L. ZOCHIOU: Good day.
“Global Sumud Flotilla”
According to information provided by the Israeli authorities, the Greek citizens participating in the “Global Sumud Flotilla” are expected to arrive gradually over the coming hours in Israel, specifically at the port of Ashdod, where registration and identification procedures will follow.
The Ambassador of Greece to Tel Aviv is expected to visit the site, most likely tomorrow morning, where the Greek citizens will be held, in order to provide the necessary consular assistance and ensure that the procedures for their prompt and safe repatriation are completed as swiftly as possible.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made démarches to the Israeli side, calling upon it to ensure the safety of the Greek citizens and promptly complete the required procedures. The Ministry also remains in constant communication with the relatives and next of kin of the participants, in order to provide immediate updates.
We demand full adherence to International Law and respect for the dignity and rights of the Greek citizens.
The case of the Unmanned Surface Vessel detected in Lefkada
This is an extremely serious incident and a matter of concern.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs raised the issue with European partners at the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels, who expressed their concern and requested to be informed of the findings of the investigation.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs also conveyed Greece’s concern during his communication with his Ukrainian counterpart, Andrii Sybiha, and underscored the seriousness of the incident.
As soon as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs receives the official findings of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, we will proceed with the necessary actions and démarches, both at the bilateral and the international levels.
Greece will not allow the spillover of war into the Mediterranean. We will take all necessary measures to ensure that the Mediterranean does not become a theater of military operations and that such an incident is not repeated.
Western Balkans
During the meetings held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs last week, one of the main topics discussed was the Western Balkans. In particular, on Monday, May 11, the Minister of Foreign Affairs participated in the meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council and, the following day, May 12, in the meeting of the “Friends of the Western Balkans” Group in Bratislava.
As the oldest EU Member State in the region, Greece has, for the past 23 years, assumed a leading role in the accession of the Western Balkans to the European Union. From the Thessaloniki Agenda of 2003 to the Delphi Declaration of 2026, Greece has consistently maintained that the European perspective of the Western Balkans is irreversible on the basis, however, of the principles of conditionality and own merits, and with no deviation from the obligation to uphold the EU acquis, the rule of law, International Law and good neighborly relations.
The Delphi Declaration marks the starting point of the Greek initiative on the Western Balkans undertaken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Gerapetritis. The next step will be the Minister’s tour of the Western Balkans in June.
Greece is willing and ready to provide expertise in critical areas such as the rule of law, public administration, digital governance, and transport and energy infrastructure, while also offering tangible support to the reform efforts of its partners in the region.
We believe that renewed momentum has been given to the enlargement policy, which constitutes a strategic priority for the EU. This is a mutually beneficial process, both for the Western Balkans partners and for the European Union itself.
North Africa and the Middle East, and Mr. Gerapetritis’ contacts with Ministers of Foreign Affairs who have an active role in developments and peace talks in the broader Middle East
The Minister of Foreign Affairs welcomed his Saudi Arabian counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud to Athens. The two Ministers discussed the latest developments in the broaderMiddle East region, including the situation in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria, as well as the further strengthening of bilateral relations.
Mr. Gerapetritis commended the role played by Saudi Arabia in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a sustainable solution in the wider Middle East and underlined the strategic importance of safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Regarding bilateral relations:
It was agreed that the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council will convene in the near future.
Particular emphasis was also placed on interconnectivity issues, including the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), to which both Saudi Arabia and Greece attach particular importance.
On Thursday, May 17, Mr. Gerapetritis had a phone call with his Egyptian counterpart, Badr Abdelatty. The two Ministers discussed issues of bilateral and regional interest in light of the crisis in the broader Middle East, including Lebanon and Gaza. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to diplomacy as a means of conflict resolution and emphasized the importance of respect for International Law and freedom of navigation. They also agreed to continue close cooperation with a view to peace and prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean.
On Thursday, May 7, the Minister of Foreign Affairs hosted a luncheon in honor of His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, during his visit to Athens.
Mr. Gerapetritis reaffirmed the support of the Greek State for the institution, the multifaceted work and the mission of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
During the meeting, issues concerning the Greek Minority and matters of key interest and priority to the Ecumenical Patriarchate were discussed, including, naturally, the Halki Theological School.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs underlined the importance Greece attaches to the protection of Christian populations around the world, particularly in the Middle East, including through its support for the Primeval Patriarchates of the region.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed that Greece consistently prioritizes the safeguarding of the rights of religious and ethnic communities and supports every effort aimed at the effective protection of religious and cultural heritage.
