L. ZOCHIOU:Good day. Welcome. Let us begin with the latest developments. Yesterday, the visit of the Palestinian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates to Athens took place, just one day after the historic Peace Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was there, accompanying the Prime Minister. It was a historic day for the Middle East. Greece consistently underscores that the achievement of a ceasefire and the release of hostages constitute a decisive first step toward a comprehensive settlement, one that will pave the way for the launch of the political process aimed at a two-state solution, based on the relevant UN Resolutions, as the only viable path to consolidate peace in the region.
Regarding Greece’s role in the region - Gaza and the broader Middle East - on the day after: The Minister’s statements yesterday provided an initial framework. First, on the humanitarian assistance aspect for the relief of Gaza’s civilian population. Greece has provided humanitarian aid in multiple ways in the past, and a significant increase in humanitarian aid to Gaza will be announced in the immediate future.
The second aspect concerns the stabilization of Gaza. This is key to solidifying security in the Gaza Strip and enabling the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza as soon as possible. Greece, being a reliable interlocutor with all parties, will contribute and assist through dialogue with all states in the region.
The third aspect of Greece’s role on the day after pertains to reconstruction. By this, we are mainly referring to the mobilization of the private sector to support Gaza’s reconstruction, with the aim of improving the lives of the Palestinian people.
A few days before the Summit, Greece participated in France’s diplomatic initiative, the Paris meeting on the future of Gaza. We support all initiatives aimed at fostering peace in Gaza and the Middle East. Greece was represented at that meeting by its Ambassador to France, Mr. Alexandridis.
Regarding the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ visits to Estonia and Finland, I would like to highlight the commonalities we share with these countries. Despite our geographical distance from these countries of the European North, one can identify several commonalities and shared challenges. Allow me to briefly mention the following. These countries are like-minded partners, EU member states and ΝΑΤΟ allies, following Finland’s decision to join the North Atlantic Alliance. Geographically, we are at the external borders of the European Union and attach particular importance to border protection. From a geostrategic standpoint, Greece belongs to NATO’s southeastern flank, while Finland and Estonia to the eastern flank. Consequently, we have undertaken a critical role in shielding transatlantic security.
We are coastal states with extensive coastlines and share a strong recognition of the importance of maritime security - an issue Greece has set as priority during its term as a member of the UN Security Council. We all face the repercussions of an ever-changing and unstable regional and international environment. We have to address threats along our borders, which are also the EU’s external borders. We converge on issues concerning the European Union, its defensive shielding, and its enlargement. All three countries support the view that enlargement must remain high on the EU’s agenda.
Let me move on to Deputy Minister, Ms. Alexandra Papadopoulou, and the political consultations between Greece and Egypt held in Athens on October 7. The discussions focused on the Eastern Mediterranean, with particular emphasis on Libya. Greece and Egypt, as neighboring countries, converge on many points regarding both the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya.
We exchanged views on the political process in Libya. We look forward to a definitive resolution of the Libyan issue through the conduct of free and fair elections, free from external interference, leading to the establishment of a representative government. Both sides expressed their support for the roadmap presented by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Libya, Ms. Hannah Tetteh, which - in brief - provides for the launch of the political process and the establishment of an inclusive government that will guide the country to elections. Greece and Egypt, as Libya’s immediate neighbors, share a common interest in ensuring stability and prosperity in Libya, for the benefit of the entire region. Political consultations will henceforth be held on a regular basis, with the next round scheduled to take place in Cairo.
Before moving on to the Minister’s and Deputy Minister's schedule, I would like to refer to the draft bill of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the “Establishment of the Office of the Hellenic Presidency”, which was submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs for public electronic consultation on October 13. The bill provides for the establishment of an independent Office of the Hellenic Presidency to coordinate and support the work of the Greek Presidency of the Council of the European Union during the second semester of 2027. Preparatory work for the organization of the Presidency has already commenced. For Greece, the Presidency represents a matter of great significance and we aim to be fully prepared at all levels.
