was the first
\nexpression of a stance that I was personally working on, in conjunction
\nwith the prime minister as well as the Services here at the Ministry, of
\n course.<\/p>\n
The second thing we said is that these troops need to
\nleave and not stay, it isn't the disagreement of the Turks or other
\nforeign players that support them over how long it would take for them
\nto leave, because we had told everybody that it is well known that in
\norder for an occupying force to leave, a procedure is required, as well
\nas a timetable. But what bothered them was that a deadline exists; in
\nother words, a date exists after which they must all be withdrawn. With
\nthe Annan Plan, if you remember, the Turks also discussed leaving part
\nof their forces behind to serve as a base. A base means sovereign
\nrights, EEZ, airspace etc.<\/p>\n
The third thing is that I made a very
\nspecific proposal, and all of them have it. It was never announced. In
\nterms of the flow of withdrawal. In other words, how can they leave? And
\n what status will this withdrawing force have? As far as the status, I
\nhad to talk about it after a year and a half. We said that the flow
\nshould be for as many of them to leave as possible during the first
\nweek, and for a normal flow of departure thereafter, at a speed that
\nwould depend on the technical capabilities for their leaving and the
\ntechnical capabilities for their being taken across.<\/p>\n
Because I
\nremind you that the Soviet Union, which agreed for the occupying force
\nto leave -a liberating force for us on the Left, though legally it was
\nan occupying force- to leave East Germany, the agreement was four years
\nfor it to leave. And moreover, instead of their leaving in December of
\n\u201894, they finally left in September of \u201894, three months sooner than
\nagreed. There an agreement was made - and I am very proud of our
\nMinistry - because for the first time we studied all the international
\nagreements, international conventions, the political practices,
\npertaining to issues of guarantees, security, and troop stationing.<\/p>\n
The
\n example closest to us in terms of withdrawal of troops was the
\nwithdrawal of the Soviet forces from East Germany. There, an Agreement
\nwas made. This Agreement had a name. In the English text, which was not
\nthe original because the document was drafted in German and Russian, it
\nsaid \u201cStationing Agreement.\u201d In the original text, the German version, I
\n read it in English and then I read the German one in order to assess
\nthe situation, it says \u201cTemporary Stationing Agreement\u201d and some of the
\nexperts we work with translated it from the Russian as \u201cTemporary
\nStationing Agreement\u201d in other words what it says is: this Army is
\nleaving but, until it has left, a portion of it will continue to be
\nhere, which no longer constitutes a guarantor Army, does not constitute a
\n resident Army, but is an Army which is in the process of departing and
\nwhich is stationed temporarily. In other words there were 100,000,
\n50,000 have remained, 20. The Soviet Union did all of this.<\/p>\n
We
\nhave a difference in the legal system. The Germans at that time had
\nobliged the Soviets to apply German law to the Army, to Soviet troops.
\nThe Cypriots are not demanding this. But the Turkish force must leave.<\/p>\n
And
\n I say in the proposal that there are three basic principles: One, the
\ntroops leave based on a deadline, which must be within a prompt and
\nreasonable period of time. Second, during the course of its leaving,
\nwhat remains behind each time \u2013 which will be smaller in number \u2013 is
\nthere only temporarily, and this temporary nature has to do with the
\ndeparture process itself and not with temporary rights over Cyprus. And
\nthird, no restructuring. In other words, not to have the army leave and
\nthen for one part of it to come out of this flow and for a base to be
\nbuilt in order for it to be restructured. No restructuring. Because then
\n we will be going in the direction of the Turkish plan, of withdrawing
\nthe bulk of the force and building a base.<\/p>\n
Neither the Cypriot
\ngovernment nor we accept the base, and we have agreed on the departure
\nprocess, that is, at a meeting in Brussels. It\u2019s just that some people
\nare quick to lose their composure, they don\u2019t have patience. And I must
\nalso tell you the following, if you permit me, two issues.<\/p>\n
First,
\n they say that Cyprus\u2019 view, which is also my own - but so as not to
\nstrike at the government of Cyprus, they strike at me \u2013 that the Turkish
\n army has to leave, falls within the realm of nationalism. Is it
\nnationalism to request that the occupying forces leave? I don't know,
\nfor the German Nazis to leave Greece, was that nationalism? For the
\nItalian fascists to leave, is that nationalism? For the Russians, the
\nSoviets then, from Germany, is that nationalism? It\u2019s wrong. I will say
\nit again, and publicly this time: Yes, you must be patriotic without
\nnationalism, being a patriot means considering your country to be great.