Regarding the schedule of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
On May 22, the Minister of Foreign Affairs will welcome the Vice President of the Federal Council and Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation, Ignazio Cassis, to Athens.
The main topics on the agenda are bilateral relations, the strengthening of economic cooperation, regional developments, EU-Switzerland relations, and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations, in light of Greece’s tenure on the UN Security Council.
Also, on May 27, Mr. Gerapetritis will hold a meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Elina Valtonen.
Subsequently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs will meet with a delegation of the United States Congress led by Trent Kelly, Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee.
On the same day, he will travel to the Informal Meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers “Gymnich”, to be held on May 27 and 28 in Limassol.
On May 29, Mr. Gerapetritis will meet with the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Petra Bayr.
Regarding the schedule of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Alexandra Papadopoulou:
On May 21 and 22, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Alexandra Papadopoulou, will represent the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Meeting of the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Sweden.
On May 26, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs will participate in the EU General Affairs Council in Brussels.
In addition, on May 28 and 29, Ms. Papadopoulou will travel to the Vatican for political consultations with the Undersecretary of the Section for Relations with States and International Organizations of the Secretariat of State of the Vatican, Mihăiţă Blaj.
On June 2, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs will meet with the Secretary of State for European Affairs of Poland, Ignacy Niemczycki.
The following day, June 3, Ms. Papadopoulou will meet with the EU Special Representative for the Sahel region, João Cravinho.
Regarding the schedule of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theoharis Theoharis:
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Theoharis Theoharis will participate in the conference “Greece & Czechia Unlocking Potential”, taking place in Prague on May 19 and 20.
In addition, on May 21, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs will participate in the “Ukraine Outlook: War, Recovery & the Road Ahead” conference, to be held in London.
On May 31, Mr. Theoharis will visit Portugal for bilateral meetings.
Regarding the schedule of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yiannis Loverdos:
On May 25, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs will address the event on the digitization of the archives of the Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice.
K. TSAMOURI: Tsamouri from STAR channel, PARAPOLITIKA and APOGEVMATINI newspapers. I heard the Minister say the other day to our colleague Alexandra Fotaki that the government would wait to see the content of this law on the “blue homeland” and would then respond repressively. He also left open the possibility of acting pre-emptively. What does this mean? What does Greece intend to do? What will its response be? Beyond raising the issue in international fora, which has already been mentioned. Something more specific?
L. ZOCHIOU: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not comment on media reports. There has been no official statement from Türkiye. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated, Greece will assess the exact content of the Turkish bill and will respond accordingly. We are taking precautions and gathering the necessary information, but under no circumstances do we proceed pre-emptively with actions that could leave us exposed. We are prepared for all possible scenarios and, depending on the content of the bill, we will undertake the appropriate reactions and actions.
M. NICOLAIDOU: Following up on Ms. Tsamouri’s question. Does that mean we will react after the bill passes through the Turkish National Assembly? Because the NATO Summit is taking place on July 7 and 8, and there is speculation that the bill may already have been passed by then, allowing Türkiye to arrive at the NATO Summit with this bill formally adopted as an official state position.
L. ZOCHIOU: I understand your question, but all of this remains media reports. In any case, the exact content will be assessed so that there can be an appropriate response on our part.
M. NICOLAIDOU: So afterwards, once it has passed? Are there communication channels with Türkiye at the moment so that we can know exactly what…
L. ZOCHIOU: Communication channels remain open at all times and on multiple levels.
D. KRIKELAS: Krikelas from Flash.gr. To add to my colleague’s question: within the framework of these open communication channels and good neighborliness, was there any information provided before we all read about this move, this proposal from Ankara, in the Turkish media? In other words, through these channels that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs keeps open, had there been any information, as may have happened in the past on other equally significant issues, whether from one side or the other? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: As I said before, communication channels are and should always remain open.
CH. MAKRI: A question on that. Mr. Christodoulides stated yesterday that démarches had been made to European leaders on the matter, in coordination with the Prime Minister. Are you aware of these initiatives?
L. ZOCHIOU: I do not know of that.
CH. MAKRI: Have démarches or contacts with European officials taken place in any case, beyond Mr. Christodoulides’ statement?