Regarding the schedule of the Minister of Foreign Affairs: tomorrow, the Minister will be at the Hellenic Parliament for the off-the-agenda debate on foreign policy. On Sunday, October 19, the Minister of Foreign Affairs will travel to Jerusalem to attend the ordination of the new Hegumen of the Holy Monastery of Saint Catherine on Mount Sinai, Mr. Symeon. On Monday, he will be in Luxembourg to participate in the EU Foreign Affairs Council. The agenda items will include Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East in light of the recent agreement, and EU–Indo-Pacific relations. He will then travel to London to represent Greece at the Berlin Process Summit on October 22.
On Thursday, October 30, the Minister of Foreign Affairs will visit Baghdad, where he will meet with his Iraqi counterpart. The following day, he will travel to Bahrain to participate in the Manama Dialogue. The Manama Dialogue is an initiative of the Government of Bahrain, where issues pertaining to security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East are discussed. The 2025 Conference will focus on the region’s geopolitical challenges, maritime security, crisis management, and energy transition.
Regarding the schedule of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Papadopoulou: on October 17, the Deputy Minister will participate in the Med Dialogue, held in Naples, Italy. On October 21, she will participate in the EU General Affairs Council in Luxembourg. On October 23-24, she will participate in the European Council in Brussels. On Thursday, October 30, she will meet with the State Secretary of Finland, and then, on Friday, October 31, with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania.
Deputy Minister, Mr. Theoharis, will travel on Thursday, October 16, to London to participate in a meeting of Ministers responsible for economic affairs under the Berlin Process. On October 19-20, he will be in Baghdad for the Joint Inter-ministerial Committee between Greece and Iraq. On October 22-23, he will travel to the United Arab Emirates, and on October 29, to Saudi Arabia.
This concludes my introductory remarks. Should you have any questions, please state your name and the outlet you represent.
TH. BALODIMAS: Balodimas from “Rizospastis” newpaper. You mentioned earlier that the government’s objective is, if I understood correctly, the launch of a political process aimed at a two-state solution. This, according to UN resolutions, implies that the Palestinian state would be established on specific territories, a significant part of which are currently occupied by the Israeli armed forces. Will the Greek government exert pressure on its strategic partner, Israel, to withdraw? My second question relates to what you also mentioned regarding the stabilization of Gaza as key to solidifying security in the region, with the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. What does this mean in practice? Does it imply that we would support, for instance, the deployment of an armed force against Hamas?
L. ZOCHIOU: I will maintain our position on the issue of the political process. Greece remains steadfast in its support for the relaunch of the political process aimed at a two-state solution, based on the relevant UN resolutions. Concerning the recognition of a Palestinian state, our position also remains firm. The recognition of a Palestinian state is part of the political process, which needs to be relaunched. We are now one step closer. What is that step? From the very beginning, on October 7, 2023, we have maintained that a ceasefire, the release of hostages, and the provision of humanitarian aid are essential prerequisites. At this moment, we have a ceasefire in place, hostages are being released, and we see that humanitarian aid is also flowing into Gaza. This represents a relative progress.
We are relatively optimistic regarding developments in the Middle East. It has been some time since we’ve heard any positive news from the region. Greece is a strategic partner of Israel and as such it can convey messages. This has always been the case and the Minister of Foreign Affairs has emphasized this repeatedly.
Regarding the stabilization of Gaza, it should be understood that the discussion is still at an early stage. Both in terms of the day after in Gaza and the need to clarify many aspects of the plan itself. In this regard, I can confirm that Greece will participate in the discussions and consultations that will follow in the coming period.
K. BALI: I have two clarifying questions. First, did Mr. Gerapetritis have contacts with any counterparts in Sharm El-Sheikh? Second, in the context of the Berlin Process Summit in London, have Ukraine and Moldova been included?
L. ZOCHIOU: In response to your first question, regarding the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ contacts, he did have meetings with counterparts. It was an opportunity to exchange views on developments in the Middle East. As for your second question, concerning the Berlin Process, the Summit focuses on the Western Balkans.
