N. STRAVELAKIS: These are the latest developments. Now let’s welcome in SKAI TV’s studio, together with Pavlos Tsimas – good evening Pavlos – the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nikos Dendias, whom we have the honour and pleasure to have with us. Good evening Minister.
N. DENDIAS: Good evening.
N. STRAVELAKIS: It has been a long time since you gave an interview. Thank you for that.
N. DENDIAS: A long time.
N. STRAVELAKIS: This has been a day full of new developments regarding the war in Ukraine and its economic consequences and implications. Let’s begin with Putin’s threat, the ultimatum he sent to the unfriendly countries, as he now calls the European countries, that starting tomorrow all payments will be made in rubles otherwise all gas supplies will be halted, although he leaves a door open in the decree he has issued.
I would like to ask you, do you consider this to be part of the Russian President’s tactics? Is he toughening his stance, is he sending a message? Is he playing his trump card – his last card – or is it something else?
N. DENDIAS: First of all, it is too early to have the full picture. But the decree leaves a door open, as you rightly observed, concerning payments in Euros etc. I believe it makes sense for President Putin to attempt to exert pressure on the European Union countries. On the other hand, it is no news that the European Union has stated that it will not give in to blackmails and threats.
P. TSIMAS: The European Union has made no statement on this. Several countries have done so, but the European Union has made no statement.
N. DENDIAS: I assure you that this is the Council’s decision, and since I have attended Councils for three consecutive years…..
P. TSIMAS: And what Councils they were, right?
N. DENDIAS: The Council of the EU and the European Council, the Council of Heads of States and Governments, are entirely at one on this.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Does this move indicate that Putin is under great pressure? I mean, things are not going well for the Russian army. Many claim that this negotiation and all that he does are tactical moves to buy him some time. But a pressured Putin might be a dangerous Putin, who will move to the next step, and then to the step after that, and then at some point he may realise the nuclear threat, as his own people in the Kremlin warn.
N. DENDIAS: Look, I hope things will not go that far.
N. STRAVELAKIS: All of us…
N. DENDIAS: My French colleague Jean-Yves Le Drian gave an interesting interview to France 24 TV, and they asked him exactly the same question you asked me. Things did not go the way the Russians expected. This proves what a huge mistake it is to invade an independent country. Beyond that, Minister Le Drian said President Putin may be trying to take advantage of a break in hostilities in order to regroup his forces. He also said that it remains to be seen whether he will seek an honourable exit, which is something we all hope for; meaning, a cease-fire agreement first, withdrawal from Ukrainian territory and then engagement in a serious negotiation. Or whether this is a prelude to a new Russian military operation. No one can know.
P. TSIMAS: No one can know. But what he is doing now, this game with the ruble, seems to be yet another attempt to exert more pressure on the European Union countries. He seems to be saying: “Leave Ukraine alone, get out of the game. Stop supporting Ukraine, or else the price you are going to pay will be too high”.
N. DENDIAS: Mr. Tsimas, this cannot happen, it just can’t. It has become a matter of principle for all democratic countries. The issue at stake here is not just Ukraine, it is much broader. A dividing line has been drawn, and it concerns principles, not geography. The fact that there are some talks about the neutralisation of Ukraine, meaning Ukraine not joining NATO, is a concession to Russia's need for a sense of security, after failing at this endeavour. Beyond that, however, Ukraine must be safeguarded and the West can no longer leave it to its own devices, regardless of the pressure it will receive from President Putin or any other party.
P. TSIMAS: However, there is a great difficulty that you and your colleagues and we and our colleagues are having in understanding exactly what the Russian President wanted, what his objectives are and what he is thinking. I have the impression that Mr. Dendias, if I remember correctly, was the last Western Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit Moscow and hold talks with Mr. Lavrov before the storm broke out.
N. STRAVELAKIS: You met with Mr. Lavrov on February 18, the invasion started on February 24.
N. DENDIAS: Six days before the invasion.
N. STRAVELAKIS: You must have been the last one.
P. TSIMAS: From what I can recall, you stated that he assured you he would not do what he did.
N. DENDIAS: I have the impression that my interlocutor had no knowledge.
N. STRAVELAKIS: You are saying that Mr. Lavrov did not know?
N. DENDIAS: I believe so, but this is my own assumption. Since he gave these assurances, it is not at all clear to me that……
N. STRAVELAKIS: What else did he tell you, can you disclose it? Because what has become known…
N. DENDIAS: It is always inappropriate for Ministers of Foreign Affairs to disclose what the other side has said. This cannot happen.