\n Nationalism means complaining about, cursing, berating another\u2019s
\ncountry and not accepting another\u2019s patriotic rights.<\/p>\n
So yes to
\npatriotism, no to a nationalism that berates other nations, other races
\nand so on, but no to adopting another\u2019s nationalism. In other words,
\nwhen Greece and Cyprus say that the Turks must leave, and the Turks say
\n\u201cwe want to stay\u201d, to consider the demand for the foreign troops to
\nleave Cyprus to be nationalism and not to consider the Turks' wanting to
\n stay - to have troops in a third, independent sovereign nation, an EU
\nmember state - to be nationalism, is a big mistake in my opinion.<\/p>\n
From
\n this perspective, they said these things for a third party's benefit.
\nThe Greek government never involves itself in the Cyprus issue, as far
\nas its domestic aspect is concerned, we stated this the day before
\nyesterday, the leaders of the AKEL and DISY parties etc. said it as
\nwell, we have never stated an opinion.<\/p>\n
For your information, as a
\n scholar and as an expert on the Cyprus issue, I do have opinions about a
\n great number of issues pertaining to the domestic aspect. I have not
\ntold anybody my opinion because I know that as soon as I say it, it will
\n come out somewhere. We only discussed the issue that falls under our
\narea of responsibility. Guarantees and security. Because we are bound by
\n international law, we have become - with three International
\nAgreements, the Treaty of Guarantees, and the Treaty on Security and
\nCooperation, the London and Zurich Agreements- we have been included in
\nthose Agreements and we must say what we will do with them.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST:
\n Nevertheless, at the moment, it seems that the process has stagnated.
\nAnd those who are in the know feel that nothing is going to happen. Does
\n this hold any risks?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Look, let me tell you this.
\nFirst, at the present time, the Turks, as I have noted over these past
\nweeks, are trying to find a pretext to prevent the negotiations from
\ncontinuing. And it is the same behaviour that they displayed in Geneva.
\nIn other words, \u00c7avu\u015fo\u011flu got up and left, and even made a surprising
\nstatement: \u201cI\u2019ve got more serious things to do.\u201d<\/p>\n
Though the
\nGeneva meeting had been scheduled for Thursday\u2013Friday, -Eide\u2019s documents
\n exist, those of the Secretary-General of the UN- when we would have a
\npolitical consultation, suddenly, on Thursday evening, they said, as
\nopposed to the Cypriots and to us, some said, \u201cNo, let\u2019s have a
\ntechnical discussion tomorrow.\u201d And I responded to them that in order
\nfor a technical discussion to take place, we must have political talks
\nabout what it is we want. And since we have scheduled what we want to do
\n ... So \u00c7avu\u015fo\u011flu left, as he had planned to leave, because he cannot
\nnegotiate, or because he could not negotiate at that time, he did not
\nhave the authorisation ...<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Is it not true that Mr.
\nTsipras did not want to go with Mr. Erdogan, and it is for this reason
\nthat the meeting did not take place at a higher level?<\/p>\n
N.
\nKOTZIAS: No, no. To go to a higher level ... Wait, let me finish with
\nthe first point. So Mr. \u00c7avu\u015fo\u011flu left and went to Turkey and said
\n\u201cGreece is weak and is unable to negotiate.\u201d That's nonsense. And a part
\n of the Press adopted this -- that\u2019s the bad part. Now, as far as when
\nMr. Tsipras will be holding discussions with the Prime Minister or the
\nPresident of Turkey on the issue of Cyprus. Once we have prepared the
\ndocuments and the solutions. When we have a 90% chance for a solution to
\n be reached. Because if the head of our nation\u2019s political system meets
\nwith the head of the Turkish political system, whatever form this may
\ntake in Turkey, and they fail to agree, the negotiations will have no
\nfuture. And indeed, in Cyprus, quite rightly so, they give me credit for
\n binding the UN from the very beginning that this will be an open
\nnegotiation in terms of its conclusion, so that when it breaks down over
\n a certain point, it is not considered to be over. In other words, two
\nbad things would happen: the negotiations will be considered as
\nfinished, and the leaders of the country will have failed. This is why I
\n am keeping the negotiations open. Now ... the Turks are afraid. If they
\n are not prepared to take back the system of guarantees, they don\u2019t want
\n negotiations to fail over that matter, because then they are exposed.