K. BALI: I was just wondering if we might have missed an update.
L. ZOCHIOU: Should there be any change, I will come back to your question.
P. MICHOS:Good morning. Panayiotis Michos from “To Manifesto” newspaper. An Armenian newspaper in Türkiye has reported that the Turkish Ministry of Culture has issued a notice to the Patriarchal Great School of the Nation (Phanar Greek Orthodox College), instructing it to vacate the premises within three months. Some interpret this as a step toward the definitive closure of a centuries-old institution of particular importance to the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul. Has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made any demarche or contacted the relevant Turkish authorities? What is its position on the matter, and how is it monitoring the situation? And a related question, again concerning Türkiye: in the context of consultations between Greece and Egypt, Athens and Cairo maintain a strategic partnership. Is Athens concerned about the rapprochement between Türkiye and Egypt, both generally and in relation to developments in Gaza? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: Regarding your first question, the Patriarchal Great School of the Nation is a landmark minority educational institution. As you are well aware, the vast majority of historical buildings in Istanbul are currently undergoing seismic reinforcement works, all the more so in the case of minority educational institutions, which are historical landmarks. The location to which the Patriarchal Great School of the Nation will be temporarily relocated will be announced shortly, within the coming period. As for your second question, I will, of course, not comment on the foreign policy of a third country. What I can tell you is that Greece pursues its own foreign policy. It enjoys a strategic partnership with Egypt, which was announced in May 2025. We are now working toward further deepening that relationship.
K. TSAMOURI: Tsamouri from STAR TV channel. I would like to ask whether the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers that Mr. Erdoğan has emerged strengthened from his role in Gaza and from the outcome of the negotiations. Are you concerned that Türkiye’s diplomatic standing has been enhanced?
L. ZOCHIOU: I will not comment on the actions of third states, let alone Türkiye. I will speak, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Greek foreign policy, and you are welcome to ask me about that. Greece is pursuing an independent, active foreign policy. It is a sovereign state and it is not determined by third parties. We are monitoring developments. I will comment, of course, not on assessments but on developments on the ground. We continue to observe and monitor developments in our neighboring countries.
K. TSAMOURI:I am not asking you to comment on their contacts or moves but, rather, how Greece assesses Türkiye’s role in the negotiations.
L. ZOCHIOU: I will stand by what I have already stated.
P. TZANETAKOS: Good morning. Tzanetakos from ERT and “To Vima” newpaper. If I may elaborate a bit further on my colleague’s question. There are a number of facts to consider. First, Türkiye now plays a distinct role in Gaza and the Middle East. Second, Mr. Erdoğan appears to maintain an open, direct communication channel with Mr. Trump. Third, there is pressure from NATO leadership, as well as expressed positions from a European core group regarding Türkiye’s potential participation in projects related to the autonomy of European defense. So, I am wondering whether the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has any second thoughts regarding Greece’s declared position linking, so to speak, Türkiye’s participation to the lifting of the casus belli. Only yesterday, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said in an interview that “this is not a time for crises,” and it seems to me that insisting on this position could potentially lead to an escalation between Athens and Ankara.
L. ZOCHIOU: I will reiterate the response I gave to Ms. Tsamouri. I repeat: Greece is a sovereign state. It pursues an active, independent, consistent foreign policy. It has its own orientations. It is not determined by third parties. Therefore, with regard to the issue you raise, there has been no change in our position on SAFE. The accession of any third country to SAFE requires the conclusion of a bilateral techno-economic agreement. Through Greek intervention, it has been secured that the signing of such an agreement is subject to unanimity, pursuant to Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 218. Furthermore, again following Greek intervention, a “safeguard clause” was included under Article 16, which lays down the conditions and eligibility criteria for companies and entities, taking into account the security interests of the Member States.
Therefore, allow me to repeat that as long as the casus belli remains in effect, Greece will not accept Türkiye’s inclusion in SAFE. To put it differently, the lifting of the casus belli is a prerequisite for any discussion to commence.
