JOURNALIST: You referred to cautious optimism on the Cyprus issue. Does this include a prospect for an agreement by March 2016.
N. KOTZIAS: We stand by the Cypriot government on a timeline’s not being needed. Solutions are needed. Timelines that attempt to push for solutions that have not matured, or have not been agreed upon in the manner they should be, undermine the future implementation of these solutions.
JOURNALIST: After the talks you had in Nicosia, do you see solutions as having matured to where a possible conclusion is visible by March?
N. KOTZIAS. Not at all. These months are bureaucratic perceptions. They don’t have to do with politics. We – and I, personally – want the Cyprus issue to be resolved. And to be clear, I will say the following: We suffered a military defeat in 1974 that was also due to our own criminal mistakes. Through diplomacy, we are trying to heal the wounds that were created, but diplomacy is not the same. It can create a new situation in which wounds of a military nature can be healed.
So we need to have a certain realism that this solution is not a solution that can be imposed by those of us who want it, promoting only what we would like. It is a compromise solution. In my opinion, a compromise solution has two characteristics. First, the Turkish Cypriots must feel that this is their island, that they and their children have a future here and that their dreams can have to do with this space. Second, the Greek Cypriots must dream that, when they wake up and open their window, they will not see, on the hill opposite, a Turkish flag, whether in stones or fabric. That is, they must feel security. Thus, here we have an exchange between rights and a sense of security. Not that rights aren’t needed for the Greek Cypriots or that the Turkish Cypriots don’t need to feel secure; naturally they do, but I pose the whole issue in the simplest form.
JOURNALIST: How does this transpose into practice?
N. KOTZIAS: I think that now we have a unique opportunity for a solution of the Cyprus problem; a solution that has to do with the generation of politicians. The impression I gained from Akinci, when I met him ten years ago, at Oxford, is that he is a person of which the Cypriot identity is a component part. In 2005-2006, I was in Oxford as the co-founder of the South East Europe programme. Amartya Sen observed correctly in one of his books that people have a variety of identities, which have a core identity, but they have a variety of identities that they project in the most disparate ways. People have a variety of identities. Akinci feels Turkish Cypriot, he feels a link with Turkish culture, but he also has an identity as a Cypriot. It is indicative that he reads Greek, he can communicate in Greek, while the next generation of Turkish Cypriots probably doesn’t have such a sense of Cypriot identity or knowledge of Greek and Greek culture. So today is a very good moment in a time that is coming to an end. And we will either open a new door to transform this time, or I don’t see it as easy for there to be another opportunity in the future. Second, it is the will of the Cypriot people and the Cypriot political leadership. And third, we have a leadership in Greece that wants to help the solution, without getting involved where it shouldn’t.
JOURNALIST: Does the European acquis add uniqueness as a parameter for a solution?
N. KOTZIAS: That parameter exists and will continue to exist.
JOURNALIST: In the talks you had in Cyprus, have you moved ahead to formulating the proposal for abolishing the existing system of guarantees?
N. KOTZIAS: We have to abolish the system of guarantees, and not only the existing one. There cannot be a system of third-country guarantees to which the Republic of Cyprus is subject. I’m saying that it is an outdated system, a system that has been violated by Turkey and that does not take into account the change in Cyprus’s position in the global system. Cyprus is not a state that is in the process of being founded and whose mode of founding will be decided by Turkey. Cyprus is a state that exists and that judges Turkey, because Turkey has applied to become a member of the EU, and one of the judges is Cyprus. So a state that is judging Turkey cannot be subject to guarantees. At the same time, however, it is crystal clear that we are living in a region with great instability, with many, many risks, and the populations should feel secure, and I include in these populations the two communities and the three small minority groups. Consequently, what Cyprus needs is a system of security for the population and the state within the international system. An element of this is that it is an independent and sovereign member state of the UN and the EU, but there are also other elements that we are shaping.
JOURNALIST: Could the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, for example, take on the security of Cyprus is a transitional stage?
N. KOTZIAS: I would say that the member states of the Security Council have a creative role to play in ensuring an independent and secure Cyprus. Additionally, you have to keep separate security in the transitional period and security in the period after the transition. There is a methodological difference in the evolution in the specific case and in the existence of the phenomenon afterwards. We will draw up texts on this issue.
JOURNALIST: Could the Cyprus problem be resolved without the inclusion of resolution of issues in the Aegean?
