JOURNALIST: We are joined by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Gerapetritis, and I would like to thank him very much indeed for being with us. Good morning, Minister.
G. GERAPETRITIS: Good morning, Mr. Tsimas. The honour is mine.
JOURNALIST: Well, it is an established fact that the memorandum contravenes international law, that we do not recognise it and that no European or other country recognises it either. In practice, however, what Greece has been trying to prevent for seven years has now happened. Is this a failure?
G. GERAPETRITIS: Let us look at the facts first and then your listeners will be able to assess them for themselves.
JOURNALIST: We are listening.
G. GERAPETRITIS: First of all, let us make clear that the Turkish-Libyan memorandum is not a recent development. The Turkish-Libyan memorandum was signed in 2019.
JOURNALIST: In November 2019, indeed.
G. GERAPETRITIS: In November 2019. Moreover, it was signed by a government in Western Libya that had no legitimate authority to do so, because it had merely a transitional mandate and no authority to enter into binding agreements. Nevertheless, it was signed. And we all know how it came to be signed. It was signed because Türkiye had established a system of influence in Libya, essentially seeking to advance its own interests.
JOURNALIST: What actually happened at the time was that Libya was in the midst of a civil war. Haftar, from Eastern Libya, had launched a military campaign to capture Tripoli, and Türkiye helped Sarraj, the head of Libya's Presidential Council, resist that offensive. In return, Sarraj gave Türkiye the memorandum. That is essentially what happened.
G. GERAPETRITIS: That is exactly as you describe it. Meanwhile, Türkiye made systematic efforts to secure the ratification of the memorandum by the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives is based in Eastern Libya and, as you understand, is not the product of regularly held elections. Your listeners should bear in mind that Libya is not a country “operating under normal circumstances”. It has considerable particularities. It is a divided country, where two separate authorities exercise power, and there are distinct centres of power within each region. Therefore, in any event, what began as a negative development in 2019 became a rearguard battle to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. However, it was evident that, once the balance of power between the individuals involved changed, as happened with the forcible removal of the Speaker of the House of Representatives two weeks ago and his replacement by someone favourably disposed towards Türkiye, developments would take a different turn. This was not unexpected. Now, if you ask me what the actual consequences are, the answer is very clear. First, as you rightly pointed out, there are absolutely no consequences as regards the implementation of this memorandum. The memorandum will not be implemented. And it will not be implemented for the simple reason that it produces no legal effects whatsoever, as it is entirely contrary to international law.
JOURNALIST: The question is simple. It is true that it produces no legal effects, and yesterday we also had statements to that effect from European Union officials, including the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. And, in any case, it is not recognised by any other country. Nevertheless, it will have practical consequences. In other words, when the survey vessel for the GSI cable project attempts to pass through the area, Türkiye will say: "Just a moment, these waters belong to us. We have divided them up with Libya."
G. GERAPETRITIS: Türkiye could have said that regardless of the existence of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, and it could have said so even if the memorandum had not been ratified. It could have invoked the Turkish-Libyan memorandum signed in 2019. But that is not the issue. The issue is this: Türkiye and Libya have now chosen to enter into an agreement that falls outside the framework of international law, accepting whatever consequences may arise from that decision. Because all bilateral actions have consequences. And what are those consequences? Greece will now mobilise its own mechanisms to denounce this memorandum. The memorandum will not be implemented under any circumstances, Mr. Tsimas. Even if it had not been ratified, it would still not have been implemented. Let me remind you that Greece launched tenders for offshore blocks South of Crete, in the area covered by the Turkish-Libyan memorandum. Greece has far more extensive interests in the area, including interconnectivity projects that pass through it. Therefore, the memorandum will not be implemented. And let me add something else. There are two levels. The first level: the most powerful mechanism available was mobilised. Within just a few hours of the ratification of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, we had statements from the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council. Further statements will follow, as Greece has mobilised all its allies and partners. There will therefore be unanimous support for Greece's position on this issue and condemnation of the memorandum.
The second and equally important level is that Greece is currently in a position to take substantial action to ensure that this legally non-existent memorandum is not implemented in practice either.
JOURNALIST: For example?
G. GERAPETRITIS: All financing arrangements concerning Libya go through Greece, as does the peacekeeping mission operating in Libya. Greece plays a substantial role in all financing arrangements concerning Libya, as well as in matters relating to the peacekeeping mission operating there. Türkiye's EU accession process also depends on Greece’s position. Greece is currently the gateway to international fora, determining access for any country. Therefore, we will now activate our mechanisms. There will be specific briefings, as there have already been since yesterday. I have spoken with both my counterparts and Heads of Institutions, and there will be a united response to this issue.