D. KRIKELAS: Good morning, Dimitris Krikelas, “FlashGR – FlashTV”. Let's go back to Gaza for a moment. You said earlier that there are specific points of the plan that need to be clarified. Can you tell us one or some which concern you the most?
L. ZOCHIOU: At this stage, the first phase, the most important and the main issue is to implement the plan. Therefore, the implementation of the agreement is a prerequisite. And obviously, the implementation of the first phase, in order to move on to the second. We are moving forward gradually.
A. BARAKAT: My name is Barakat, I am from the Egyptian state television and “Al Ahram”. Greece wants to play a major role in the Palestinian issue, and rightly so. However, yesterday when the [Palestinian] Minister was here, we did not see the Palestinian flag outside the building, as is usually the case. This had happened before, on October 7. When will this happen again? When will Greece put the Palestinian flag outside again, as it is done when an official visit takes place? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: Thank you. Let me answer you about the flag. It is something that is not in the diplomatic practice of Greece. It is a matter of protocol. I also refer you to previous photographs of Palestinian Foreign Ministers. There was no flag. I think I have already referred to the issue of the Palestinian state.
A. TELOPOULOS: Two very quick questions. Telopoulos, from ”iefimerida.gr’’ and ”Efimerida ton Syntakton” newspaper. On the one hand, adopting the reasoning of my colleague, Mr. Tzanetakos, regarding Türkiye's geopolitical upgrading, I would like to ask, since our stance on the casus belli has not changed, if at least in the coming period we will attempt to restore some communication with Türkiye, precisely bearing in mind this fact, that it is constantly being upgraded geopolitically in the region. And secondly, to be a little more specific about the security issues you mentioned, that we will participate in the discussion. Is there a possibility that we could also discuss participation in a peacekeeping force, if the three guarantor powers do not do so, that is, if it is under the auspices of the UN? With all the conditions we are setting, could Greece also send soldiers there, if a peacekeeping force is created for Gaza? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: Well, as far as your issue of restoring relations is concerned, relations between Greece and Türkiye have not been severed. Nor has communication between the two sides been severed. Nothing has changed in our relations and we are in fact communicating in a structured way: Through political dialogue, the positive agenda and the MOUs. We are bound to communicate. We are bound to keep our channels of communication open in order to prevent crises and tensions. So, at this point, the structured dialogue exists. It is there and we are moving forward at this level.
As for the peacekeeping forces in Gaza, I think I answered that in the first question. It is too early to see how all this will unfold. However, Greece will be present in the consultations on any issue concerning Gaza. That is all for now.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: Could you explain this to us a little more in detail? That is, at the moment we have four powers - Egypt, Qatar, the United States, Türkiye - which are the ones who signed the text of the agreement the day before yesterday. These powers were there before, as mediators between Hamas and Israel and so on. In this case, you say that Greece will participate in the consultations that will take place in the near future. In what format exactly will this be? Provided, of course, that the agreement will proceed, will be implemented and not be broken, etc. In what format specifically? Will there be some European countries included in it? Will it be these four aforementioned countries? Will it be something more expanded? In what format?
L. ZOCHIOU: You understand that all this is still being worked out. That is why I say that, at this moment at least, the situation is too fresh for us to move forward. Everything is still in the realm of speculation at this point. Obviously, in the coming days there will be more developments, so at the moment I am primarily expressing Greece's intentions. What is certain is that Greece will participate in both the humanitarian part and the reconstruction. Beyond that, however, it will be part of the discussions and consultations regarding the future of Gaza.
H. KRATSI: Christina Kratsi from Alpha TV channel. Regarding the two specific issues you mentioned, namely the humanitarian aid and reconstruction. Is there anything more specific? That is, has a channel been set up to send humanitarian aid? For reconstruction, have specific companies expressed interest? Since you also mentioned the private sector.
L. ZOCHIOU: All I can tell you at this moment is our contribution. We will assist financially, by providing expertise in the area of institution building.
H. KRATSI: And for reconstruction?
L. ZOCHIOU: This is reconstruction. Beyond what I have already mentioned, reconstruction involves providing expertise in institution building. The second aspect is financial support.