N. KOTZIAS: The Cyprus issue is a separate problem and a urgent problem. It can and must be resolved. The Aegean doesn’t have a problem. Turkey is making claims and instigating a problem, while it has already caused the Cyprus problem through the illegal occupation. The one can be resolved without the other, and the Cyprus problem takes precedence. There are views that say that all of the problems have to be resolved together and, in fact, not just that we should resolve all of the problems together in one country, but that we resolve all of the problems that we have with all of the countries at the same time. These are understandable desires. Methodologically, you resolve, first of all, those problems that are mature and on which you have a partner or collocutor across the table who wants to solve the problem. The Cyprus problem is illegal occupation, violation of UN rules. It is in the midst of a resolution process and must be resolved. We are in talks with Turkey on the issues in the Aegean. The problem that we are aware of is the delimitation of the continental shelf. It is a problem of another nature from that of the Cyprus problem, even if the same revisionist solutions are concealed behind them. But the two problems are different in nature.
JOURNALIST: In view of the visit from your U.S. counterpart, John Kerry, will Greece’s becoming a reception point for U.S. natural gas be discussed?
N. KOTZIAS: Let me put it this way: We want Greece to become an energy hub. This will strengthen our geopolitical position and our economy. In this context, whatever can benefit our position and economy is welcome. Russian pipelines, too, are welcome, but it appears that they won’t all reach Turkey. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is welcome; it will carry gas from Azerbaijan. LNG is welcome, and that’s why an LNG station will be built in northern Greece: to strengthen the vertical pipeline towards Bulgaria, Romania and, possibly, to Serbia and other countries. Additionally, there is also other natural gas that will be at the disposal of the global market, and in this I include Iran, which has natural gas as well as oil, but lacks the necessary technology for processing it right, and Greece is a good place for this. We will have the natural gas from the Kurdish regions of Iraq, as well as from Iraq itself. We have the LNG from Algeria and from Qatar, which has the best technological knowhow on this system, and we also have all the natural gas of the Eastern Mediterranean. To all of this we will have to add the fact that the U.S. will start exporting cheap natural gas in 2016.
JOURNALIST: How is the new state of affairs being used?
N. KOTZIAS: All of this has two advantages. First, that, if we capitalize on it correctly, strategically speaking, we will be able to sell it ourselves, and, second, that there will be a significant reduction in the price of the natural gas used by our economy, as well as by the Cypriot economy, so it will facilitate competitiveness. I am hostile to the theory that says that a country’s competitiveness is cheap labor forces, low wages and curtailing of the social state. I have described in my books that there are ten formulas for bolstering competitiveness. The three strongest, with the best prospects, of the ten competitiveness strategies are development of high-cost manufacturing, with a high level of specialization, high technology, highly specialized workforce. In my government’s opinion, as well as in my personal opinion, that is where we have to look. But to get there, we need some transitional tools, like the cost of loans, the cost of electrical power production, and so on. Germany isn’t where it is just because it is good at organization, but because it has the cheapest loans. It’s loans today are at even a negative interest rate of -0.2%. Private companies that, in the past, were paying 7-8% interest have fallen to 1-1.5%, which means that they have a competitive advantage due to the manner in which they manage debt. So we, too, need to find competitive advantages, and one of those is natural gas.
JOURNALIST: In your talks with the U.S., is there also the prospect of cooperation of this kind.
N. KOTZIAS: The U.S. always raises issues of enrichment of pipeline routes with its collocutors. It is very, very interested in the TAP’s being completed and the vertical pipeline with Bulgaria and Romania being put in place. They have never mentioned the sale of their natural gas, but I think in their way they imply it.
JOURNALIST: The fact that Greece has yet to declare its exclusive economic zone creates a vacuum in the region.
N. KOTZIAS: Greece has declared many EEZs, with Italy, Libya, Egypt, Turkey.
JOURNALIST: With Egypt?
N. KOTZIAS: We have agreed and we have technical groups exploring the EEZ issue, but an agreement is needed there, too, an exploration with Libya. We have some “triangles” that overlap.
JOURNALIST: As with Turkey …
N. KOTZIAS: The problem is more complex with Turkey. We are waiting for a new government to be elected so we can see if there is the same desire for a solution, or at least discussion, of the problems as there was with the previous government. I hope it is the case.
November 1, 2015