N. STRAVELAKIS: No, I’m not asking for details, you are right. I’m asking if the feeling you got from that meeting was that they will not invade and what was Russia’s plan at that particular time.
N. DENDIAS: I will tell you how I perceive this. I reiterate, I am not entitled to refer to what the other side said.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Yes, in that regard. I am asking about the impression you got.
N. DENDIAS: At the time the Russian side was using the term 'strategic ambiguity', they also used it at the meeting with Liz Truss, who confirmed it to me afterwards when I met with her. That is, a deployment of Russian forces and exerting pressure on the border area of Ukraine, so that Russia could lead Ukraine, through pressure and ambiguity about the intentions of the Russian army, to take certain decisions sought by Russian foreign policy. That was the rationale, the overall concept as I perceived it from the Russian side.
P. TSIMAS: And Lavrov himself may have been taken aback by this development.
N. DENDIAS: However, the truth is that what Russia did, whether Lavrov knew it or not, is so outrageous and unacceptable in the 21st century, so much beyond all reason, that one cannot but condemn it in principle right away, draw a thick red line and say that this is not tolerated, period. And that is what Western democracies have done, and rightly so.
N. STRAVELAKIS: More than a month has passed since the day of the invasion. At the time Putin had stated what his objectives were: denazification, demilitarisation. What we understood was that in fact he wanted to overthrow Zelenskyy and occupy or control Ukraine the same way he managed to control the Crimea within a few days. Everything has changed since then. As we stand now, at the point where negotiations are, what do you think lies ahead of us? Are there any steps taken that can lead the two sides to an agreement within days, weeks, or are there several weeks or months of war lying ahead of us?
N. DENDIAS: Mr. Stravelakis, I cannot guess.
N. STRAVELAKIS: From the facts that you see.
N. DENDIAS: It is common belief that the Russian side made a huge mistake. It assumed that the Russian army would be welcomed as a liberator and that the Zelenskyy government and the Ukrainian state apparatus would fall to pieces. That was the Russian working assumption on which the operation was carried out.
N. STRAVELAKIS: This is no longer the case.
N. DENDIAS: This did not happen. Let's go to where we are now. Some faint signs seem to appear: for instance, the agreement according to which Ukraine may concede in principle not to join NATO. However, it is up to Ukraine, and nobody else, to decide as a sovereign country whether to make any concessions in the negotiations with Russia.
Our obligation, the moral obligation of the Western world, is to support Ukraine and the Ukrainian people in their huge efforts to defend their dignity and independence. This is what we need to do.
If they themselves decide that it is possible, in the context of the negotiations with Russia, to come to certain agreements, it is obvious that we will support them, but we cannot lead them towards making concessions. We should not. It would be completely unethical and, if you will allow me to put it in practical terms, it would be contrary to the long-standing positions of Greek foreign policy, for which International Law, territorial integrity and the opposition to revisionism are the “Holy Gospel”.
P. TSIMAS: If part of a compromise agreement is Ukraine recognising that it has lost Crimea, that Crimea officially belongs to Russia and that the territories that have been occupied, namely Eastern Ukraine, Donbas, will become independent or will be annexed to Russia, then I do not think that the Greek side, Athens, will be pleased with this development; even if it would mean the end of war.
N. DENDIAS: I reiterate, I do not think the Ukrainian side will end up conceding to the annexation of Donbas to Russia. There may be a status of autonomy, with some enhanced rights, but this is a working assumption. I do not know. I reiterate, what does or does not make the Greek side happy is of little importance. If you ask what would have made me happy, it would be if this would have never happened, if absolute respect had prevailed: Russia would have continued to follow the path of rapprochement with the European Union, the path of convergence towards the European way of life and would have become part of the European security architecture. And all these events would have been just a bad nightmare from the time we'd wake up. But we have entered a different world.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Since you talked about a nightmare and a different world: as Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, what is it that scares you, what is the issue that concerns you the most about this new world that is emerging?
N. DENDIAS: Everything. I do not hide from you, Mr. Stravelakis, what we are going through is very distressing. However, I will begin with the positive aspects, since this should always be the way to begin.