JOURNALIST: Let me return to my original question. All that you have said regarding the validity or enforceability of the memorandum is obviously correct. However, is it not a failure of Greek diplomacy that, after seven years, what it had been trying to prevent has ultimately happened?
G. GERAPETRITIS: It was not within Greece's power to prevent it. Let us start with the basics. Logically, if something is entirely within our control, then obviously we should not allow it to happen. But if something is beyond our control, we cannot prevent it. Let me remind you that ratification does not take place in a vacuum. We already had an agreement dating back to 2019. In 2019, this agreement was concluded unilaterally, in violation of international law and without any legitimate authority. Ratification adds absolutely nothing, either in theory or in practice. We should not expect anything to result from the ratification of the memorandum. Those who speak of national defeats and the like would do well to be very careful in their choice of words.
JOURNALIST: Let me ask about the response. You have described measures involving diplomatic mobilisation, briefings and, obviously, action at European level and in relation to financing arrangements, among other things. Does your planning also include the long-discussed extension of our territorial waters to 12 nautical miles South and West of Crete?
G. GERAPETRITIS: Greece does not react impulsively. Greece acts according to a plan and, above all, in pursuit of its national interests. And this is a fundamental difference compared with what happened in previous decades. Everything that has been achieved over the past seven years – our maritime delimitation agreements, the extension of territorial waters in the Ionian Sea, the marine parks, maritime spatial planning and the utilisation of our resources – has been undertaken primarily because we have a plan in place. We will not be influenced by an act that is entirely null and void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever. It would be unthinkable for our strategy to be determined by how Libya and Türkiye perceive their own relationship, or for them to be able to influence our strategy. So, the answer is this: Greece will extend its territorial waters. I have said this many times. It is a right deriving from its sovereignty and from international law. But Greece will exercise this right in the manner and at the time that the Greek State itself chooses.
JOURNALIST: Now, a second related question. You spoke yesterday with your Egyptian counterpart. Egypt is, how shall I put it, directly involved in the matter we are discussing, because we have an agreement with Egypt on the partial delimitation of our Exclusive Economic Zones. Can you tell us, if you are in a position to do so, whether you are confident that Egypt's position will be the one we would like to see, the one we expect, or the one required by international law? And could we include in our diplomatic arsenal an extension of the existing delimitation agreement with Egypt?
G. GERAPETRITIS: My answer is unequivocal. Greece and Egypt enjoy a strategic and, if I may say so, brotherly relationship. This relationship is founded not only on the agreement on the partial delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones; it is strategic in its very nature. That is why I have complete confidence in our shared understanding, which was reaffirmed during yesterday's communications. Clearly, the question of extending the existing agreement will also be discussed in the future. This is something we will address in due course, when we have assessed the circumstances. In any event, as regards Libya, Greece and Egypt have an entirely shared understanding. And the same entirely shared understanding, Mr. Tsimas, exists among all 27 Member States of the European Union, without exception.
JOURNALIST: I see. Now, there is a practical consequence, or at least one would logically assume there is, from the ratification of the memorandum by the House of Representatives in Eastern Libya, which Türkiye pressed for just days, or even hours, before the planned start – or rather resumption – of work on the much-discussed GSI project, the electricity interconnection cable between Cyprus and Greece. Today, we have statements by Mr. Fidan published in the “TA NEA” newspaper, in which he says quite clearly: "We are not raising an issue of disputed waters. What we ask is that, when a vessel conducts surveys at sea, it sends us written notification, not merely verbal notification, stating that it intends to carry out specific activities in a particular area. And that", Mr. Fidan says, "is all we are asking for." Is this something we can live with? In other words, is this something we can do?
G. GERAPETRITIS: I believe the answer is clear. Greece is the only country whose authorization is required - and has, in fact, already been requested - for the Greece-Cyprus electricity interconnection. In this regard, once authorization is granted by Greece, providing information concerning the research and the laying of the cable could be feasible - with the explicit clarification that this does not constitute a formal licensing process.