L. ZOCHIOU: Our position is the one I have just expressed.
M. NICOLAIDOU: In other words, is there a possibility that the issue could be raised at Council level, among the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at the EU Foreign Affairs Council, as we did with the Ukrainian drone? Could such a discussion take place in May? Have we informed anyone? We also have President Ursula von der Leyen, who made certain statements highly supportive of Türkiye. Have we informed our European partners?
L. ZOCHIOU: We are taking precautions and gathering the necessary information. Under no circumstances, however, as I have already said, are we proceeding pre-emptively with actions that could potentially leave us exposed. There must first be a clear picture of the bill’s exact content.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: The Prime Minister had previously expressed the view that Greece supports the referral to the International Court of Justice. Mr. Fidan, in relatively recent statements, said that one side says six nautical miles, the other says twelve, but that these are issues that can be resolved. The question is the following: during the contacts held thus far within the framework of the Greek-Turkish dialogue, from the Prime Minister’s to the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs’ level, has the Greek side raised the issue of referral to the International Court of Justice with the Turkish side? And if so, what has the Turkish side replied? And if the Turkish side accepts referral to the International Court of Justice, under what terms and with what agenda?
L. ZOCHIOU: You have raised several issues.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: The issue is the International Court of Justice. Over time, we have seen the Turkish side change its position. Since the 1970s, it has shifted its stance many times. At times it is in favor, at times, against. Greece’s longstanding position is that it supports referral to the International Court of Justice on matters concerning the Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf. The issue is whether this matter has been raised within the framework of the Greek-Turkish dialogue at all levels and what responses the Greek side has received. I believe this is the crucial issue in this case.
L. ZOCHIOU: Let us address these issues one by one. First of all, issues pertaining to sovereignty are not subject to discussion. Secondly, with regard to the Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf, these constitute the only outstanding Greek-Turkish dispute that could be brought before the International Court of Justice, something we have consistently stressed in every direction. We are consistently in favor of dialogue. As you know, the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself stated - including during the visit of his Turkish counterpart, Mr. Fidan, here in Athens - with absolute clarity, that there is no convergence as regards the scope of the discussion. And this is what we continue to reiterate: there is no convergence and therefore, at least at this stage, we are not moving in that direction.
TH. ARGYRAKIS So, should I conclude that the Turkish side does not at this point accept a referral to the International Court of Justice?
L. ZOCHIOU: I believe it is clear what the scope of the discussion entails.
TH. ARGYRAKIS There is disagreement over the agenda.
S. RISTOVSKA: Madam Spokesperson, you mentioned earlier that the Minister will travel to the Western Balkans in June. Do you have specific dates, or details on which countries he will visit? Will he visit all five or six countries? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: Relevant announcements will follow. As the program currently stands, the tour will take place in June.
TH. BALODIMAS: Since we mentioned NATO earlier, do we have any information as to whether a senior U.S. official may visit Greece in July, either President Trump or the Secretary of State or Secretary of War? And secondly: you mentioned that members of the Senate - or rather from the Seapower Subcommittee - will come next week for a meeting with Mr. Gerapetritis. Will these issues raised earlier by colleagues also be discussed?
L. ZOCHIOU: Which issues exactly?
TH. BALODIMAS: Greek-Turkish relations.
L. ZOCHIOU: First of all, no visit to Greece by U.S. officials has been arranged. As regards your second question, there will be a relevant announcement.
CH. MAKRI: A question regarding the drone. There is speculation surrounding the findings. I believe you said that they are not yet known to you. However, there are reports suggesting that it did not originate from Ukraine. Can you confirm or deny this? Are you aware of anything indicating that it was ultimately not Ukrainian?
L. ZOCHIOU: I cannot confirm that information. We are awaiting the official findings of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff.
M. NICOLAIDOU: So, we do not know whether the U.S. President, Mr. Rubio or anyone else may come to Greece before the NATO Summit? You are not confirming this.
L. ZOCHIOU: I believe I was clear in my response to Mr. Balodimas. To the best of my knowledge, no such visit has been confirmed.