\nIn other words, what is it that they are asking for? To have the right,
\nlegally, to do the same things they did back in \u201874. In other words, to
\nintervene in Cyprus whenever they see it fit. And for Greece and Cyprus,
\n as well as the EU, to agree to this. And they realize that they can't
\nmake this work. So they attempt, by causing friction, either to take
\nother issues and to arrive at what they consider to be a better
\ncompromise or, if they don\u2019t achieve this, to make the negotiations
\nbreak down over other issues in which they are not so obviously at fault
\n in the eyes of the International Community.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Do you see danger in the process' stagnating?<\/p>\n
N.
\n KOTZIAS: It is bad when the process stagnates, and we have to keep it
\nalive. This is why I agreed to a second international conference,
\n\u201cGeneva II,\u201d which both sides proposed in Cyprus, in other words the
\nPresident of the Republic of Cyprus and Mr. Akinci, the representative
\nof the Turkish Cypriot community, even though I do believe that, until
\nthe Referendum takes place, it will be difficult for Turkey to reach a
\nconclusion as to whether it wishes to reach a compromise or not.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST:
\n Are you concerned about annexation scenarios such as Crimea or
\nsomething similar, or do you consider that to be science fiction?<\/p>\n
N.
\n KOTZIAS: Here at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, anything we hear, the
\n slightest word, wherever it may come from, we investigate it. In regard
\n to annexation. First of all, let me tell you that it greatly impressed
\nme that when the Turkish Cypriots say they will annex the Northern
\noccupied portion of Cyprus, none of them makes the same comments as
\nthose that were made in relation to the resolution of the Cypriot
\nParliament on the 1950 Enosis Referendum. In other words, the Turks are
\ntrying to create an atmosphere where a reference to a historical fact in
\n books is more dangerous than the declarations they make, e.g., the
\npseudo-prime minister of occupied Cyprus proclaiming that they are going
\n to go ahead and secede from Cyprus. We must emphasize this, that it is
\nthey who are scaremongering. Second, I do not believe that the majority
\nof the Turkish Cypriots are willing to be incorporated into Turkey as
\nsecond class citizens (\u201cpoor relatives\u201d) and to disappear and be
\nforgotten about. Third, I do not think that Turkey is interested in the
\nannexation of Northern Cyprus. It is more interested in either solving
\nthe problem or finding a way to geostrategically control the entire
\nisland. Something else: why annex it? And the last thing. The
\nhistorical, diplomatic, legal position of Turkey will become very weak -
\n in my personal opinion - should the discussions not go well. I hope,
\nand we are working hard for the talks to go well, that Turkey will not
\nproceed with annexation, at least not in the near future, this is not in
\n its interest and will create more legal issues for them. Scaremongering
\n about annexation is aimed at making it acceptable to exert pressure on
\nthe Cypriot side in order for it to subside, as various forces want to
\nsee it do.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: And to conclude, since I am certain that this interview will also be watched on the other side of the Aegean.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: I always speak being fully aware that they are listening to me.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: What message do you send to Ankara?<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: We are the best neighbour they could ever find. I hope they become the same thing for us.<\/p>\n
JOURNALIST: Thank you very much.<\/p>\n
N. KOTZIAS: Thank you. Have a good evening.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
JOURNALIST: Mr. Minister, thank you for being kind enough to join us for this conversation\/interview, and we are taping this on Friday morning, and just a few hours ago there was what I think, at least, was a major incident at Farmakonisi. Let's start with that. What is your take on it? Whether it is […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[34],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3344","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-embassy-news"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gr\/uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3344","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gr\/uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gr\/uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gr\/uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gr\/uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3344"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gr\/uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3344\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gr\/uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3344"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gr\/uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3344"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.mfa.gr\/uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3344"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}