JOURNALIST: It appears there have also been some contacts or discussions between France and Türkiye, given that the company undertaking the project is French. Furthermore, reports have emerged today suggesting the existence of a "back channel" - an informal line of negotiation - between Greece and Turkey. I wonder if…
G. GERAPETRITIS: There is, categorically, no such understanding. I have had to state this countless times; unfortunately, I find myself repeatedly compelled to respond to purely speculative scenarios. There is absolutely no communication with Türkiye regarding the laying of the electricity cable. This is a sovereign right of Greece. The established procedures will be followed. As you are aware, a request for a permit to carry out operations is already pending at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will be reviewed by the competent inter-ministerial committee. Greece will take the necessary steps, given that it is the state that exercises maritime jurisdiction in the area.
JOURNALIST: And if Türkiye attempts -manu militari as you legal experts put it - to obstruct the vessel as it passes through, what will our reaction be?
G. GERAPETRITIS: Allow me to say that Greece is prepared for any potential scenario. As far as I can tell, there is no indication of an intention on Türkiye’s part to react in such a manner. And it would be best if no such reaction occurred, given that this is a project that is not exclusively Greek; it involves French interests and benefits from European funding. One cannot threaten a project with a European orientation while simultaneously aspiring to become a member of the European family - that is self-evident. Naturally, we are prepared for any eventuality, but I believe there should be no reaction at all.
JOURNALIST: So, the timeline you had established for the cable remains unchanged?
G. GERAPETRITIS: Mr. Tsimas, as I mentioned, we do not operate based on fleeting circumstances or ad hoc reactions - those approaches belong to a bygone era. We have a very concrete plan. This plan focuses on safeguarding our nation’s interests, expanding its geopolitical footprint, and strengthening its international standing. We are pursuing this systematically, professionally, and consistently. In this way, we have forged alliances that are inextricably linked and very strong. We have strengthened our defense, and we currently command a strong voice in all international fora. We are presently presiding over the Security Council. Next week, I will personally chair a series of Security Council meetings that are of critical importance to Greece. I may also have the opportunity to address issues concerning maritime security and the International Law of the Sea. Consequently, Greece currently possesses a stronger international voice. Its foreign policy is neither defined by others nor dictated by passing circumstances.
JOURNALIST: Let me turn now to domestic affairs. You have seen the reactions. There have been strong reactions from the opposition parties - most notably from Mr. Samaras, who reiterated his call for your resignation.
G. GERAPETRITIS: Mr. Samaras is, of course, free to ask for whatever he deems appropriate. After all, he is a former Prime Minister and a potential political leader. What I must say - and I believe this is self-evident to anyone who approaches Mr. Samaras’s statements with a sense of reason - is that they are driven by a profound intolerance. I do not get the impression that this constitutes criticism. If it were criticism, Mr. Tsimas, the first thing he would have done is condemn the Turkish-Libyan memorandum itself. Instead, we saw European authorities - the highest authorities in Europe - come forward to condemn the Turkish-Libyan agreement, while Mr. Samaras chose to condemn the Greek government. I am sorry, but this demonstrates that this is not a case where one is driven by national ideals. Rather, a case of one driven by hostility - a political hostility - that has nothing to do with the country’s interests. And to return to the point I began to make: when we speak of national defeats or national victories, it is wise to maintain a sense of historical perspective. You cannot equate the situation regarding the Turkish-Libyan memorandum - which produces no results; and it is worth stating this clearly and meaning it - with a defeat. Indeed, it produces no results. This is not just a figure of speech, nor is it a legalistic technicality. The Turkish-Libyan memorandum has no tangible effect, and this will be proven in practice. Therefore, when a former Prime Minister, political leaders, or political parties speak of "national defeats," the first thing they misunderstand is that our national duty is, above all, to view matters objectively. In this case, we are dealing with a memorandum that has no legal standing. There is no "national defeat." In reality, we have the full support of all our partners. Greece’s voice is strong, and we have many avenues available to respond to such actions, which run counter to International Law.
JOURNALIST: Let me stay on domestic matters for a moment and return to Mr. Fidan. Mr. Fidan makes a point in the responses he provided to Maria Vasiliou for “TA NEA” newspaper. He says that whenever we meet with Greek governments - and he doesn’t just mean yours; I assume he includes previous ones as well - we find that they know how to approach the issue, but they are unable to bear the political cost, because in the Greek political landscape, Türkiye functions like an aspirin. Without Türkiye, Greek domestic politics could not exist. In other words, he is suggesting that you do not reach an agreement with Türkiye - or move toward a compromise - because you are under pressure from the likes of Samaras or Velopoulos today, or someone else tomorrow, or someone else in the past.