M. NICOLAIDOU: Ok, thank you.
P. MICHOS: Panayiotis Michos from TO MANIFESTO newspaper. On Monday, the Government Spokesperson was asked about an issue concerning Greek-Ukrainian relations and referred the matter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following a report by Protagon. The report claimed that in November 2025, beyond the joint declaration signed by Prime Minister Mitsotakis and President Zelenskyy, a Protocol was also agreed upon which was not made public and of which the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was allegedly informed only afterwards. First, is this true or not? Do you confirm it? And secondly, are reports accurate that during the démarches made by our representatives in Kyiv, the Ukrainian side expressed irritation over the public disclosure of the incident? Because, according to what the Ukrainians allegedly argued, this causes them to lose control of the narrative. Thank you very much.
L. ZOCHIOU: If I understand correctly, you are referring to an agreement signed on the margins of the European Council in 2024. Naturally, aspects of that agreement were negotiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
P. MICHOS: I am referring to an agreement concluded during President Zelenskyy’s most recent visit, which was not made public. I am not referring to the security agreement signed by Ukraine with all European states in October 2024.
L. ZOCHIOU: We are referring to the agreement signed on the margins of the European Council in 2024.
P. MICHOS: No, I am referring to an agreement reached during President Zelenskyy’s latest visit to Athens in November 2025.
L. ZOCHIOU: As I understand it, the agreement, that I believe you refer to, was signed on the margins of the European Council in 2024, which was negotiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That is what I know.
P. MICHOS: The agreement you are referring to is the one ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament but it has not yet come to the Greek Parliament. It is the security agreement signed by Kyiv with all EU Member States. I am asking about another agreement, citing the Protagon report, namely that a security protocol was concluded between the two leaders and was not made public. If you have anything to tell us, because we were referred to you - not me, other colleagues.
L. ZOCHIOU: I will come back to your question.
P. MICHOS: Regarding the second part of the question?
L. ZOCHIOU: For what reason did he refer you to us, if it is an agreement...
P. MICHOS: As you can see in the Monday briefing of the political correspondents, he referred...
L. ZOCHIOU: I have seen it. He did not refer you to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he said “I will look into it” and he referred to the 2024 agreement.
P. MICHOS: He said I will ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I will come back to you. Now, one of you has to answer. You may refer to the publication. Regarding the second part of the question…
L. ZOCHIOU: First of all, no démarches have been made. Evidently, bilateral discussions are taking place, but under no circumstances has a démarche yet been made, given that, as I noted in my introductory remarks, we are awaiting the official findings report.
P. MICHOS: In the context of those discussions, did the Ukrainian side express what I mentioned earlier?
L. ZOCHIOU: I will not disclose the content of the discussions. However, there is certainly no “control of the narrative”, to which you referred.
P. MICHOS: The Ukrainian side raised it, not me. I am merely conveying certain information and asking whether you confirm it.
CH. MAKRI: Regarding the official findings report from the Ministry of Defence, when do you expect to receive official information?
L. ZOCHIOU: That depends on the Hellenic National Defense General Staff.
K. ALATZAS: Good morning. Kostas Alatzas from EFSYN and ACTION 24. I would like to further focus on the issue of the Ukrainian drone, following up on the colleague’s question. What Protagon was reporting is that the Greek side had been informed - if I understood the question correctly and to make it somewhat more specific - that the vessels of the so-called “Russian shadow fleet” constitute hostile targets for the Ukrainian side. Therefore, Athens had been informed that the Ukrainian side hits such targets. At least, that is how I understood the publication: that Greece was aware that such operations were taking place. The findings report of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff has been completed, at least, according to my information. We do not know what follows. According to the information available, the drone was of Ukrainian manufacture and origin. It is also estimated that its mission was to strike a Russian vessel or a vessel transporting Russian fuel, and that it was launched from a ship in the Mediterranean. These are the reports concerning the contents of the findings. My question is: what is Athens waiting for in order to make the appropriate démarches? And does the current waiting-mode approach have anything to do with the position of our European partners, given that at the latest Foreign Affairs Council there were several partners who - to put it plainly - told us that there was no need to escalate the issue further, so as not to undermine Europe’s support for Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia? What are we waiting for before making a démarche to Kyiv?
L. ZOCHIOU: We are waiting for the findings report. As soon as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs receives the official findings of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, we will proceed with the démarches, both at the bilateral and the international levels.
As regards the second issue you raised, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not received any such information regarding a “shadow fleet” and legitimate targets. However, as concerns sanctions - we have now reached the 20th sanctions package adopted within the framework of the European Union - even vessels included on sanctions lists can under no circumstances justify, or give anyone the right to, strike or sink them, or endanger human lives and the marine environment. The framework governing the implementation of sanctions is specific.
