JOURNALIST: Next week we have two important meetings of EU leaders and EU Foreign Ministers. Do you expect a specific package of measures regarding Turkey’s conduct in the Cypriot EEZ? Have you talked about these measures with your Cypriot counterpart?
N. DENDIAS: We have obviously discussed the possibility of measures as well as the strategy. This was one of the reasons I went to Nicosia on Monday and this is why there was a bilateral meeting – in addition to the meeting with Egypt – between prime minister Mitsotakis and the president of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, with the two Foreign Ministers in attendance. We have a strategy ahead of the European Council meeting. A strategy for the implementation, to a significant degree, of previous EU decisions that address the issue of sanctions on Turkey for illegal actions. But precisely because we are in the stage of consultations with our partners, I don’t want to go into greater details about the actions we are taking or our objectives. But it is a strategy both sides have agreed on and it is based on ideas that serve the national interest.
JOURNALIST: You and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo signed the amendment of the Greece-U.S. defence agreement. How important is this for Greece? Whatadvantages does it have?
N. DENDIAS: First of all, it is an agreement that institutionalises something that already existed to a degree. The use of military facilities at Stefanovikio and Larissa is nothing new, and nor is Souda. But the new agreement creates the institutional framework in our relations with the U.S., and both sides are undertaking specific obligations and specific operating rules for these facilities. It doesn’t follow the example of Souda. These are facilities operating within a Greek framework and under Greek command. There is also a detailed description of the operations and a list of the type of operations to be carried out. And last but by no means least, it ensures the American presence in the port of Alexandroupoli, with all of the geostrategic implications one sees in this. This was the goal of the Greek side and the Mitsotakis government.
This agreement isn’t aimed against any third party. It is an agreement with multiple levels. The Greek level lies in the transfer of know-how from the American side through the use and operation of previous weapons systems, the creation of infrastructure and the creation of economic benefits for local communities from the operation of the facilities. There is no point in obtaining a weapon system even if it were economically feasible, as the know-how and infrastructure cost much more than the system itself. From the U.S. perspective, they are increasing their presence in Greece. On the regional level, the U.S. military presence is a factor for stability in the wider Southeastern Mediterranean region. I should also highlight that, following the briefing of the political parties, which has already been carried out, the agreement will be submitted to Parliament.
JOURNALIST: You talked to Mr. Pompeo and other American officials this summer. At that time, you talked about strategic safeguards for Greece. Do you think the U.S. can provide strategic safeguards in Greece? Or does the ambiguity of Washington’s signals regarding fronts in the wider region give rise to concern about the stance it will take in the event of turmoil in the Aegean or the Eastern Mediterranean?
N. DENDIAS: I’ll answer you candidly. Greece sees its relationship with the U.S. as one that sends a message in every direction regarding a given way of dealing with the problems in our region. What way is this? The peaceful resolution of disputes, the terms of international law and its implementation. The actors in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region have to act in accordance with the international rules. And the U.S. is stepping in and declaring that correct conduct includes the implementation of the rules of international law in favour of demilitarisation. In fact, Mr. Pompeo took it a step further. He named the “cheater” whois breaking the rules through its conduct. And he stated this directly, without hedging. Since 1974, no one has made statements like this to the Greek side. Mr. Pompeo’s stance is a service to international peace and security, not just a stance in favour of Greece. We didn’t “call for our big brother because one of our classmates was threatening us”. To the contrary, it was made clear that international law must be implemented in this “class”. On this level, Greece is very powerful. And it follows the rules and participates in the European endeavour, which is the factor par excellence for stability and implementation of the rules of international law.
JOURNALIST: Greece is a status quo country. From Turkey we are seeing conduct that is, first of all, more and more revisionist, as you have said, with gunboat diplomacy. How can these two outlooks be reconciled? How can these two countries reconcile their differences?
N. DENDIAS: Greece is a strong and confident player. We see Turkey on equal footing. If Turkey is under the mistaken impression that it is powerful and addressing a weak interlocutor, it is making a huge mistake. Greece has emerged from the economic crisis, it is growing, participating in the most advanced system of states in human history, with many interlocutors, and it is returning to the Balkans with the capability to influence. It wants to help other countries achieve what Greece has already achieved – in other words, participation in the European endeavour. Greece is a country that is truly powerful and that wants the best for Turkey – in other words, we want Turkey to reach the same level. Greece is proposing this manner of communication, and Turkey is responding in a way that was acceptable 150 years ago. But in this day and age, in the competition between these two mindsets, it is perfectly clear which will prevail. If humanity had a gunboat diplomacy mindset, we would be in the 19th century. So we explain the obvious to Turkey. That it needs to abandon the mindset that was prevalent 150 years ago. It is a fact that Turkish society is diverse due to different levels of development. Its leadership is under pressure. But Turkey isn’t going to get anywhere with its gunboat policy. And I address myself sincerely to Greek society. We should have great confidence in what we are and the message we send. We are looking Turkey in the eye and trying to convince it of what is good for it and the region. If Turkey doesn't understand, so much the worse for Turkey.