What are the positive aspects? It is the fact that democracies as a whole are opposed to revisionism taking a perfectly clear and unequivocal stance, regardless of sacrifices and despite blackmails.
For Greece, this is a particularly important acquis and this is the reason why, in addition to our principles if you like, we support it wholeheartedly.
It functions as a quasi-shield for our own interests, our own future and constitutes a step towards creating a much more coherent Europe than it is now.
N. STRAVELAKIS: This is the positive aspect. What is your concern?
N. DENDIAS: The negative aspect? It is to experience war in Europe in the 21st century, and with civilian casualties at that. Did anyone expect this? Were these our hopes at the dawn of the 21st century? For goodness’ sake!
P. TSIMAS: There is a theory going around since the outset of this war, especially in US media, which is constantly outlined, you may be aware of it as well: that in fact what Russia does in Ukraine is to hold a country hostage in order to blackmail the West, especially the United States, into engaging in a negotiation, a 'grand bargain' that will end up in a new deal, a new sharing of the world.
N. DENDIAS: Russia is a very large country. As regards its territory, it is the largest on the planet. A country that always has a role to play in developments, is always an international player in all the crucial issues that concern humanity. What would be of importance is Russia to become an interlocutor in terms of competition as regards its exports, its technology, and its huge cultural offering that constitutes its legacy to humanity.
What is utterly inconceivable is the way Russia chose to reopen this discussion: by using guns, tanks and by slaughtering civilians. In all sincerity, all this is utterly inconceivable to me - why? Because Russia made this choice despite having other adequate options. And, if you like, for these adequate options it had the support of a number of countries that aligned with it, to a lesser or greater extent.
P. TSIMAS: During the time when all the efforts were being made, talks were taking place, when Macron was visiting Moscow again and again, was making telephone calls again and again, when Chancellor Scholz was doing the same, what was our stance? Were we....?
N.DENDIAS: We were positive.
P. TSIMAS: Yes, we were in favour of…
N. DENDIAS: We were in favour of doing the same as we are doing with Turkey. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis had lunch with President Erdoğan. Our view is that there should always be channels of communication maintained, open channels of communication. Let’s face it, there is no other way. If you do not discuss, you do not get results.
N. STRAVELAKIS: You mentioned Turkey and I would like to ask you a question, which I imagine you were expecting.
N. DENDIAS: Did I say something I shouldn't have, Mr. Stravelakis?
N. STRAVELAKIS: No, I assume you were expecting it.
N. DENDIAS: You are helping us to open the next chapter.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Since you referred to revisionism and bearing in mind that the whole world is opposed to Putin’s revisionism, I suppose you were thinking of Erdoğan’s revisionism as well. This is a word that you have repeatedly used to describe the policy he is pursuing.
N. DENDIAS: Yes.
N. STRAVELAKIS: So, I’m asking you this: we are facing a Turkey which has gone from troublemaker to peacemaker, but, in order to undertake this role, is aided by the fact that it does not implement sanctions. Turkey is sailing on two boats even if it is a member state of NATO. What do you think?
N. DENDIAS: Right. First of all, I believe that no one can sail on two boats in the long term. They will eventually fall.
Furthermore, I believe everybody has taken notice of the fact that Turkey has not imposed sanctions, regardless of whether they strongly undeline it or merely put it as a footnote. Everybody has taken notice, I assure you.
P. TSIMAS: But they tolerate it.
N. DENDIAS: Indeed, they tolerate it precisely because of the current situation, because we cannot afford having too many fronts open, it is as you say. And if you ask me if I am pleased with this, I am giving you a straight answer: no, I am not pleased with the fact that they tolerate it.
But, on the other hand, we need to be clear, without wanting to “buy” the best version for us. The Turkish revisionist narrative, as a case in point, has suffered a heavy blow. Policies seeking to revise Treaties and disregard the principle of the territorial integrity of States have suffered a severe blow internationally and Turkey has understood this very, very well, I assure you.
There is an evident change of tone and shift of priorities in the rhetoric of Turkish officials. Turkey had been a country which markedly employed revisionist policies whether in Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, or its intervention in Libya. And all of a sudden this narrative appears to have no moral justification internationally.