G. GERAPETRITIS: I believe the first thing Mr. Fidan should do is critique Turkish policy, because it is Greece that consistently seeks to resolve differences based on International Law. It is Greece - not Türkiye - that has signed and ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Furthermore, it is Greece that advocates for referring matters to international jurisdiction. It is Türkiye that has not signed on and refuses to submit to international jurisdiction. And, since Mr. Fidan brought up this "aspirin" analogy, let me add something: I see things quite differently. What I observe is that, over the recent period - the last year or two - it is the Turkish media that have been exerting pressure on the Turkish government. I see a general escalation in the highly hostile rhetoric directed by Turkish media toward Greece. There is a constant stream of reports pushing the Turkish government to become even more aggressive. Therefore, I believe the situation has changed today. While it may be true that, in the past, Greek foreign policy was characterised by a "Türkiye-centric" focus - defined, in effect, by the other - the exact opposite is true today. Greece now follows a course guided by a compass that is autonomous, independent, and self-sufficient. It has secured the kind of foundations and alliances that mean it no longer needs to have its direction dictated by Türkiye’s policies. On the contrary, I increasingly see Greek foreign policy - and Greek policy in general - becoming a focal point for Turkish media, which exert pressure accordingly. Consequently, it would be wise to examine this "aspirin" issue from within as well.
JOURNALIST: Even if that were the case, it still wouldn’t be a good thing. I mean, it doesn’t benefit bilateral relations.
G. GERAPETRITIS: You are right. Of course - and it is worth noting - we have always tried to maintain a functional relationship, and, to a large extent, we have succeeded. We have managed to avoid any major crises over the last three years. We have succeeded in reducing - practically eliminating- the massive migration problem that once existed on the islands of the Eastern Aegean. We have managed to significantly reduce violations, and to foster a relationship that is, at the very least, tolerable - one that establishes channels of communication and helps prevent crises. This does not mean, of course, that we should compromise on fundamental issues. Our national interests represent our absolute red lines. They are not something we can deviate from, and everyone understands this.
JOURNALIST: If I may - just one last question - regarding the topic that has been discussed more than any other over the past 15 days: I am referring to the case of the American Ambassador in Athens. There is a criticism leveled at the government - which I do not find unfair - that it tolerated diplomatic conduct on the part of the U.S. Ambassador that was entirely unusual, and that the recall of the U.S. Ambassador to Washington has gone by without comment or reaction from the Greek side.
G. GERAPETRITIS: Do you believe the Greek side ought to have reacted to the appointment or recall of a foreign country’s Ambassador? Look, Mr. Tsimas, there are very specific diplomatic protocols, there is established etiquette, and there are fundamental diplomatic relations and channels. What the Greek government did was maintain a channel of communication with the American Embassy - just as it does with all foreign Embassies based in Athens. This is because the United States is not just any country; it is an ally and a very powerful force on the global stage. For this reason, we wanted - and continue to want - to keep these channels open. This has served the country’s interests; I say this with complete sincerity. It has helped us foster excellent cooperation in the energy and commercial sectors, as well as collaboration within international organizations. Greece and the United States are moving along a path that is mutually beneficial. We hosted a visit by the U.S. Secretary of State, which was, by all accounts, an absolute success. In my view, the Greek side acted quite correctly by not reacting. It was explicitly denied - within the framework of parliamentary oversight - that no threats were ever directed against Greece or the Greek government.
JOURNALIST: There have been many incidents, but yes, regarding what you are saying...
G. GERAPETRITIS: Look, Mr. Tsimas, what concerns the Greek government is not the internal dynamics between the central U.S. administration and its Embassy in Athens. What matters to us is that the relationship between Greece and the United States is governed, above all, by an approach based on equality. And at this moment, we are equal partners in this dialogue. Therefore, given that the question was answered - confirming that no threat ever existed - Greece acted entirely correctly by cooperating with the former Ambassador. It will also cooperate with the current Chargé d’affaires ad interim, with whom, incidentally, I personally enjoy an excellent relationship. And at the end of the day, what we must keep in mind is that, ultimately, what matters is the extent to which our national positions are strengthened through the Greek-American relationship. And the reality is that Greece’s position has been substantially elevated.
JOURNALIST: Mr. Minister, thank you very much.
G. GERAPETRITIS: It was my great pleasure.
JOURNALIST: Thank you for this discussion, as I believe all our listeners understand its relevance to current events. Thank you very much. We have taken up more than our fair share of your time - and of the station’s airtime - so I apologize. Good morning.
October 21, 2026