TH. BALODIMAS: More than anything else in the answers you've given on the Gaza issue, there is a lack of clarity everywhere. So, should we expect the agreement to be further specified? Then why exactly do you believe there was such a celebration?
L. ZOCHIOU: Sorry, your last question?
A. BALODIMAS: Why exactly do you think there was so much celebration about this agreement? In the sense that, based on the answers you're giving as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there still seem to be many unclear points.
L. ZOCHIOU: Well, let us look at the facts, Mr. Balodimas. The facts are as follows. First, there is an agreement between Israel and Hamas. That is an achievement. Second, there was a summit - a Peace Summit - attended by many countries from around the world, and it resulted in signatures from Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, and of course the United States. This, in itself, is also a diplomatic success. Third, we have a ceasefire. Fourth, there has been the release of hostages. Fifth, there is the flow of humanitarian aid. These are the facts, upon which we rely, and, as I have already mentioned, the most important thing at this point is for the first phase to be implemented. Obviously, there are issues that need to be clarified, but our positions are grounded in these facts.
M. MOURELATOU: Maria Mourelatou from “TA NEA” newspaper. I have three questions. First: what is the current situation with the Monastery of Sinai? Second: regarding the six-point plan presented by Mr. Christodoulides in Sharm El-Sheikh - had there been prior consultation with Greece? Were we aware? Had there been discussions, etc.? And third: concerning Greece and Türkiye, is it possible that our bilateral relations will continue exclusively through the three agreed pillars, and we won’t see a High-Level Cooperation Council convened in the coming months? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: Beyond Sunday's developments, namely the ordination, the enthronement will follow. And if you ask me about the solution concerning the Monastery, if there is anything, it will be announced. Regarding the six-point plan, I’m not in a position to know whether there was prior coordination with the Greek side. As for the High-Level Cooperation Council, if it is scheduled, it will be officially announced by the appropriate authorities.
P. MICHOS: Regarding the electricity interconnection between Greece and Cyprus: what stage are we at, and can we clarify which Greek Ministry is handling the matter? Is it the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, or the Prime Minister’s Office? It's a bit unclear. Can you explain where the project currently stands? There was a meeting yesterday organized by another ministry, which is not under your jurisdiction - the Ministry of Environment - but generally, which Ministry is advancing the project? Is it progressing? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: From the perspective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our focus is on the geopolitical dimension of the project and we have taken a position on it, about the importance of the project and its geopolitical significance, as a project of common European interest.
Its geopolitical significance lies in the fact that it is directly linked to ensuring energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean. And, of course, we expect and require commitment to its implementation from all parties involved. Greece remains committed to the project's implementation. For anything beyond that, as you can understand, there is the relevant Ministry, the Ministry of Energy, which is responsible for another aspect of the project itself.
TSAMOURI: May I ask a question on that? You said that we are committed to the project and are asking all parties to commit to its implementation. Yesterday, Mr. Keravnos, the Minister of Finance of Cyprus, again expressed his doubts, citing international studies, saying that it is not viable, etc. Are we, at a diplomatic level, putting any pressure on Nicosia to overcome their reservations?
L. ZOCHIOU: We do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. What I can tell you about our relations with the Republic of Cyprus is that the unity between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus is solid - and there is no doubt about that. Beyond that, concerning internal matters of the Republic of Cyprus, I believe the appropriate person to respond would be the competent official, which of course is not the spokesperson of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
H. MAKRI: May I pose a question? I wasn't present from the beginning. Chrysa Makri from “Parapolitika” newspaper. I wanted to ask about Egypt. You said about Greek-Turkish relations that there are open channels of communication. Given that the Summit was held in one room, I don't know if you said at the beginning whether there was any communication between Mr. Gerapetritis and Mr. Fidan or the Prime Minister, at least formally.
L. ZOCHIOU: There was no meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece and his Turkish counterpart.
H. MAKRI: So the communication that you say exists, even in such a major event, how is it recorded? Only diplomatically?
L. ZOCHIOU: You understand that a meeting, on the sidelines of a summit dealing with the peace process in Gaza, I don't think it carries enough weight to determine Greek-Turkish relations - I mean whether or not there was a short meeting on the sidelines of the summit.