And I suspect that Turkey looked to - perhaps at the level of Presidents, President Erdoğan secretly admired President Putin as the strongman who imposes his will. The cancellation of this policy in Ukraine - because no matter what happens, this power policy has been cancelled in Ukraine, it is over - so whatever happens from now on, Turkey has realised that its revisionist narrative has failed.
P. TSIMAS: I will dwell on this, because you are giving an interesting answer. On February 25, the day after the invasion, I remember we were all wondering, how does Erdoğan perceive what is happening, how does he see it? If a Great Power like Russia can impose its will by force on a neighbouring country in the name of its deep-rooted conception of history, how does Erdoğan perceive that? And we really were scared of the possible answer to this question.
A few days later we asked ourselves the exact opposite question: If Erdoğan is watching the whole world, the Western world, Europe and the USA standing up to the revisionist endeavour by a Great Power like Russia, then how much ground should he give or to what extent can he afford to have revisionist aspirations? On the other hand, this may be a very optimistic view.
N. DENDIAS: Maybe, but President Erdoğan is an astute politician, he would have not survived politically for twenty years if he weren’t. He is aware, despite the effort he makes to portray himself as an unpredictable player, he is very well aware of the international climate. And I predict that Turkey will try to change the way it promotes itself, not its positions - in fact, I am not that optimistic, I wish I were - but the way it promotes its positions, so that it does not find itself out of place with the international climate that has been created.
P. TSIMAS: I must insist: it's a question that I imagine has reached your ears too. We, who work in the media, hear citizens asking this question every day. Is Turkey's policy shrewder than ours? In other words, does this policy of “sailing on two boats” or “standing with one foot and a half on one boat and half a foot on another” suddenly turn Turkey into an international player, while we, who play by the book and follow a policy of principles, gain nothing?
N. DENDIAS: Mr. Tsimas, first of all I have to say to you that indeed I’ve been told the same thing several times as you have also been told. And for a minute you may wonder, “could this be true?”. And they used exactly the same expression you mentioned: “playing by the book”.
P. TSIMAS: Meaning a policy of principles.
N. DENDIAS: Yes, a policy of principles. First of all, I believe that those who play by the book do not necessarily lose. I believe that playing by the book is a perfectly good way to move ahead.
Second, in the main, the worst thing that Greece can do is to try to imitate Turkey, or to become an “anti-Turkey”.
Greece has its own policy, which is not defined by the policies of others because this is the position of our society and this is something that serves the country and its interests.
Greece has chosen to have a European future. The worst thing ιt could have done would have been to disassociate itself from the European Union, to break the consensus. Then we would have really been put in the corner, and we would have tarnished our image as upholders of principles that we have been shaping in the last years.
N. STRAVELAKIS: So, I understand from what you describe that you hope, that you are optimistic, that this new role of Turkey and this new international situation will make Turkey less impudent, more restrained, more careful, right? Less provocative.
N. DENDIAS: First of all, if Turkey perceived itself like Russia, considering us to be like Ukraine, I think that such a comparison would be completely wrong. Let us be clear about that.
P. TSIMAS: Yes, Turkey is not Russia and we are not Ukraine, that’s right.
N. DENDIAS: We are not Ukraine and we are perfectly able to defend our national rights, right? Let us be clear so that no such ideas are entertained beyond the Aegean, which may not be helpful.
Beyond that, however, yes, I believe that Turkey will be forced, due to the international environment itself, to tone down its revisionist rhetoric and essentially cancel any real revisionism in the foreseeable future.
The international community does not tolerate interventions …
N. STRAVELAKIS: In the foreseeable future you say.
N. DENDIAS: The international community does not tolerate interventions.
N. STRAVELAKIS: But is Turkey changing? And I ask this because following the meeting between Akar and Panagiotopoulos, Akar talked about ‘a fair settlement in the Aegean’. Only yesterday there were 50 violations over the Aegean.
The Turkish state television, as reported by Manolis Kostidis this morning, makes an issue of the military parade in Samos, on March 25th. I mean, is Turkey really changing? Or will it just tone down its rhetoric, but the content will remain the same?
N. DENDIAS: Yes, I have no delusions, Mr. Stravelakis, I do not expect that tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, Turkey will change its stance radically, no. I want to be honest about that too.
As I said to you, the most I can hope is the toning down of its rhetoric and, as regards the Turkish political system, the containment of its revisionist ambitions.