K. ALATZAS: As a follow-up, are you concerned about the possible presence of other such drones in our region?
L. ZOCHIOU: As I stated in my introductory remarks, we have expressed our concern both to our European partners, as has the Minister of Foreign Affairs to his Ukrainian counterpart.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: May I ask something? In recent days, almost simultaneously and following the incident in Lefkada, there were several Ukrainian drones that were found the last couple of days in the Baltic region, specifically in Latvia and Estonia. In Latvia, the Minister of Defense resigned, and yesterday, in Estonia, NATO aircraft shot down a Ukrainian drone, whose apparent objective was to transit Baltic airspace en route to Russia. In Estonia’s case, Ukraine officially apologized yesterday. Following the contacts Minister Gerapetritis had with his Ukrainian counterpart, can you tell us whether any apology was conveyed by the Ukrainian side or, in any event, what was discussed in general terms?
L. ZOCHIOU: When the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke with his Ukrainian counterpart, it was not possible to issue a reprimand, given that we did not yet have a clear picture of the findings report. Our response will, of course, also depend on the explanations provided by the other side, if and when the matter is raised in the most official manner.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: So, at this point, the Ukrainian side has provided no response along the lines of “it is ours, it is not ours,” “we apologize,” or “we do not apologize.”
L. ZOCHIOU: I have outlined the context, and we will leave it at that.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: May I also ask something regarding yesterday’s conversation between the President of the European Commission and the Turkish President? In her post, she wrote that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Cyprus Issue were discussed. Do you have any further information on this?
L. ZOCHIOU: That question would be better addressed to the Commission’s Spokesperson.
K. ALATZAS: The day before yesterday, the Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defense (KYSEA) decided to return the two Patriot batteries that had been deployed, amid concerns regarding Iranian contingencies, to Didymoteicho in Thrace and to Karpathos. According to sources from the Ministry of National Defense, the decision was taken because there had been a change in the threat assessment. Do you have anything to tell us on this matter, specifically whether it is linked to the reports we have seen in recent weeks in the Turkish press concerning the legislative initiative on Türkiye’s jurisdiction over maritime zones? Is the decision related to what we are hearing from Türkiye, especially given that Türkiye had reacted to the redeployment of the batteries?
L. ZOCHIOU: One comment on this, given that you understand it falls outside the remit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the defense posture of the islands is a purely operational matter and concerns the Hellenic National Defense General Staff.
P. MICHOS: The President of the European Commission spoke with the Turkish President and described what she considers Türkiye’s importance for the region. Recently, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, together with a large delegation, visited Türkiye, signed 60 memoranda, and described Türkiye as the guardian angel of Southeastern Europe. How does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs view such statements by partner countries and nominal allies? Does it agree? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: Τhe Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursues an independent and active foreign policy.
E. SIPSAS: Good morning, Sipsas from CGNT. In your introductory remarks, you said that you are in contact with Egypt regarding the situation in Gaza, Lebanon and the Middle East. Egypt has stated clearly that the Israeli strikes in Lebanon raise the issue of violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty. Is Greece also prepared to state clearly that these constitute a violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty and pose a risk of destabilization in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean?
L. ZOCHIOU: First of all, welcome to our briefings. Look, we have stated our position on Lebanon with clarity. We have repeatedly called for full respect for International Law and for respect for Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We openly and actively support Lebanon and, of course, the direct talks taking place between Lebanon and Israel as an important step towards peace and stability in the region.
D. KRIKELAS: I understand that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not comment on press reports regarding Türkiye’s intention to codify the “blue homeland” into law. However, beyond the reports, there have also been public statements by politicians on the other side; this is not something insubstantial. I would like to ask whether you have an assessment, given that we have open communication channels. There is an ongoing dialogue, notwithstanding the obvious longstanding disagreements. Does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have an initial assessment as to why Türkiye is choosing, at this particular moment, to disturb the calm waters and create turbulence in this way? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: As you mentioned yourself, the “blue homeland” is a baseless revisionist doctrine. The legal status in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean is clear. And, as we said earlier, Greece consistently supports dialogue aimed at resolving the sole dispute we have with Türkiye: the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf on the basis of International Law. Beyond that, however, as regards the draft legislation and so forth, I could not comment further, neither on the timing nor on the underlying rationale.