JOURNALIST: On the EastMed pipeline, we are waiting for a government in Israel, there is a new government in Italy. Do you think the plan will move ahead?
N. DENDIAS: It isn't a low-cost project, but it serves many of the EU’s objectives, including diversification of sources. It’s a project that can’t be judged with narrow economic criteria. This was another reason for my recent visit to Nicosia, and I have already visited Israel. I think we’ll be able to find common ground with the Israelis and the Italians. I had contacts with the previous Italian government. The question was where the pipeline would terminate in Italy. I’m optimistic that, in the end, we’ll find a modus operadi.
JOURNALIST: There is a fierce civil war going on in Libya. Turkey is trying to support one side. There may be behind-the-scenes communication between Libya and Turkey about decisions in the Eastern Mediterranean that impact Greece. Is Greece’s position secure in the case of an agreement between Turkey and Libya on EEZs?
N. DENDIAS: The Mitsotakis government has declared that our country is returning to all of the regions where our national and European interests are at stake. We see ourselves not just as Greece, but also as a representative of the EU, in the sense of conveying a European mindset in the region. This is the case for both Syria and Libya. I have already participated in discussions with Mr. Pedersen regarding Syria and with Mr. Salamé regarding Libya. We have told our European partners that we are willing to get actively involved in the effort to resolve these two problems. With regard to Libya, we quickly reached the conclusion that Turkey is again attempting an action that is unacceptable and in violation of international law. In other words, it is trying to persuade the government in Tripoli to delimit the EEZ, ignoring the existence of Crete, as if islands had no effect. There is no map on which Crete can escape anyone’s notice. We reacted immediately. We talked to our French friends, we talked to our Italian friends, we talked to the Libyan government itself. I met with the Libyan Minister of Foreign affairs when I was in New York. We explained to them that this is not a game. This ill-conceived approach on the part of Turkey has very little chance of success.
JOURNALIST: A number of governments have tried to determine our maritime zones. Are we close to any progress with any of the countries around us?
N. DENDIAS: We are talking with our friends Italy and Egypt. There have been lots of talks with Egypt, and they will start again. I have appointed a new committee to continue the talks with the Egyptians. President Sisi and Foreign Minister Shoukry have already said the same thing to the prime minister and myself. With the Italians we have an agreement in principle. Things are a little more complicated with Albania. But it isn't out of the question that we’ll find a solution. With Turkey, the issue is part of the overall framework of Greek-Turkish disputes. In general, because certain choices lead to side effects on other fronts, we are extremely cautious. But we are optimistic.
JOURNALIST: One of your first moves was to travel to the Balkans.
N. DENDIAS: As I said earlier, Greece is making a comeback following the crisis. Our country has a major and positive role to play in the Balkans. To help our partners in the EU, Bulgaria and Romania, which are outside the Schengen area and want to join. We want to be useful. And Greece has a leading and stabilising role to play in the Western Balkans, so that this region can gain a European perspective. And we will use all our influence towards this goal. Bear in mind that Greece’s GDP is much higher than that of the Balkan countries. What our country needs as it emerges from the crisis and projects soft power, is to make a positive impact.
JOURNALIST: Does Greece want the countries of the Western Balkans to join the EU?
N. DENDIAS: With regard to the government of North Macedonia, it is clear that they must comply fully and strictly with the obligations deriving from the Prespa agreement. This includes correct interpretation of the agreement. Because every legal text, even the most perfect and the most detailed legal text, is open to interpretation. We want to agree with the government of North Macedonia on the correct interpretation of the agreement. We want to solve the product-related problems. We want to safeguard the interests of Greek enterprises in a manner that is positive for everyone in the region. All of the provisions concerning ancient Greek cultural heritage must be complied with. And we are speaking frankly with Albania. We are asking that the rights of the Greek national minority be protected. We aren’t making any claims against Albania. Greece is a factor for stability and the safeguarding of borders. But Albania needs to understand that its European path includes protection of the European acquis, which guarantees the protection of minorities. And their property rights must be protected. The Greek national minority’s rights to their property in the wider Himarë coastal region must be protected.
JOURNALIST: Greece has traditional relations with countries like China and Russia. How can we sustain these relations based on our firm Western orientation?
N. DENDIAS: Greece has friendly relations with both China and Russia. China came to invest in Greece. It took the risk of investing in Piraeus when other companies wouldn’t. Investments in the infrastructure sector are appropriate given the disinvestment Greece suffered during the crisis. With regard to Russia, I will be meeting with Minister Lavrov. I won’t hide the fact that I would like a clearer Russian stance on the issue of the violations of the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus. We haven’t seen Russia say anything along the lines of what Mr. Pompeo said. I would like to see that happen. It is also clear that we are not pleased with the sale of the S-400s to Turkey. Nevertheless, we want to have sincere relations with the Russian Federation, and we are pursuing this. I would like to add that we have a presence in the Caucasus via our trilateral collaboration with Armenia and our relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Let me take this opportunity to also say that our country is pursuing the development of relations with countries in different areas of the globe – apart from Europe and the U.S. – such as African states and India.
October 13, 2019