Now, if the very essence of Turkish foreign policy can be gradually changed towards a more European and democratic approach and a cordial rapprochement with Greece, which would have brilliant results for them and us, then this is something that remains to be seen.
But I'm not optimistic that this will occur tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.
P. TSIMAS: It will not happen tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but do you see an environment in which Turkey can find -because I have been hearing diplomats saying this for years- motivation to understand what is in its interest, to resolve these long-standing differences with Greece, to abandon its irrational claims and reach an agreement - a compromising one of course - with Greece?
In recent years, we had the feeling that Turkey has no incentive to do so. Is it having one now?
N. DENDIAS: In my opinion, whether Turkey itself understood this or whether it is the internal situation that forces President Erdoğan to ask for 51% of the vote and therefore the support of the far-right parties through a nationalist agenda against all logic – then that’s a different issue. That was indeed the case.
In my view, and I say this honestly, the interest of Turkey and Turkish society is to converge with the European Union, which is its more powerful neighbour, economically speaking. But if now, in this new framework, Turkey sees this more clearly, then I will tell you that it will help in that direction.
The model of the other approach has collapsed: that is, a President like Putin, who by force of arms can impose his will wherever he wants. This is something that has collapsed. Will the Turkish political system properly realize it? I cannot tell you, but I hope this thing will happen, I told you again.
In the beginning, as you asked me, there was fear of Erdoğan acting in mimicry of Putin. I think we all know now that there is no role model.
N. STRAVELAKIS: However, as you know, there is the less compromising side that says “look, we are proud of a Turkey in the role of peacemaker”, a Turkey which has done what it has done in Cyprus, a Turkey which gives lessons and says how Russia and Ukraine will reach a compromise, while what Putin did in Ukraine is exactly the same as what Turkey has done in Cyprus.
N. DENDIAS: Although that may sound extreme, it is not false, I want to be honest about that as well. It is obvious that Turkey invaded Cyprus, in violation of International Law, period. And if it wants to talk about guarantor powers, etc., then it should have already withdrawn. The fact that it remains on the island with an occupying army constituted the grossest violation of International Law in Europe until the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That is the plain truth.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Can this new reality facilitate Turkey to take advantage of the situation as regards the United States and the issue of sanctions?
N. DENDIAS: It will try.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Today, for example, Çavuşoğlu referred again to this matter and said: “I think they will give us the F16 jet fighters, they can no longer hide behind the Congress”. You understand what he means…
N. DENDIAS: Yes, yes …
N. STRAVELAKIS: You understand that he means the ambiguity about the sanctions. And “in any case if they do not continue with this, we have ... the S400 missile defence systems”, Çavuşoğlu says. Do you think that Turkey will try to play this role with the United States, to get the F16 jet fighters so that the sanctions are lifted, even if it has Russian missiles?
N. DENDIAS: Turkey will try something more than that; it will try to get the F35 fighters. And if it fails at this, it will return to the F16 jet fighters, arguing cunningly that “if we are not given the best, give us at least something”.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Can Turkey succeed in that?
P. TSIMAS: Do you feel that they can do it? I mean the US side could ...
N. DENDIAS: I think that the Legislatures of the United States have a clear picture.
Despite the great usefulness of Turkey to the United States at this juncture, even without imposing full sanctions, the contacts I have had - and I have had many, both with senators and members of the House of Representatives - allow me to say that I have a clear picture.
But let us be honest, our own effort is required as well, right? If we expect justice to be given to us by God alone ...
P. TSIMAS: Now, there is a particular aspect to this problem, which has come to the fore. For years, energy reserves, natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean, had been almost forgotten or they had become of secondary importance. The latest developments are enhancing, somehow, their importance again. These reserves are regaining their great value, obviously at European level.
I understand that Turkey made an effort both by approaching Israel and by trying to reach out to Egypt, in order to heal the wounds that it itself had caused in previous years and to establish a new project, namely a new pipeline that will run from Israel through Turkey to Europe, instead of the EastMed you were discussing.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Erdoğan said that today.
P. TSIMAS: That leaves Greece out of the energy route.
N. DENDIAS: Just a minute, I have taken notice of it; this is not the first time that President Erdogan has said such a thing.