I can, of course, speak to you about our Maritime Spatial Planning, as well as the initiatives and actions undertaken by our side.
D. KRIKELAS: No need. Obviously, the question follows from what the Minister of Foreign Affairs said, namely that certain steps had previously been taken by the Greek side. In essence, what Mr. Gerapetritis implied was that this comes as a reaction to what Greek diplomacy and Athens have done over recent months, which includes a whole series of actions.
L. ZOCHIOU: I cannot interpret what is happening in Türkiye.
TH. BALODIMAS: Let us return to what you said earlier, which formally sounds correct, namely that this redeployment of forces is a purely operational matter for the Hellenic National Defense General Staff. On the other hand, however, what you said - and something similar was said by the Government Spokesperson - sounds somewhat as though responsibility is being shifted elsewhere, either to the political leadership of the Ministry of National Defense or to the Army General Staff of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff. When these systems were deployed there, what was publicly stated was that this was due to an Iranian threat. I imagine that a similar discussion took place now in the KYSEA regarding their withdrawal. Does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believe that there is now no Iranian threat?
L. ZOCHIOU: I would refer you to the competent Ministry of Defense.
TH. BALODIMAS: On this matter, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has a primary role to play. A position should also come from you, regardless of whether you wish to comment at this moment.
L. ZOCHIOU: We will leave it at that.
M. MOURELATOU: Mourelatou from TA NEA newspaper. I would like to ask where matters stand regarding the technical talks on the delimitation of the EEZ with Libya, whether we have any indication, and whether Ms. Papadopoulou will participate in the NATO Ministerial Meeting. Has she received any guidance or instructions from here regarding whether we would participate should a NATO operation in the Strait of Hormuz be decided upon? Thank you.
L. ZOCHIOU: As regards the technical talks, there is no specific date yet. The diplomatic teams are working towards identifying a date in the immediate future.
As regards the Strait of Hormuz, within the NATO framework, at least for the time being and to the best of my knowledge, there is nothing further, no tangible initiative. Our position is clear: navigation must remain free in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We support diplomatic initiatives aimed at restoring international legitimacy and freedom of navigation. We have already stated our position regarding the Franco-British initiative and our support for it.
K. TSAMOYRI: The colleague asked you, “why now?”. Why is Türkiye returning to provocations at this particular moment, after a long period of relative calm? I would like to ask, if you cannot answer the “why now” question, whether this concerns you and whether there has been any planning within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the possibility that we may experience a repeat of the 2020 crisis this summer, given that after Bayram, meaning in June, the law on the “blue homeland” is expected to be brought before the Turkish National Assembly and there may perhaps be further tensions.
L. ZOCHIOU: Let me stick to what the Minister of Foreign Affairs said, namely that there is a possibility of an escalation of tensions. You understand that all of this remains volatile, given that, as we said at the outset, there is no clear picture as to what this reported draft law entails or provides for. Therefore, I would say that, first and foremost, we should follow developments calmly. Evidently, as I mentioned, everything is being recorded, we are gathering all the information, and once we have a complete and clear picture, we will of course respond accordingly.
E. SIPSAS: Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, I would like to ask, since the Greek government has announced that it will not participate in a mission to assist navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, is Athens considering something else in the future, perhaps participation in some mission if the situation deteriorates or if attacks on commercial vessels increase? Can you say whether any participation is being considered?
L. ZOCHIOU: Recently, Greece co-signed a statement together with 25 states referring to the Franco-British initiative. As envisaged, the mission would have a purely defensive nature. It would also commence once conditions permit. And it presupposes cooperation with all parties involved.
E. SIPSAS: Some countries, however, are categorical that they will not participate at all, such as Germany. It specifically says: “No intention at all.” Does Greece have any “intention,” so to speak, perhaps to participate in the future or at least provide some form of assistance, whatever that may be?
L. ZOCHIOU: Greece co-chairs, together with the IMO, a group dealing with cooperation with the maritime community. Greece also has another comparative advantage: the expertise it has acquired through its participation in, and leading role within “ASPIDES”.
TH. ARGYRAKIS Is an expansion of “ASPIDES” being considered? There are differing views and reports.
L. ZOCHIOU: Indeed, views are conflicting and diverging, so there is no clear picture as to what the future may hold. Thank you very much.
May 20, 2026