M. MOURELATOU: I wanted to ask whether we maintain active diplomatic channels with Moscow and if so, in what way? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: We maintain diplomatic relations. Our Embassy is operating, its operation has not been interrupted. Greek-Russian relations have essentially been damaged after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Before, our relations were at a very satisfactory level and we fully respected the historical, cultural and religious ties we had with the Russian Federation. Bilateral relations have been damaged, they have frozen after the invasion and our contacts have certainly become much less frequent. It is true that we need to discuss. And what do I mean when I say "discuss"? Greece is a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council. We must cooperate, exchange views, and express our positions in such a crucial body as the UN Security Council.
N. PETANIDOU: Petanidou from “Naftemporiki’’. I would like to move on to the topic of Libya. If we have any updates regarding the second round of discussions between the technical committees or if there has been any telephone communication or anything else in the period so far.
L. ZOCHIOU: There is no development regarding Libya. If there is anything, it will be announced when it is finalized.
M. TSILINIKOU: Maria Tsilinikou, SKAI TV and CNN Greece. Regarding Russia and your position following the statement, the provocative post of the Spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Was there any contact between the two countries?
L. ZOHIOU: There was none.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: Because Mr. Gerapetritis, in his visits to Estonia and Finland, in both cases insisted on the issue of the so-called “shadow fleet”. Why do Finland and Estonia - and the other Baltic countries, as far as I know - insist so much on the issue of the shadow fleet with regard to Greece? What specifically did they ask for? And in any case, they are asking the Greek government to take action against the shipowners, if I understand correctly?
L. ZOCHIOU: I will return briefly to the issues raised in the introduction by saying that as coastal states, all three countries, namely Greece, Finland and Estonia, attach particular importance to maritime security. Maritime security is an issue on which Greece has a strategy and is one of the priorities of its term in the UN Security Council. Indeed, the shadow fleet was on the agenda of the discussions with both countries. On this issue, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself said, we join our voices with Finland and Estonia, condemning the existence of the shadow fleet. Firstly, because it constitutes a blatant violation of International Law. Secondly, it constitutes an instrumentalization of shipping for aggressive purposes. Thirdly, it is a form of unfair competition and concerns ships that do not meet the required safety guarantees and do not comply with navigation rules. And, of course, it is a practice that is harmful to the marine environment itself. These issues were discussed in the meetings that the Minister had in Helsinki and Tallinn.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: And something again regarding Russian affairs. The day before yesterday, our former Ambassador to Kyiv, Vasilis Bornovas, for the first time since 2022 when he left from there, reported on social media, on Twitter, that the Greek Embassy was closed and he himself was removed from there along with the remaining staff, due to pressure from the then American Ambassador to Greece, Pyatt. How exactly was our Embassy in Kyiv closed in 2022, following the outbreak of the war? Was it a decision by Athens, or was it a decision by our Ambassador at the time, Mr. Bornovas?
****As noted in the relevant Announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 22, 2022, the Ambassador of Greece to Ukraine at the time requested and received authorization to depart immediately from Kyiv, together with the Embassy staff, due to the rapidly deteriorating security situation on the ground. Indeed, there exists relevant official correspondence on this matter. Subsequently, towards the end of April 2022, once it was duly determined that conditions in Kyiv allowed for the return of the Embassy personnel, the Central Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued instructions for the re-staffing of the Mission.
It should be underlined that at no point was the operation of our Mission suspended, contrary to certain reports, and that the only decision taken concerned the temporary withdrawal of its personnel. In any case, assessments regarding local security conditions are made by the Heads of the Greek Missions Abroad, who submit their recommendations to the Central Office. Any other speculation concerning the circumstances under which the Kyiv Embassy staff departed Ukraine bears no relation to reality and is not substantiated by the official correspondence.
L. ZOCHIOU: Thank you very much.
October 16, 2025