N. STRAVELAKIS: That is what Erdoğan said today.
N. DENDIAS: Yes, it sounded more as a wish list to the Israeli side and less as a project that is ready to begin.
First of all, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, I am not allowed to comment on issues between other countries, right? Between Israel and Turkey, let's say. But as an observer, not as Foreign Minister, I would have a small question to ask.
There are two possible routes for this pipeline to go from Israel to Turkey. One is through Syria, with which Israel has the relations it has, so this is probably out of the question. The other one is through Cyprus, which Turkey denies its legal existence. So, there is an issue here.
P. TSIMAS: Yes, how will it go through? What is the realistic option right now? What is the option that Greece can realistically pursue, so that the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean - with the participation of Greece - can become a transition fuel, a transition source of energy for Europe?
N. DENDIAS: There are several alternatives. The EastMed route, whether a pipeline route or a cable route, remains on the table because, if you remember, it had not been ruled out by the US prior to the crisis. That comment of a US official had to do with the pipeline, and not with the route or the cable. In the same document, as regards the cable, he was absolutely positive with the same route, which is the geopolitical argument; because the geopolitical argument concerns the route. He was referring to the cost which is the economic argument.
The other alternative is the Greek-Egyptian Agreement, which may concern the transportation through either a pipeline or a cable.
P. TSIMAS: Where are we in relation to Egypt? I notice that Egypt, of all the countries with which Erdoğan had a fight in previous years and he is now trying to make amends with, is the only country that he hasn’t achieved it yet.
N. DENDIAS: Egypt pursues a firm policy of principles.
N. STRAVELAKIS: You were there on Monday.
N. DENDIAS: I was there, it was the eighth time I went there. And, frankly, I am extremely proud of the level of relations that the Hellenic Republic has with Egypt; I am extremely proud.
Egypt has emerged as an absolutely reliable and very serious partner for Greece.
P. TSIMAS: There is a thorn in all this, the famous "Turkish-Libyan memorandum", the delimitation ..
N. DENDIAS: Yes.
P. TSIMAS: Because any route from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe goes through the area Turkey and Libya have delimited between them.
N. DENDIAS: Right, right.
P. TSIMAS: So?
N. DENDIAS: Mr. Tsimas, let us be clear at this point and allow me to say this without any interruptions and with absolute clarity.
The Greek-Egyptian Agreement, which I had the honour to negotiate and sign on behalf of the Mitsotakis government and the Hellenic Republic, is of existential importance for Greece and allow me to say, of existential importance for Europe as well, precisely for the reason you mentioned: because it constitutes a potential energy link between Europe and Africa.
There is no way Greece can allow this Agreement to be questioned. There is no way, regardless of circumstances.
P. TSIMAS: Is there a possibility of cancellation of this Agreement within the framework of this cordial understanding that you mentioned previously?
N. DENDIAS: This Agreement constitutes a model…
P. TSIMAS: I am not talking about the Greek-Egyptian Agreement; I am talking about the “memorandum” between Erdoğan and Libya.
N. DENDIAS: You know, regarding that I would say the annulment of the non-existent is an interesting legal endeavour both for us and for every person with a basic knowledge of UNCLOS and the Law of the Sea, just a basic knowledge. You do not need to be a keen scholar.
This "Turkish-Libyan memorandum" is ridiculous. It is preposterous, it does not exist.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Minister, in the light of new developments, can EastMed as it was originally planned, the project the Americans put in the freezer, be put back on the table? You were in Egypt and you definitely discussed that, as well.
Considering the good relations of Greece with all countries, Turkey has been lately negotiating with Israel, not with Egypt; it is trying its best, as Pavlos said. So, in light of these developments, can the EastMed project come back to the fore now that Europe is in need?
N. DENDIAS: Mr. Stravelakis, this is an economic project. Politically speaking, we have discussed the matter of the route previously. As an economic matter, it has to do with its economic viability, gas prices and cost...
N. STRAVELAKIS: But now we have one more reason, we need natural gas.
N. DENDIAS: Right, right. But then again, we need to assess the new gas prices and the new needs.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Could Turkey be engaged in any way, I mean this Turkey that you described?
N. DENDIAS: A Turkey that would have abandoned revisionism, that would wish to become part of the system ...
N. STRAVELAKIS: A Turkey hat would meet the specifications you say.
N. DENDIAS: That would be desirable for everyone; both for Turkey and for everyone. We do not want to expel Turkey from the international stage, we do not want to exclude it, we do not want an enclosed and phobic Turkey.
We want a Turkey that is a rational player in the international system, within the framework of principles, values and legality. I wish that. And I never stop hoping that one day a Greek Foreign Minister will talk with this Turkey.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Now, we have very little time. Concluding, I would like to refer again to Ukraine and to the initiative you have already announced to participate in a humanitarian mission to Mariupol.
And I would like to ask; today forty-five buses set off for Mariupol, but I do not know how this mission is going to end…
P. TSIMAS: We still do not know that, yes. Let’s hope.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Where does this initiative stand and where do your talks with Zelenskyy -who thanked you publicly - stand? You actually have invited him to speak before the Hellenic Parliament next Thursday.
N. DENDIAS: The Prime Minister invited him.
N. STRAVELAKIS: The Prime Minister and Greece, our country, the government. And you have an open invitation to travel to Kyiv.
N. DENDIAS: Yes, I will do that.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Will you go?
N. DENDIAS: I will go, yes, as soon as Mr. Kuleba returns, he is not there now. He does not always state where he is for obvious reasons; of course, I will travel to Kyiv. But we are also very interested in the coastal part of the Black Sea, that is, the part that, historically, Greek populations have existed, flourished and continue to exist today.
P. TSIMAS: Let me ask you something, do you feel that we did what we could for these people? Because, apart from the fact that there were Greek citizens there, I mean people with Greek nationality, or Greek citizenship, there is a large population of Diaspora Greeks who feel they are Greeks.
N. DENDIAS: They really feel they are Greeks. Look, I do not hide from you that for us it is very sad what happened, very sad. I'm sorry that there was no way we could prevent this.
We tried in any way we could. I went there on time, I did so. Why did I go? To indicate and strengthen our presence there. We tried to strengthen mechanisms with our own small economic means; I asked what I asked from the Russian side during my visit to Russia. The reason, if not the main reason, of my visit to Russia was to point out that there is a population there that they need to pay attention to.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Over 100,000 people.
N. DENDIAS: And they are not just there, right? They are also in Kherson, they are also in Odessa, where there are historical buildings inextricably linked with modern Hellenism, and there is also a Greek Diaspora.
During the siege and occupation of Mariupol, the Russian side violated every rule of humanitarian and International Law. It shelled residential areas, there were casualties, many casualties, hundreds of thousands of victims among civilians.
It was extremely difficult for us to bring our Consul back home from there. What can one say?
N. STRAVELAKIS: Pavlos, one last question.
P. TSIMAS: He has not told that…, you have not told this story. That is, the evacuation of the Consul, who demonstrated heroism and self-sacrifice, that is, he stayed there when no one else stayed in Mariupol.
N. DENDIAS: And that was by his own choice, not by order. I have to say that to his credit. When the last "Nostos" operation headed by the Ambassador, Mr. Kostellenos, left Mariupol I initially urged the Consul to leave, to follow and then see what would happen.
N. STRAVELAKIS: And he stayed, eh?
N. DENDIAS: He preferred to stay. And also, and I want to say that to his credit, he did not leave without the Ukrainians who were in the same shelter as him. He refused the offer to leave alone.
N. STRAVELAKIS: A real hero.
P. TSIMAS: And it must have been an ongoing negotiation to ensure a safe corridor for him.
N. DENDIAS: A negotiation with all sides and under adverse conditions. We were just lucky because my visit there the previous days permitted me to have knowledge of the building, the specific building, the existence of an adequate shelter and to timely have him removed into this building, where there was a shelter that provided protection, because the area was shelled.
N. STRAVELAKIS: Minister, thank you very much.
N. DENDIAS: I thank you very much.
N. STRAVELAKIS: I think you have given answers to all the questions that have arisen since the last time you spoke.
N. DENDIAS: I am very worried, Mr. Stravelakis. A politician is a good interlocutor when he does not answer anything.
N. STRAVELAKIS: You answered all our questions.
P. TSIMAS: Not all, because certain issues were not brought up, obviously, but thank you very much.
N. STRAVELAKIS: And I hope to see you in Kyiv and for the Greek initiative to have results and for everything to proceed in a positive way for the country.
Thank you very much.
April 1, 2022